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ABSTRACT 
 
In what ways is Pentecostalism a catalyst or an inhibitor of congregational and 
congregant civic engagement among U.S. Latinos? And how does this compare to other 
religious traditions, specifically Catholicism, Evangelicalism, and Mainline 
Protestantism?  
Against the backdrop of recent social scientific debates about social capital, civic 
skills, and civic engagement, this dissertation considers the U.S. Latino Pentecostal 
community to see whether in fact some of the most disadvantaged members of society 
(immigrants, the urban poor, single mothers, minorities, and others) actually gain civic 
skills and opportunities for civic engagement within and beyond the walls of the church, 
skills and opportunities that ultimately contribute to the health of society. Now that the 
Latino community is the largest ethnic minority in the U.S., understanding the power and 
transformative potential of this community is more important than ever, particularly when 
it disrupts stereotypes and assumptions.        
 Under girding my research is the dataset collected in the last few years through 
the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino 
Religion of the University of Notre Dame. In this study, a random stratified sample of 
100 Latino congregations was chosen from a universe of 606 Latino congregations. 
Eighty-two of the one hundred churches participated in all of the data collection phases 
(leadership interview/survey, self-administered leadership survey, adult survey, and 
xiii 
 
youth survey). Twenty-six of the thirty-two Pentecostal churches participated in the 
study. 
 To answer the research question of this study, I develop typologies of Latino 
Pentecostal congregations, and of congregational and congregant civic engagement, 
being careful to identify the congregation type effect on the civic engagement behavior of 
congregants. Finally, I compare the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations with the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline 
congregations and their congregants.  
 The dissertation argues that Latino Pentecostal congregations, depending on a 
variety of reasons such as demographics, congregant place of origin, and leader’s 
education, can either be very conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, or 
progressive and this-worldly—in addition to many other options along this continuum. 
Such findings are particularly important given the common social scientific research 
assumption that Latino Pentecostal congregations are generally conservative, inward- 
looking, and otherworldly. After surveying a representative sample of Latino Pentecostal 
churches in Chicago, I found all Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are 
engaged both within the walls of the church and beyond their walls in the community and 
in society. The difference among the different types of churches is not whether they are 
engaged or not; rather, their differences have to do with their intensity and focus of 
engagement. In fact, significant numbers of Pentecostal churches are involved in 
providing social services such as the distribution of food, clothing, emergency financial 
help, and job placement to their members and the surrounding community while others
xiv 
 
 participate in protests and marches, such as the immigration marches that recently swept 
the country. Still other congregations connect their members and the surrounding 
community with structured networks of social services provided by nonprofits or the 
government while still others partner with nonprofits to provide health fairs, basic 
educational services, and financial and economic development training. 
 This research confirmed the existence of “traditional” and “progressive” 
congregations, and the newly emerged “neo-conservative” Pentecostal church. The 
“traditional” church is the home of the disfranchised of the Latino community, while the 
other types are quickly becoming the places of worship for the upwardly mobile in the 
community. “Progressive” congregations are very progressive in all ways except for 
moral issues (all Latino Pentecostal churches were found to be very religious and very 
morally conservative), while “neo-conservative” churches are also progressive, but 
diminishingly so. Surprisingly, “traditional” churches are not the inward-looking and 
otherworldly churches many people believe them to be. Although they have significant 
limitations, they are active at all levels of engagement, and, with a few exceptions, rival 
“progressive” churches in their progressive stances.  
 In summary, there are different types of Pentecostal congregations and those 
differences are reflected in their civic engagement behavior. “Progressive” and 
“traditional” Latino congregations are not just leaders in civic engagement among 
Pentecostal but also among Latino churches from all faith traditions. “Neo-conservative” 
congregations are, on the other hand, somewhat less progressive than their “traditional” 
counterparts and share similarities with Latino Evangelical churches.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Opening 
 
It was a beautiful late afternoon in a small village in a country of Central 
America. The footsteps of forty or fifty people became audible as they approached the 
colorful cemetery where the ceremony was to take place. Sons and grandchildren carried 
on their shoulders the coffin holding the remains of Ms. Josefina and as they approached 
the grave site the weeping of Ms. Josefina’s oldest daughter (seventy-five years of age) 
became uncontrollable and the sobbing in the crowd widespread. Although Ms. Josefina 
had been born to a rural land-owning family, she had endured her share of hard times 
before she died at the age of ninety four. After giving birth to eight children, Ms. Josefina 
was widowed at age thirty four and never remarried, raising her children on her own. 
This sad afternoon her children and the children of her children had come to mourn the 
death of the matriarch and to see her one last time.  
 
As the casket approached the grave site, one by one the family members gathered 
around it, and the oldest son, a former alcoholic and womanizer turned Pentecostal 
pastor, began the ceremony along with Rev. Maria, Ms. Josefina’s pastor. The homily 
focused on heaven as the resting place for those who like Ms. Josefina believed in Jesus 
and lived a devout Pentecostal life. The pastor emphasized the hope with which Ms. 
Josefina had lived of one day going to be with the Lord; he challenged the audience to do 
the same so that one day they too could go to be with the Lord and see Ms. Josefina once 
again, but this time  in heaven. As Pastor Carlos concluded his remarks, Rev. Maria sang 
the song Ms. Josefina most loved… 
 
Más allá del sol  
   Más allá del sol  
  Yo tengo un hogar, hogar bello hogar 
  Mas allá del sol  
 
Well beyond the sun 
Well beyond the sun 
I have a home, a beautiful home 
Well beyond the sun 
 
Aunque en esta vida, no tengo riquezas  
Se que allá en el cielo, tengo mi mansión  
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Although during life, I did not enjoy wealth 
I know that in heaven I have a beautiful home 
 
Más allá del sol  
Más allá del sol  
 
 Well beyond the sun 
 Well beyond the sun…(song translated by Norman E. Ruano, 2007) 
 
Although a sociologist of religion might have concluded that this ritualized event 
was simply a familiar manifestation of Pentecostal otherworldliness, the fact is that Ms. 
Josefina left a very complex legacy to her family. For over thirty years, Ms. Josefina had 
indeed been a very devout Pentecostal; even though she was illiterate, she had mastered 
the Bible and the Pentecostal oral traditions. She had been responsible for the conversion  
to Pentecostalism of the majority of her children and a sizable portion of her extended 
family.  
 
However, Ms. Josefina had also lived a very civically engaged life; she had been 
an aggressive and fearless social activist, a grass-roots neighborhood activist in the 
capital city. After an earthquake leveled many of the poor suburbs of the capital city, Ms. 
Josefina, along with other neighborhood activists, fought tirelessly day and night to get 
the government to provide homes, health clinics, schools, and basic water and electric 
services to the victims. When the earthquake crisis was over, Ms. Josefina continued the 
fight for the poor, organizing them to take over vacant city lots to force the government to 
address their housing needs. She also organized protests, vigils, and direct 
confrontations with the security forces to address insecurity, police brutality, and 
arbitrary increases to public bus fares, among many other issues—all of this in the midst 
of one the bloodiest civil wars in Latin American history.    
 
That afternoon in August, after her oldest daughter (one of the few non-
Pentecostals in the audience) hugged the casket, whispering her Catholic prayers 
obscured by the sounds of the weeping crowd and the Pentecostal songs, the casket was 
lowered into the grave. As Ms. Josefina’s sons slowly sealed the grave, one of the 
grandsons—a sociologist and Pentecostal who had been deeply influenced by his 
grandmother’s life and who saw her as a model for social commitment—playing in his 
mind the movie of his life experiences with the grandmother who raised him, could not 
stop thinking of the weight of the matriarch’s legacy: a deeply committed Pentecostal and 
a fearless social activist, a lover of Jesus and his teachings, and a tireless defender of the 
poor.     
 
The life story of Ms. Josefina represents the very essence of what this dissertation 
is all about. As I have studied Pentecostals, particularly U.S. Latino Pentecostals, for 
more than a decade, I have wondered many times whether Pentecostalism is an inhibitor 
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or a facilitator of civic engagement. Is Ms. Josefina the exception to the rule when it 
comes to civic engagement, or does she exemplify a poorly understood aspect of 
Pentecostalism? Was Ms. Josefina a social activist that converted to Pentecostalism and 
simply did not let her religion get in the way, or is civic engagement a key aspect of the 
Pentecostal ethos? Do we even have evidence through which to tease out these realities?  
 Although the Pentecostal movement traces its origins to the early 1900s, only one 
hundred year ago, it is quickly becoming a global phenomenon of gigantic proportions.    
Until recently the numbers of Pentecostals around the world have been a subject of timid 
or wild guesses. However, a recent global study of the Pentecostal and Charismatic 
movements by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2006) confirms what many 
have been guessing but were unable until then to demonstrate with data. In the Americas, 
the study shows, twenty percent of Guatemalans, fifteen percent of Brazilians, nine 
percent of Chileans (none of the previously mentioned in the U.S.), and five percent of 
Americans claim to be Pentecostal, a total in those countries alone of more than 40 
million people (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 2). When the 
percentage of Charismatics (both Catholic and non-Pentecostal Protestant) are added to 
the Pentecostal figures, sixty percent of Guatemalans, thirty percent of Chileans, forty-
nine percent of Brazilians, and twenty-three percent of Americans, more than 150 million 
people in only four countries of the Americas, claim to be Pentecostal or descendents of 
Pentecostalism through the various Charismatic movements (Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life, 2006, p. 2).  
The same study also claims that fifty-six percent of  Kenyans, twenty-six percent 
of Nigerians, thirty-four percent of South Africans, forty-four percent of Philippinos, and 
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eleven percent of South Koreans claim to be either Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 2). These numbers document the emergence 
of a huge and quickly growing religious movement that has altered the landscape of 
world Christianity and has the potential of very soon becoming the largest strand of 
Christianity worldwide.   
  Although Pentecostalism has been present in the U.S. from the movement’s very 
origins in the early 1900s, especially among racial minorities and the lower classes, more 
recently different expressions have been imported into this country by immigrants 
particularly those of Latin American descent. Among U.S. Latinos, Protestant 
Pentecostalism (not taking into consideration the Catholic Charismatic movement) is 
growing dramatically becoming an influential force in Latino barrios throughout the 
country. Gaston Espinoza and his colleagues (2003, p. 15) found that 4.5 million Latinos 
identified themselves as Protestant Pentecostals (twelve percent of the total U.S. Latino 
population), and an amazing sixty-four percent of all Latino Protestants in the country. 
Given that the majority of Latinos in this country originate from Catholic Mexico, this is 
indeed astonishing. This trend is partly fueled by the continued immigration flow from 
Central America (particularly in the last twenty-five years) with its high rates of 
Pentecostal affiliation, but is also a result of immigrants’ continued defection from the 
Catholic church once on U.S. soil.   
As the Pentecostal movement and its derivative movements have traveled the 
Americas and the world, they have also increasingly become an important social, 
economic, and political force especially among the poor and disenfranchised (Martin, 
1990, 2002; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; Stoll, 1991). Besides understanding the 
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religious underpinnings of this gigantic movement, the challenge for sociologists is to 
also understand its political and social implications for the world, the societies and 
communities where it is present, and ultimately for the individuals that profess it.   
General Literature Review 
This dissertation, therefore, seeks to understand some of the social and political 
implications of Pentecostalism by studying the intersection of Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement. Recent research has started to shed light on the centrality of religion to civic 
engagement in the United States and around the world (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Smidt, 
2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007), but considerable more research and discussion is 
needed.  
But what is civic engagement? For Robert Putnam (1995, p. 665) civic 
engagement is “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not merely with 
politics.” Robert Wuthnow (1988) defines it as behavior understood by actors as 
engaging and maintaining the civic order in pursuit of the common good. Loveland 
(2005, p.142) goes further and proposes that civic engagement is “individuals working 
toward a shared vision of a good society, and engaging in the social, public acts that are 
required to achieve the desired ends while at the same time submitting to the basic 
authority of a yet more broadly shared civic culture.” More specifically, Loveland adds 
that much civic engagement is directed at causing change (2005, p.142).   
The civic engagement debate started in the 90s and continues on its course today. 
It is actually part of a larger debate over what is happening to American democracy 
(Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). According to Skocpol and Fiorina, there seem to be many and 
recent contradictory changes in American democracy, some of which “have clearly 
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enhanced democracy and others undercut our shared public life” (1999, p. 1). The fact is 
that even when U.S. democracy has become more inclusive significant numbers of 
Americans seem to be drawing back from involvement with community affairs and 
politics—being less civically engaged (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 2).  
Although a lot of the groundwork for studying such civic engagement had already 
been put in place by the work of James Coleman (1988) who dealt with issues of social 
ties and culture and brought to the academic spotlight the concept of “social capital” 
(defined as social ties and shared norms that can enhance economic efficiency and help 
individuals to become better educated, find jobs, amass economic capital, raise well-
socialized children, and make careers), it was Robert Putnam who made the social capital 
and civic engagement debate a hot national topic (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999).  
In Bowling Alone (2000), Putnam argued that social capital and civic engagement 
were fundamental for democracy and had been major components of the life of the 
United States, but that the country has experienced a sharp decrease of social capital as of 
late. In fact, instead of joining churches, unions, clubs, and many other voluntary 
associations, Americans were now doing things alone, individually, as a result of 
declining social trust and the unraveling of social connections (Putnam, 2000).  Although 
Putnam has been critiqued for using unreliable data sources for some of his claims, and as 
a result of a Durkheimian perspective of focusing too much on the issue of trust (Skocpol 
& Fiorina, 1999), his book, and the subsequent movie, sparked the fire of debate which 
has resulted in the proposal of competing perspectives that seek to shed light on the very 
essence of social capital and civic engagement.    
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 While the “social capital” approach (Putnam, and others) focuses on the 
socialization of individuals into shared norms and cooperative societal action, the 
“rational choice” approach focuses on the ways in which institutions and organizations 
create incentives for individuals to engage in various kinds of behavior (Skocpol & 
Fiorina, 1999). The “rational choice” scholars (Coleman, Fiorina and others) are indeed 
skeptical about the benefits of involvement in public affairs. Another approach, the 
“historical institutionalist approach,” (Skocpol and others) deemphasizes trust as 
fundamental for democracy and proposes that conflict and distrust produced democracy 
in the first place (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). Consequently, voluntary associations matter 
as sources of “popular leverage, not just as facilitators of individual participation and 
generalized social trust” (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 15).   
In the end, the majority of analysts agree that American democracy is going 
through important changes that have affected civic engagement and, as a result, now it is 
often the most privileged citizens who are organizing and directing the democratic 
apparatus. In light of this, it is essential to look again at the eternal concerns of power and 
inequality especially as they relate to the most disenfranchised in society (Schlozman, 
Verba, & Brady, 1999).     
The social capital and civic engagement debate and the empirical work conducted 
to address it has found that religion plays a fundamental role in this matter (Wuthnow, 
1999, 2004; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Schlozman, et 
al., 1999; Ammerman, 2005; Cnaan, 2002; Chavez & Higgins, 1992; McRoberts 1999, 
2003; Smidt, 2003; Wood, 2002). Above all, it has become clear that “civic involvement 
has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its religious 
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organizations“ (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 331). Although some questions are being raised about 
modern religion’s capacity to produce civic engagement beyond the walls of the church, 
the reality is that there is still a consistent relationship between the two (Wuthnow, 1999; 
Smidt, 2003). A recent study by the Institute of Latino Studies at the University of Notre 
Dame found that for Chicago Latinos, church membership (thirty-three percent of the 
Latino population of the city were church members) is the main form of community 
organizational membership (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3).  The authors 
concluded that “it is clear that church membership is an important pathway into faith 
based social action groups, the second most cited form of organizational membership in 
Chicago” (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3).   
Although the relationship between religion and civic engagement is 
unquestionable, it plays out differently in various religious traditions. As has been 
extensively documented, there has been a decline of Mainline Protestant religion, a 
religious sector that has been on the vanguard of religious civic and social involvement, 
while Conservative Protestant religion has experienced dramatic growth, a sector 
characterized by less civic and social involvement at least beyond the walls of the church 
(Wuthnow, 1999).  The author (Wuthnow, 1999) is careful to clarify that it is not that 
Conservative Protestants do not become civically engaged at all; instead they are more 
inclined to become engaged in the local congregation. Although this is still civic 
engagement, it is limited to within the walls of the church and has little impact in the 
wider society (Wuthnow, 1999, pp. 345-46).  
 Even with the differences already outlined, there is no doubt that congregations in 
general provide opportunities for participants to develop civic skills that are transferable 
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to the world beyond the walls of the church, including the political arena (Wuthnow, 
1999; Verba et al., 1995). Verba and his colleagues even argue that religion is one of the 
few places left in civil society where the inequalities so obvious in the population in 
terms of education and income are radically reduced and where citizens, especially the 
seriously disfranchised from society, have a more even participatory field (1995). In fact, 
Wuthnow (1999) found that volunteering is very important for people active in religion 
and although Evangelicals tend to participate less in nonreligious organizations, thus 
limiting their civic skills mainly to the environment of religion, they were as likely as 
other religious people to participate in politics.  
 Besides providing opportunities for congregants to develop civic skills and offer 
opportunities to use them inside and outside the walls of the church, congregations 
themselves have also been very active in providing social services both to their 
congregants and the communities beyond their walls (Ammerman, 2005; Chavez, 2004; 
Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wuthnow, 
2004; McRoberts, 2003). In many instances, congregations serve as a greatly needed 
safety net for populations (immigrants and other populations in need) that do not have 
access to other safety nets (Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002).  
 How about Pentecostalism and civic engagement? Up until recently very little 
work had been done on Pentecostalism and civic engagement. In 2007, Donald Miller 
and Tetsunao Yamamori published the most complete study on the topic. In Global 
Pentecostalism, the authors argue that there are different types of Pentecostalism(s) and 
that one of the growing types is “progressive Pentecostalism” (2007). Although this 
strand of Pentecostalism recently emerged, its dynamic civic engagement is evidenced in 
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the width and depth of the social services it provides to its members and the community 
at large and with a one-person-at-a-time model deals with numerous social problems 
(Miller & Yamamori, 2007). Miller and Yamamori are generally positive about the civic 
engagement among “progressive Pentecostals,” but they also emphasize that there are 
significant numbers of Pentecostals who are “other-worldly” and do not become civically 
engaged and that even “progressive Pentecostals” are just now beginning to address 
structural social problems because of their inclination to stay out of the political arena 
(2007).  
While Miller and Yamamori focused on the civic engagement of Pentecostalism 
outside the United States, Greeley and Hout in a recent study about white U.S. 
Conservative Christians concluded that Pentecostals are the “super-conservative 
Christians of the American religious landscape” (2006, p.163). However, the authors 
were pleasantly surprised to find out that when it came to voting, Pentecostals were more 
inclined to vote for Democrats—not that the majority voted for Democrats—than is 
generally the case among other Conservative Christians in this country (Greeley & Hout, 
2006, p. 171).   
Even though there are no congregational studies that focus exclusively on 
Pentecostal congregations, other congregational studies that had as part of their sample a 
few Pentecostal churches have provided some understanding of the intersection of 
Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement. The work of McRoberts (1999) among 
“activist” Pentecostal churches in a northeastern city found that several African American 
Pentecostal churches became “activist” churches mainly as a result of visionary leaders 
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who had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement and who still continue to take their 
social role very seriously.  
Some of this work has also started to shed light on Latino Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement. Kniss and Numrich (2007), McRoberts (2003), Cnaan, Hernandez, and 
McGrew (2002), and  Wood (1994), while looking at congregations in specific localities 
(Cnaan and colleagues in Philadelphia, for instance) and as part of larger samples of 
congregations, found that Pentecostal congregations, including Latino Pentecostal 
congregations, were important parts of the congregational life of the geographical areas 
of study. McRoberts (2003) looked at African American and Latino Pentecostal 
congregations in a neighborhood and analyzed “if” and “how” they became active in the 
community; he found that the majority of congregations provided social services to their 
members while some provided services to both members of the community and their own 
members. A few congregations were found to be very active in the community engaging 
the social, economic, and political structures at play in the neighborhood (McRoberts, 
2003).  
Qualitative work on three congregations by Richard Wood (1994) also shed some 
light on the political participation of congregations, one of which was Pentecostal. From 
his results, Wood (1994) concluded that Pentecostal congregations are not very likely to 
actively participate in direct political action because their meaning structures made them 
look in other directions.  
In another study, Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), while studying the 
provision of social services by congregations in Philadelphia, found that the majority of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations they came across provided a very diverse array of social 
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services both to their members and to the community at large. In fact, it was documented 
that these churches provided more services to community members at large than to the 
members of the congregation.  
These studies show the existence of different types of Pentecostal congregations 
as they relate to civic engagement. While some congregations are “activist” (McRoberts, 
1999), others provide social services to their members and the community at large 
(McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002), and others simply do not get 
involved in direct political action (Wood 1994). 
Research Question 
Although more and more research is being conducted on religion and civic 
engagement, mainly through the lens of congregational studies, the intersection of 
Pentecostalism, particularly Latino Pentecostalism, and civic engagement is still poorly 
understood. With a few exceptions (McRoberts 1999, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & 
McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood 1994; Miller & Yamamori 2007; Greeley 
& Hout 2006), there are few studies that have looked at the subject. It is important to note 
that only McRoberts (1999), and Miller and Yamamori (2007) focus exclusively on 
Pentecostal congregations while the other studies have in their samples some Pentecostal 
congregations.  
To date, there has been no comprehensive study of Latino Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement that compares different strands of Pentecostalism and their civic 
engagement practices with those of other religious traditions. Both the McRoberts (1999) 
and the Miller and Yamamori’s (2007) studies are up to the present the most 
comprehensive work on the subject, but they either mainly focus on other places but the 
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United States (Miller & Yamamori, 2007), or focus narrowly on Pentecostals of one 
community (McRoberts, 1999) preventing a comparison among the various racial and 
ethnic groups and Pentecostals with other faith traditions.  
Furthermore, Miller and Yamamori exclusively focus on progressive Pentecostal 
congregations and fail to do a comprehensive comparison between those and other types 
of Pentecostal congregations (2007). By using a qualitative approach, Miller and 
Yamamori (2007) are also not able to provide a concrete picture of the prevalence of 
civic engagement within Pentecostalism in comparison to other faith traditions.  
While Cnaan and colleagues (2002), and Greeley and Hout (2006) used 
quantitative approaches, the former only focuses on social services provision and not on 
other types of civic engagement, while the latter, in a few pages, compares the morality 
and voting behavior only of exclusively white Pentecostals with other Conservative 
Christians in the U.S.  
Even though some work has already proposed typologies of Pentecostal 
congregations as it relates to civic engagement (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 
1999), the model used is static—a Pentecostal congregation is deemed classical, 
progressive, or activist—which fails to take into account the evolutionary path of many 
congregations. Namely, it is possible that a classical Pentecostal congregation might, in 
the not too distant future, become a progressive one. In previous research I have 
conducted, I have found that some progressive congregations split from their classical 
origins because they were dissatisfied with their lack of engagement in the public square 
(Ruano, 2007). 
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Furthermore, very little research (with the exception of Cnaan, Hernandez, & 
McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007) has looked at Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement in the context of immigrant communities in the United States. The “mature” 
democratic system of this country offers immigrants a variety of opportunities for civic 
engagement while engulfing them in an individualistic consumer-driven culture. 
Therefore, is migration a variable that inhibits or facilitates civic engagement? How, if at 
all, does this variable affect Latino Pentecostalism’s civic engagement? 
Despite the fact that a significant number of Latino Pentecostals are poor, 
immigrants, single mothers, and women in general, including people with low levels of 
education, there is no research that has looked at the opportunities that exist in Latino 
Pentecostal congregations to develop civic skills and how those skills are potentially 
transferred to the individual’s life and community outside of the church including the 
public square. This is an important area of research because it has the potential to 
illuminate the role Pentecostal congregations play as potential contributors to the 
development of human and social capital for the disenfranchised.  
I also think is it important to question certain assumptions underlying some of the 
religion and civic engagement literature. For instance, even though Wuthnow (1999) is 
careful to indicate that being involved in the congregation and its activities is still civic 
engagement, there is a tendency to argue in favor of engagement in the public square as 
the only socially beneficial type of engagement. I would suggest, instead, that civic 
engagement both inside and beyond the walls of the congregation is beneficial to society 
because it develops the stock of social capital in individuals. In fact, for many people in 
congregations, civic engagement may be an evolutionary process. By being involved in 
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their churches and the ministries and programs they offer, congregants may develop civic 
skills and an awareness of themselves, their communities, and their environment. Some 
may choose to engage their communities and society through congregational and other 
religious organizational means, while others may choose to do so directly through non- 
religious means. I would, therefore, argue that within-church engagement may actually 
serve as a stepping stone into other forms of civic engagement. Furthermore, I would 
propose that choosing to engage communities and societies through congregations or 
religious means does not have any less societal or individual value than choosing to do so 
through non-religious means—one is not any less than the other and both have the 
potential of addressing some of the most pressing issues in society, even the ones that are 
structural or systemic in nature.     
Finally, there is not a lot of research that sheds light on the effect of specific types 
of congregations on the social perceptions and civic engagement behavior of Pentecostals 
in general let alone on Latino Pentecostals. Are Pentecostals who belong to progressive 
Pentecostal congregations as opposed to classical congregations more or less engaged 
inside the congregations, in their communities, and even the public square? 
In summary, the lack of research on the various aspects of Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement, particularly Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, may in fact 
result in blanket statements and conclusions about a huge movement that spans the world 
and includes hundreds of millions of people—a movement that some research (Miller & 
Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999; Ruano, 2007) suggests is quickly diversifying even 
in its civic engagement practices. So we must ask to whom Greeley and Hout are 
referring  when they conclude that Pentecostals (in this case U.S. Pentecostals) are “ultra-
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conservative Christians”—with the caveat that they do not tend to vote as Republican as 
their Evangelical brethren—or  “fundamentalist” or simply “otherworldly conservative 
Evangelicals” (2006)? Which Pentecostals are they talking about? Are they talking about 
classical, progressive, or other types of Pentecostals? Are they including them all? The 
lack of research on the subject and the way some of the research was conducted does not 
readily allow adequate answers for these questions.          
Therefore, I propose that it is imperative to identify the different strands of 
Pentecostalism and whether that affects the congregations’ and their congregants’ civic 
engagement practices. In other words, it is important to know why and how Latino 
Pentecostal congregations and their congregants get civically involved and if there are 
different patterns of engagement (for instance, some emphasize more within-church 
engagement while others community and public square engagement) for the different 
types of churches and their congregants. Given the fact that a significant number of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations are located in immigrant barrios with high levels of 
poverty and other social problems and given that their members are largely members of 
the surrounding communities, it is also imperative to understand the types of civic skills 
and civic engagement opportunities afforded to the congregants and whether they 
translate into engagement outside the church, and if so, under what circumstances. 
Due to the limitations in the study of Pentecostalism, Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement, and Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, in particular, this 
dissertation attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature. The dissertation deals with 
how different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations get civically involved, how those 
different types of congregations influence their congregants in the development of civic 
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skills and civic engagement behavior, and how the civic engagement of different types of 
Pentecostal congregations compares to the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, 
Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant churches.  
I use “evangelical” as a separate category for comparison to test whether, in 
regards to civic engagement, Pentecostals and Evangelicals are in fact different. Although 
in the non-Latino religious context, Pentecostals are a small minority of the 
“Evangelical” tradition, in the Latino context Pentecostals are the majority making it 
necessary to study the movement and its followers in their own right and uniqueness and 
in relation to Latino Evangelicals. The fact is that in the Latino context Evangelicalism 
has been greatly influenced by Pentecostalism and not necessarily the other way around, 
as is the case in the non-Latino context (Espinoza, 2004).    
So What? 
In light of the decline of Mainline Protestantism as of late and the concomitant 
decline of the dynamic civic engagement that characterized it while other forms of 
Conservative Protestantism that are not as inclined to civic engagement in the public 
square are on the rise (Wuthnow 1999), a systematic understanding of Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement would show if “progressive” and other strands of Pentecostalism can 
actually fill the void left. This is especially important for the Latino community of the 
United States. Besides experiencing unprecedented demographic growth rates, this 
community is also experiencing significant religious landscape changes away from 
Catholicism towards Pentecostalism—mainly from a dynamic migratory flow from 
countries that have high levels of affiliation with Pentecostalism and from conversion 
once on U.S. soil (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).     
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Because Pentecostalism since its very origin has been the refuge for significant 
numbers of the disfranchised of the world (although this reality may be changing 
according to Miller and Yamamori, 2007) including the poor, the uneducated, 
immigrants, women in general, single mothers, gang bangers, drug users and abusers, and 
people that suffer  all kinds of social and individual dislocations (Brusco, 1995; Chesnut, 
1997), a systematic understanding of Pentecostalism and civic engagement would show 
whether, in fact, Pentecostal congregations are also important sites for the development 
of social capital for those that most need it. Are they places where the inequalities so 
obvious in the population are radically reduced and where people, especially the seriously 
disfranchised from society, encounter a more even playing field (Verba et al., 1995)? 
More important, systematic research on the intersection of Latino Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement would clarify if Pentecostal congregations are indeed places that 
provide opportunities for congregants, including the disfranchised, to develop civic skills 
that can ultimately help them address the multitude of social problems in their 
communities and that can even be used in the political arena (Wuthnow, 1999; Verba et 
al., 1995).  
Given the precarious financial situation of many disenfranchised sectors in society 
and particularly in the Latino community (immigrants, single mothers), a systematic 
understanding of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their civic engagement would also 
allow us to understand how they provide social services to their members and the 
communities around them serving as a social safety net otherwise not available to many 
people in urban barrios.    
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Finally, by comprehensively studying Latino Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement, we would be able to understand whether Pentecostal congregations serve as 
facilitators or inhibitors of the integration of Latino immigrants into the mainstream of 
U.S. society. Do they promote an education and a work ethic that produces upward 
mobility and that is aligned with U.S. economic values? Are Latino immigrants that 
belong to different types of Pentecostal congregations more effective at integrating into 
American society than those that are not church members or those that attend 
congregations of other religious traditions?    
My Claim  
 Present academic research on Pentecostalism generally divides it into historical 
sub-movements (classical Pentecostalism, neo-Pentecostalism, the Charismatic Renewal) 
and proposes (with a handful of exceptions, Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 
1999; Ruano, 2007) that the congregations and the respective congregants of each of 
these sub-movements are monolithic in belief and civic engagement practice, portraying 
the majority generally as being inward-looking and otherworldly, and thus not very 
concerned with civic engagement beyond the walls of the congregation. I propose, 
however, that there are different strands of U.S. Latino Pentecostalism, even within what 
would be considered classical Pentecostalism, that see their role in the world differently, 
resulting in different modes of civic engagement both by congregations and their 
congregants. In fact, while many U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations and their 
congregants are indeed very conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, others are 
progressive and even activist, outward-looking, and thisworldly, and other potential 
options along this continuum.   
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In order to address my research question(s) and to test the validity of my thesis, I 
develop a typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations emphasizing how congregations 
are dynamic, not static, and change through time and under different circumstances—for 
instance, a classical Latino Pentecostal congregation can become a progressive 
Pentecostal congregation. I also propose a typology of congregational civic engagement 
that takes into consideration various modes of civic engagement both inside and outside 
the walls of the congregation. 
I then analyze the factors and the conditions under which different Pentecostal 
congregations (a comparison between different types of Pentecostal congregations) 
become civically engaged and the types of civic engagement in which they, as 
organizations, get involved in—from addressing the needs of individuals to dealing with 
the needs of communities that surround them to tackling systemic, structural forces in the 
society around them. I also analyze the various ways, both formal and informal, in which 
different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations provide their congregants with an 
opportunity to develop civic skills, and how different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations through their religious or nonreligious practices inside and outside the 
walls of the congregation may ultimately affect the civic engagement behavior by their 
congregants within the church and beyond the church walls. As a result, I develop a 
typology of congregant civic engagement. 
Finally, I compare Latino Pentecostal congregations with Latino Evangelical, 
Mainline Protestant, and Catholic congregations in relation to civic engagement. In the 
U.S., the tendency is to include Pentecostals under the umbrella of Evangelicalism 
(Smith, 1998), but I will test to see if by studying Pentecostal congregations in their own 
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category important differences (as they relate to civic engagement) are found when 
compared to Evangelical churches. At the same time, based on the civic engagement 
experience of different Latino Pentecostal congregations, I analyze whether the present 
dualistic Conservative Protestantism versus Liberal Protestantism framework used by 
some sociologists of religion (Wuthnow, 1999, 2002) needs revision to include a 
Moderate Protestantism component.   
Plan of Dissertation 
 In chapter two, I review the relevant literature regarding social capital and civic 
engagement, religion and civic engagement, and Pentecostalism and civic engagement. I 
pay special attention to the literature that deals with typologies of congregations and 
congregational civic engagement, congregants and civic engagement, and the effects of 
specific types of congregations on the civic engagement perceptions and behavior of the 
congregants. I also review the literature that deals with U.S. Latino Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement emphasizing comparative literature that deals with the civic 
engagement of various religious traditions. In the end, I identify and outline the 
shortcomings and the gaps in the literature as they relate to religion and civic engagement 
and Pentecostalism/Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement.  
 In chapter three, I review the methodology used for this study. This dissertation 
mainly uses the dataset generated by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted 
by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion of the University of Notre Dame from 
2003 to 2007. From the universe of 606 Latino congregations found in Chicago, a 
random stratified sample of one hundred Latino congregations (defined as congregations 
with more than fifty percent of Latino congregants in traditional Latino neighborhoods 
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and thirty percent or more of Latino congregants in new Latino dispersion areas of 
Chicago) was chosen. The sample was stratified on the basis of the faith traditions found 
in the Latino community, Catholicism, Pentecostalism, Evangelicalism, and Mainline 
Protestantism. The stratified sample included thirty-two Pentecostal congregations. 
Eighty-two (N= 82) of the one hundred churches participated in all of the data collection 
phases (leadership interview/survey, self-administered leadership survey, adult survey, 
and youth survey). Twenty-six (N=26) of the thirty-two Pentecostal churches participated 
in the study. This dataset of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants is by 
far the most complete Latino Pentecostal dataset ever collected in the U.S.  
  I then complement the quantitative data with qualitative data from three different 
Latino Pentecostal congregations representative of the typology of Pentecostal churches 
developed in the dissertation. The qualitative data was collected using participant 
observation, focus groups, formal and informal interviews, and content analysis.  
 In chapter four, using the congregations as the unit of analysis, I hypothesize a 
typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations and test it using cluster analysis. I then 
extensively discuss the religiosity, demographics, and social and political perspectives of 
the different types of Pentecostal congregations indentified. I conclude with further 
research questions and issues and concerns about the findings.   
In chapter five, I develop a theoretical typology of civic engagement and test, by 
use of descriptive statistics, its relationship to the different Latino Pentecostal churches 
identified in chapter four. The objective is to show that there are different strands of 
Pentecostalism and that different types of U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations engage 
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in different types of civic engagement, dispelling the perspective that Pentecostal 
congregations are generally monolithic in their civic engagement or lack of it.   
 In chapter six, I outline how U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations serve as 
facilitators for the development of civic skills that can ultimately be used in local 
communities and the political realm to address social concerns. I also show how the type 
of Pentecostal congregation an individual attends affects his/her civic engagement 
behavior both inside and outside the congregation. 
In chapter seven, I compare the civic engagement practices of U.S. Latino 
Pentecostal congregations with those of congregations of other Latino religious traditions 
focusing on Latino Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic congregations. 
Ultimately, I identify in this chapter the similarities and differences that exist between 
congregations and tease out whether they result from culture, social context, from 
religious tradition, or from a combination of all of these. Finally, I also address the 
dualistic theoretical Liberal/Conservative framework generally used by sociologists of 
religion to describe the religious landscape in the U.S., and question whether indeed the 
experience of U.S. Latino Pentecostals provides compelling evidence for the modification 
of this framework.      
     In chapter eight, I summarize the main arguments and contributions of this 
dissertation and outline the implications of the findings for the study of religion and civic 
engagement, and Pentecostalism/Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, and 
propose future research while identifying key questions still in need of answers. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 
Besides the already well-known demographic transformation of the U.S. 
population by Latinos in the last decades, there is another transformation that has not 
until recently received much attention—the transformation of the nation’s religious 
landscape. A study by the Pew Hispanic Center concluded that “religious expressions 
associated with the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements are a key attribute of 
worship of Hispanics in all major religious traditions—far more so than among non-
Latinos” (2007, p. 3). The authors of the study conclude that practice of this distinctive 
form of Christianity is transforming the nation’s religious landscape (Pew Hispanic 
Center, 2007, p. 3). 
Latino religion is experiencing a move away from Catholicism (whereas 74 
percent of the foreign-born adult Latino population identifies with Catholicism, this 
dramatically drops to only 58 percent of the native born) and into Protestantism (Pew 
Hispanic Center, 2007, p.12). On the other hand, while only 16 percent of foreign-born 
Latinos identify with Protestantism, 26 percent of the native-born do so (Pew Hispanic 
Center, 2007, p.12). The majority of Latinos (70 percent) that identify themselves as 
Protestant also identify themselves as born-again or Evangelical, but more importantly, 
57 percent identify themselves as “renewalists”(an umbrella term used by the Pew 
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Hispanic Center that refers to both Pentecostals and Charismatics)—31 percent self 
identify as Pentecostal and 26 percent as Charismatic (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31). 
In contrast, less than 20 percent of non-Hispanic Protestants identify themselves as 
“renewalists,” Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31). What is 
even more revealing is that the majority of Hispanic Catholics, 54 percent, also identify 
themselves as Charismatics while only around 10 percent of non-Hispanic Catholics self 
identify in this manner (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31).  
The implications of these trends to U.S. religion are monumental. By now a third 
of all Catholics in the U.S. are Latinos and the Pew Hispanic Center projects that their 
share will continue to grow dramatically (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 3). At the same 
time, as Catholic Latinos turn more and more to renewalism and Protestantism and those 
that convert to Protestantism turn more and more to renewalism, both Pentecostal and 
other Protestant Charismatic, the American religious landscape will surely see a turn 
towards renewalism in the years to come.      
 Consequently, the religious, social and political implications of this Latino turn 
towards renewalism, especially Pentecostalism, must be seriously studied. Although 
Latinos are by now the largest ethnic minority in the country (46.1 million) and have 
made some advancement in their educational and economic status, still millions of 
Latinos (especially the undocumented—estimated  at about 10 million people) continue 
to suffer from poverty, are employed in some of the least promising sectors of the 
economy, live in urban areas with endless social problems, do not have health insurance, 
do not have adequate access to education and other vital services, and, as if that were not 
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enough, are presently the target of anti-immigration campaigns led by some of the most 
politically conservative, and nationalistic sectors of U.S. society.   
Unfortunately very little research has looked at the implications of Latino 
Pentecostalism for the individuals that practice it, the communities they live in, and the 
country as a whole. That is, as Latinos choose Pentecostalism and other renewalist 
movements, it is imperative to develop an in-depth understanding of the social and 
political implications for Latinos and the country at large particularly as it relates to civic 
and political engagement within and beyond the walls of the church. Is Pentecostalism a 
facilitator or an inhibitor of civic and political engagement? This research must, however, 
evade the easy temptation of lumping Latino Pentecostals together with American or 
Latino Evangelicals. Due to the fact that Pentecostals represent a small percentage of the 
U.S. and even the Evangelical landscape, Pentecostals are not generally studied in their 
own right. Instead Pentecostals are lumped with Evangelicals resulting in a disappointing 
lack of knowledge about Pentecostal religious beliefs, practice, and civic engagement 
behavior. In the Latino context, however, it is important to highlight the uniqueness of 
Pentecostalism, its differences from Evangelicalism, and the implications of that for 
social and political engagement because Pentecostalism exerts a lot more influence over 
Evangelicalism than the other way around (Espinoza, 2004).   
In this chapter, I will review the literature that is directly related to the topic of 
this dissertation.  The objective is to provide the theoretical and academic context that 
informs the work I do in this dissertation. The literature review will go from a more 
general review of the work related to social capital and civic engagement to later become 
more specific about religion, social capital, and civic engagement. At the end, I will 
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review the literature that addresses Pentecostalism, Latinos, social capital and civic 
engagement to finish with a discussion about the research areas that need clarification, 
modification, or addition. I am confident that this literature review will provide an 
understanding of how my dissertation work fits within the larger social science, 
sociological, sociology of religion, and Pentecostal debates and hopefully show how my 
work will make a contribution to these debates and the academic work being conducted 
to address them.   
Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
 
But what is civic engagement? For Robert Putnam (1995, p. 665) civic 
engagement is “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not merely with 
politics,” and Robert Wuthnow (1988) defines it as behavior understood by actors as 
engaging and maintaining the civic order in pursuit of the common good. Loveland 
(2005, p. 142) adds that civic engagement is “individuals working toward a shared vision 
of a good society, and engaging in the social, public acts that are required to achieve the 
desired ends while at the same time submitting to the basic authority of a yet more 
broadly shared civic culture.” Loveland emphasizes that much civic engagement is 
directed at causing change (2005, p. 142).   
The civic engagement debate started in the 1990s and continues on its course 
today. It is actually part of a larger debate over the state of American democracy and the 
related debate about social capital (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). According to Skocpol and 
Fiorina (1999, p. 1), there seem to be many and recent contradictory changes in American 
democracy, some of which “have clearly enhanced democracy and others undercut our 
shared public life.”  The fact is that even when U.S. democracy has become more 
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inclusive, significant numbers of Americans seem to be drawing back from involvement 
with community affairs and politics—that is, they are becoming less civically engaged 
(Skocpol & Fiorina,1999, p.  2).  
Although a lot of the groundwork had already been put in place by the work of 
James Coleman (1988) who dealt with issues of social ties and culture and brought to the 
academic spotlight the concept of “social capital,” it was Robert Putnam who made the 
social capital and civic engagement debate a hot national topic (Skocpol & Fiorina, 
1999).  
In Bowling Alone (2000), Putnam argued that social capital and civic engagement 
were fundamental for democracy and had been major components of the life of the 
United States, but that the country has experienced a sharp decrease of social capital as of 
late. In fact, instead of joining churches, unions, clubs, and many other voluntary 
associations, Americans are now doing things alone, individually, as a result of declining 
social trust and the unraveling of social connections (Putnam, 2000).  Many social 
scientists have followed Putnam’s lead in the study of social capital while others have 
intensely opposed him (Edwards & Foley, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b; Portes & 
Landolt, 1996; Skocpol, 1999; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). 
But why is civic engagement and social capital so vitally important? The answer 
finds its origins in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, Democracy in America (1969). 
De Tocqueville (1969) argued that democracy requires the presence and vitality of civic 
associations that are not political in nature and that serve as sources of meaning and 
social engagement. In fact, according to de Tocqueville associational life actually 
“provided the foundation for democratic life, because democracy could not survive unless 
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citizens continued to participate actively, joining with others of similar mind and interest 
to address matters of common concern” (Smidt, 2003, p. 1).  Robert Putnam (1993), 
following the lead of de Tocqueville, maintains that associational life contributes to the 
formation of social capital, which in turn fosters civic engagement.  
But why is civic engagement that important? Ultimately, according to Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady (1999, p. 427), the participation in voluntary activities matters for 
several reasons: “the development of the capacities of the individual, the creation of 
community and the cultivation of democratic virtues, and the equal protection of interests 
in public life.”   
Corwin Smidt (2003, p. 4) defines social capital as “features of social 
organization (friendship networks, norms, and social trust) that facilitate working and 
cooperating together for mutual benefit. Accordingly, social capital can be viewed as a 
set of “moral resources” that lead to increased cooperation among individuals. James 
Coleman (1990, pp. 302-304), one of the main proponents of the social capital framework 
of analysis, adds that social capital, like other forms of capital, is productive making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. 
Social capital is then important because it has the ability to bind together “autonomous 
individuals into communal relationships...transform self-interested individuals exhibiting 
little social conscience and weak feelings of mutual obligation into members of a 
community expressing shared interests and a sense of the common good” (Smidt, 2003, 
p. 5).  
According to Putnam (1993, p. 70), social capital has two key components that 
makes it so important for civic life—trust and reciprocity. The argument goes that by 
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participating in voluntary associations, individuals interact with each other and that one 
result of this is increasing the likelihood of mutual trust. This in turn “helps to broaden 
the scope of the individual’s interests, making public matters more relevant… [it also 
increases] members’ level of information, trains them in social interaction, fosters 
leadership skills, and provides resources for effective public action” (Verba, Schlozman, 
& Brady, 1995).  
The main proponents of the social capital framework, Coleman and Putnam, see 
social capital residing in different places. For Coleman (1990, p. 302) social capital 
resides in the structure of the relations between and among persons within a particular 
context. It is not the property or characteristic of an individual, but rather is embedded in 
particular relationships. On the other hand, Putnam (2000, p. 20) recently—it is important 
to note that he has recently changed his stance because he used to follow Coleman’s 
lead—argued that “social capital has both an individual and a collective aspect.” As an 
individual resource, social capital can be moved along by the individual from relationship 
to relationship becoming another form of human capital (Smidt 2003, p. 9). Social 
scientists that see social capital as something possessed by an individual see in survey 
research the correct approach to study social capital and focus on assessing “the 
individual involvement in associational life and the attitudes and orientations that may be 
linked to such life” (Smidt 2003, p. 9). On the other hand, social scientists that see social 
capital as embedded in personal relationships study it with qualitative techniques such as 
participant observation.  
Despite the fact that there has been an abundance of research that has used the 
social capital framework of analysis as its base, there is a variety of issues related to the 
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“concept and the theoretical foundation upon which it is based. These issues relate to the 
adequacy of its theoretical explanatory power, its conceptual clarity, its posited empirical 
relationships, and its normative perspective” (Smidt, 2003, p. 7). A key theoretical 
critique of the social capital framework is that it is “too simplistic and that it neglects or 
downplays crucial factors [such as the role institutional structures, particularly the state, 
play in the formation and continuation of associational life and that social capital 
formation besides having social also has structural dynamics] that also serve to shape the 
nature of democratic life” (Smidt, 2003, p. 7). The other theoretical critique advanced by 
both Smidt (2003, p. 8) and Foley and Edwards (1998, p. 13), two of the most ardent 
critics of Putnam and other social capital proponents, has to do with how associational 
life produces social capital, especially how the trust that results from face-to-face 
interactions becomes generalized social trust. According to these critics the mechanisms 
for the production of social capital and the expansion of trust have not yet been clearly 
articulated. 
Empirically, Putnam has been critiqued for making a case for the decline of 
formal membership levels in long-standing organizations (e.g. the Parent Teacher 
Association) as a reflection of a decline in civic engagement (Putnam, 2000). However, 
his critics argue that Putnam ignores growth in membership that has occurred in newly 
formed membership organizations (e.g. the American Association of Retired Persons); 
they suggest he has simply confused change with decline because membership may be 
shifting and not declining (Smidt, 2003, p. 10).  
Another important critique of Putnam’s social capital framework has to do with 
how “crucial” voluntary associations really are in the production of social capital. Some 
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wonder, “Is not the social capital produced by the family and even the educational system 
more important than the one produced by voluntary associations” (Smidt, 2003, p. 10)? 
Others argue that it is likely that not all types of associational membership are equal in 
terms of the production of social capital (Smidt, 2003, p. 10). Foley and Edwards (1998, 
p. 15) succinctly conclude that the issue is not whether involvement in voluntary 
associations generates interpersonal trust, fosters habits of cooperation and norms of 
reciprocity, but “what kinds of associations do so, under what circumstances, and with 
what effects to the polity?” 
Although the social capital framework has been widely publicized and used by 
academia and the press, there are other competing approaches that shed light on 
important aspects of democracy and civic life. 
 While the “social capital” approach (Putnam and others) focuses on the 
socialization of individuals into shared norms and cooperative societal action, the 
“rational choice” approach focuses on the ways in which institutions and organizations 
create incentives for individuals to engage in various kinds of behavior (Skocpol & 
Fiorina, 1999). The “rational choice” scholars (Coleman, Fiorina and others) are, in fact, 
skeptical about the benefits of involvement in public affairs.  
Another approach, the “historical institutionalist approach,” (Skocpol and others) 
deemphasizes trust as fundamental for democracy and proposes that conflict and distrust 
produced democracy in the first place (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). Consequently, 
voluntary associations matter as sources of “popular leverage, not just as facilitators of 
individual participation and generalized social trust” (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 15).   
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In the end, the majority of analysts agree that American democracy is going 
through important changes that have affected civic engagement where the most 
privileged citizens may be organizing and directing the democratic apparatus. In light of 
this, it is essential to look again at the eternal concerns of power and inequality especially 
as they relate to the most disenfranchised in society (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 1999).   
Religion, Social Capital, and Civic Engagement 
 
One of the unequivocal results of the social capital and civic engagement debate 
and the empirical work conducted to address it in the last twenty years has been the 
finding that religion plays a fundamental role in the production of social capital and civic 
engagement (Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004; Verba, et al., 1995; Schlozman et al., 
1999; Ammerman, 2005; Cnaan 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Chavez & Higgins, 
1992; McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Smidt, 2003; Wood, 2002). In fact, Putnam (2000, p. 66) 
categorically states that “faith communities in which people worship together are 
arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America.” In spite of 
this recognition, Putnam himself has treated religion as one form, among many such 
forms, of association paying little attention to its uniqueness; religious associations are 
viewed to be similar to other kinds of associations in which individuals get involved 
(Smidt, 2003, p. 2; Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 216).  
In response, the work of Smidt (2003), in Religion as Social Capital, provides a 
focused and comprehensive analysis of the uniqueness of religion for the formation of 
social capital and how religious social capital shapes the civic engagement that ultimately 
shapes public life. In order to address the uniqueness of religious social capital, Smidt 
(2003, p. 216) poses some fundamental questions: “to what extent, then, is there 
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something distinctive about religious social capital that serves to differentiate it from 
other kinds of social capital? Or is all social capital basically similar in nature, regardless 
of its origins?” 
In order to answer these questions, Smidt (2003) and other analysts (for instance, 
Kniss & Numrich, 2007) have looked at the role congregations, para-church 
organizations, religious individuals, and nonreligious demographic variables play, 
together or individually, in the production of religious social capital and its subsequent 
impact on civic engagement. I will now to turn to a review of the literature that addresses 
these issues.  
Congregations, social capital, and civic engagement. One of the main observers 
of religion and civic engagement has noted that it is clear that in this country “civic 
involvement has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its 
religious organizations“(Wuthnow, 1999, p. 331). In fact, for some analysts (Kniss & 
Numrich, 2007), the local congregation is intimately related to social capital and civic 
engagement, a fact that is not surprising given that the congregation is the “locus of 
activity for American Christianity” (White, 1968). According to Cnaan, Boddie, and 
Yancey (2003, p. 20), “the impressive, and often unrecognized, role that the local 
congregations play in building human and social capital is more than a current social 
phenomenon; it is a long-held and enduring social norm. In essence, it is a norm that 
dictates the way in which people that come to worship together also become involved in 
community service.”  Cnaan and colleagues (2003, p. 20) conclude that joining a 
congregation in the United States “necessarily involves accepting a set of norms—
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including the norms of contributing to the building of human and social capital and of 
being willing to participate in civic affairs.”  
 This is not surprising given the active participation of Americans in religion and 
the local congregation. A recent study (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 157) 
found that while more than 40 percent of Americans claim to attend church either 
regularly or frequently, only 20 percent of Canadians report the same. On the other hand, 
only 16.7 percent of Americans report rarely attending church while 32.9 of Canadians 
do so (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 157). The same study found that only 9.6 percent of 
Americans believe that the concept of God is an old superstition, that 84.3 percent of 
Americans believe in salvation through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
that 83.3 percent of Americans believe that the Bible is the inspired word of God, and 
that 59.9 percent of Americans have committed their life to Christ (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 
158).  The results of this study, besides showing the extent of the religiosity of Americans 
in comparison with another developed Western country (Canada), also show that 
Americans are a lot more likely to be members of a “religious or church-related group” in 
comparison to Canadians—33 percent versus 20 percent (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 159). In 
another study, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999, p. 427) found that more than 60 
percent of Americans are, in fact, members of a church.  
  It is important to note, however, that the local congregations’ role in the formation 
of social capital and the facilitation of civic engagement has been found to be multi-
dimensional and complex. In a national study of student volunteers in America, Robert 
Wuthnow (1996, p. 9) concluded that “churches and synagogues remain the primary 
place where instruction is given about the spiritual dimension of caring.” Cnaan and 
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colleagues (2003, p. 29) add that all major religions emphasize collective responsibility 
for social justice and the welfare of other human beings. In fact, local congregations’ 
theological teachings emphasize mutual responsibility, the need to assist strangers in 
need, and the legitimate claim of the weak and needy upon the community (Cnaan, 
Boddie, & Yancey, 2003, p. 29). These teachings serve to socialize those that come in 
contact with the congregation, especially the younger generations, and become road maps 
for them of desired behaviors of compassion and caring (Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancey 2003, 
p. 29).  
In the end, the socialization experienced by the churched results in civic 
engagement, within and beyond the congregation, characterized by a strong motivation to 
participate for religious, social, and altruistic reasons and less for self-interested material 
motives (Harris 2003, p. 135).  
 This socialization of individuals at the local congregation is also accomplished by 
the uniqueness of the role religious language plays in motivating individuals to get 
involved and to giving them the reasons to do so. Schwadel (2005, p. 169) clearly states 
that “what is preached from the pulpit and talked about in the pews influences church 
members’ activities, not just in the church but also outside of the church.” In fact, Rhys 
Williams (2003) argues that religious language is a form of social capital that can foster a 
democratic public politics. Williams (2003) maintains that religious discourse is a 
cultural resource that, if used correctly, can contribute to doing public collective activity 
because it is democratically available along with serving as a motivating force that is 
available and resonates well with a variety of populations in American society. Although 
Williams (2003, p. 189) expresses his concern with “what kinds of religious language 
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gain currency in our political culture,” he concludes that “it is only when religious 
language is fully engaged with the problems, issues, and challenges of organizing human 
life that it is capable of contributing to emancipation as well as righteousness, to justice 
alongside morality”—religious language needs to find a seat at the public table. In other 
words, it is not only socializing individuals within the walls of the congregation that is 
important, but religious language also has a role as a public voice that addresses the 
concerns of a particular society.    
 Besides being caring and social responsibility learning sites, local congregations 
also “regularly and straightforwardly act as communication networks that foster civic 
volunteerism” (Coleman, 2003, p. 34). Robert Wuthnow (2003, p. 242) adds that 
“religious organizations tell people of opportunities to serve, both within and beyond the 
congregation itself, and provide personal contacts, committees, phone numbers, meeting 
space, transportation, or whatever it may take to turn good intention into action.”  
 Furthermore, one of the most important contributions of local congregations to 
society may be their ability to generate civic skills for their members and to give them 
opportunities to use them both within and beyond the congregation (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 
346; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).  Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, p. 394) 
define civic skills as “the communications and organizational abilities that allow citizens 
to use time and money effectively in political [and social] life.” According to Wuthnow 
(1999, p. 346), civic skills are learned when people learn to work together on committees, 
lead meetings, and serve as officers and in other capacities at the local congregation. 
What is important about civic skills is that they are transferable to other spheres of life 
such as the workplace and the political arena (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 346).  
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 Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, p. 320) emphatically maintain that in 
regards to civic skills local congregations are one of the few places left in civil society 
where the inequalities so obvious in the population in terms of education and income are 
radically reduced and where citizens, especially the seriously disenfranchised from 
society, have a more even participatory field. In other words, congregations distribute the 
opportunity for the development of civic skills and their practice more democratically 
than do other groups in society.  
 However, not all congregations have been found to provide the same 
opportunities to develop and practice civic skills (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; 
Wuthnow, 1999). In fact, analysts observe that Protestant congregations with their 
horizontal organizational structure and their emphasis on lay participation may indeed 
provide more opportunities to develop and practice civic skills for their members than 
Catholic parishes with their more hierarchical or vertical organizational structure (Verba, 
Scholzman, & Brady, 1995, p. 321; Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348). Wuthnow (1999), however, 
qualifies this conclusion and shows that Evangelicals “do learn certain skills…The only 
problem is that evangelicals are less likely to hold membership in nonreligious 
organizations to which they can transfer these skills” (p. 348). In other words, Protestant 
congregations may have an advantage over Catholic parishes in the ability of the 
members to develop and use civic skills, but not all Protestant and Catholic churches 
experience the same reality. 
 Besides providing opportunities for congregants to develop civic skills and offer 
opportunities to use them inside and outside the walls of the church, congregations 
themselves have also been very active in providing social services both to their 
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congregants and the community beyond their walls (Ammerman, 2005; Chavez, 2004; 
Cnaan, 1997, 2002; Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancey, 2003; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Cnaan, 
Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Wuthnow, 2004; McRoberts, 2003). Cnaan, Boddie, and 
Yancey (2003, p. 24) argue that in regular times and in times of disaster local 
congregations are organizing the provision of care because the local congregation, along 
with local schools, are viewed “as trusted local pillars and spaces where the community 
can feel at “home.”  
According to Cnaan (1997) congregations are involved in housing projects and 
economic development, along with their involvement in the provision of social services 
mainly to the community outside the congregation. Cnaan and colleagues (2003) in a 
study of congregations found that churches provided on average 4.04 social programs 
that favored 4 to 1 the serving of non-members. The main social services provided 
included food pantries, clothing closets, community fairs, choral groups, recreational 
programs for teens and children, hospital visitation, tutoring, soup kitchens, and services 
through alliances with neighborhood associations, among others. Cnaan and colleagues 
add that most services, around 80 percent, were provided on congregations’ premises 
(1997). The vast majority of these programs (74 percent) reported “the use of 
volunteers…[and] the church’s financial commitment allocated to social ministry was 
also significant—17.4 percent of the congregation’s operating budget” (Cnaan, Boddie, 
& Yancie, 2003, p. 25).  In many instances congregations serve as a greatly needed safety 
net for populations (e.g. immigrants, single moms, and other populations in need) that do 
not have access to other safety nets (Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002).  
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 But not all congregations have the same missional view of their role in the public 
square and the communities that surround them (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984; 
Kniss & Numrich, 2007). In an effort to understand the ways congregations see their role 
in the public square, Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll (1984, p. 87) developed a typology 
of congregational mission orientations. The typology is organized into two main 
dimensions. While one axis looks at a “this-worldly” versus an “other-worldly” 
orientation, the other axis looks at a “membership-centered” versus “publicly proactive” 
orientation (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, p. 87). The four mission orientations 
that resulted are the following: civic orientation, membership centered and this-worldly; 
sanctuary orientation, membership-centered and otherworldly; activist orientation, 
publicly proactive and this-worldly; and evangelistic orientation, publicly proactive and 
otherworldly (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, p. 87). Although the authors found 
that major denominational congregations studied, conservative Protestant, Catholic, and 
Mainline Protestant, contain some strong congregations in each orientation, they found 
that the majority of conservative Protestant churches are strongly evangelistic, almost 
half of the Catholic congregations embody a strong activist orientation, and Mainline 
Protestant congregations do not show any strong orientation—maybe a sign of a late 
twentieth-century Mainline Protestant “crisis of identity or failure of conviction” 
(Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, 89). The authors also conclude that maybe as a 
result of proximity to need, congregations in the city, regardless of their religious 
tradition, are more likely to have strong activist orientations than congregations located in 
the suburbs or rural areas (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll 1984, p. 89). Other typologies 
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of congregational public orientation/civic engagement have found similar results (Kniss 
& Numrich, 2007; McRoberts, 2003; Wood, 1994).     
 Although the role of the local congregation is without a doubt fundamental in the 
development of social capital and the facilitation of civic engagement, there is another 
religious organization that works together with the congregation to produce and facilitate 
civic engagement—the para-church organization. Para-church organizations are special 
purpose groups that are “independently incorporated and autonomous from congregations 
and denominations” which at the local levels provide a variety of social services, but 
work with congregations mainly as a source of volunteers (Coleman, 2003, p. 39).   
In a study of para-church organizations in the United States, Coleman (2003, p. 
39) found that congregations and para-church organizations exist in “symbiotic 
relationship—in both creating and investing social capital.”  In fact, these two religious 
organizations may need each other to generate an effective public church because many 
local congregations “do not really know how to use the social capital they generate in 
more public settings. They lack, at times, the practical or organizational skills to turn it 
effectively toward broader civic engagement and public policy” (Coleman, 2003, p. 39). 
In turn, para-church organizations use the preexisting networks and communities they 
find in the congregation, forge linkages between and across congregations, religions, 
social classes, and ethnic and racial groups with the purpose of teaching church members 
“how to put their faith into concrete action and have larger civic consequences” 
(Coleman, 2003, p. 40). Coleman (2003, p. 41) concludes that “precisely because of the 
widespread taboo against introducing controversial political issues into the local 
congregation, even when they have some clear religious or moral overtones, para-church 
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groups serve local congregations by providing outlets for social and public faith without 
dividing the congregation as such.”   
Wood, after analyzing the results of a study of church-based organizing by faith-
based organizations concludes that “democratic social capital indeed helps foster 
democratic action, but to be effective it must be mobilized politically” (2003, p. 85). In 
Wood’s (2003, p. 86) view any efforts at democratic reform that marginalizes religious 
faith is headed for failure particularly in poor urban areas where religious institutions 
generate social capital, giving poor folks the resources they need to work together. 
They feed and clothe multitudes of the most desperate victims of rising economic 
inequality. They help many others emerge from the ravages of addiction or 
destructive behavior. They organize politically, sometimes calling the powerful to 
new accountability. They sustain hope when much of what the poor see around 
them is cause for despair. And when all else falters they offer consolation and 
comfort. In all of these ways religion matters—both politically and in ways that 
transcend politics.  
  
Religious individuals, social capital, and civic engagement. One important way 
that religion, mainly through local congregations and other religious organizations, 
contributes to the formation of social capital and the facilitation of civic and political 
engagement is through its impact on individuals (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 217). In 
fact, much of the academic work that has been done on social capital, civil society, and 
civic engagement—to the dismay of a few analysts (Curry, 2003; Wuthnow, 2003)—
focuses on the behavior and beliefs of individuals (Curry, 2003, p. 139). Therefore, 
because it is possible to assess the individual patterns of memberships in voluntary 
associations and almost impossible for social analysts to observe the full range of formal 
and informal relationships between people, considerable attention has been given to 
associational membership as an indicator of the rate of formation or destruction of social 
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capital (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 154).  That is, according to the 
quantitative analysts that use this approach and use survey data to do their analysis, the 
engagement in civic associations “helps socialize individuals, teaching them mores with 
regard to how one should think and behave—mores necessary for maintaining a healthy 
society and polity, and fosters engagement politically through greater public awareness, 
broadened interests, and enhanced skills” (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 
154). 
 But how does religiously-based social capital affect individuals that come in 
contact with religion? It has been found that…  
church attendance and religious tradition help to explain differences in levels of 
civic engagement well beyond that which can be explained by education, age, 
gender, race, and differences in social trust alone. On the other hand, such 
religious factors only help explain differences in levels of political participation 
indirectly through civic engagement itself” (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 
2003, p. 169).  
 
In the same study the authors found that with growing levels of church attendance, there 
is also an increase in non-church associational membership, and an increased likelihood 
of volunteer activity (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 169).  In a study of 
voluntarism in America, Campbell and Yonish (2003, p. 94) confirm previous findings 
that “the proportion of people volunteering increases as church attendance increases;” 
more important, however, is the fact that more church attendance results in more 
nonreligious, informal, and advocacy volunteering along with religious volunteering. The 
authors also found that “church is always one of the most common pathways to 
volunteering” –be it religious volunteering or not (Campbell & Yonish, 2003, p. 95).   
 
 
44 
 
 
           Campbell and Yonish (2003, p. 105) conclude with a cautionary note indicating 
that “church-based voluntary activity is not always directed to the wider community. 
Rather, among volunteers, the more one attends church, the less likely one is to engage in 
non-church voluntary activity” (Campbell & Yonish 2003, p. 105). This is the same case, 
however, with secular organizations and the authors conclude that more research is 
needed to determine if this is a result of a ceiling on people’s time or if attitudinal and 
worldview aspects affect the involvement in nonreligious activities (Campbell & Yonish, 
2003, pp. 105-106). 
 According to Nemeth and Luidens (2003, p. 107), although Americans in general 
are generous contributors to charity (more than two thirds of American households 
contributed to charities from 1987 to 1995 with an average household contribution of 
about $1,000), members of “religious organizations are far more likely to contribute to 
charities, and to contribute greater amounts than are those who report that they do not 
belong to such religious organizations.” But is it that members are just giving money to 
their congregations and other religious organizations? Or is it that charitable giving is 
simply a central part of the ideology of most religious groups? The authors conclude that 
more Americans contribute to religious organizations than to any other type of charity (it 
may be a result of the intense involvement of religious members in their organizations 
and the religious social capital characterized by trust and familiarity!) and that they “do 
so in substantially greater amounts” (Nemeth & Luidens, 2003, p. 120). Members of 
religious organizations are also more likely than those who are not members to “make 
contributions to non-religious charities and to contribute to these charities in greater 
amounts” (Nemeth & Luidens, 2003, p. 120). Nemeth and Luidens (2003, p. 120) 
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conclude that the social capital that is produced in the social networks of the church 
results in greater giving in both religious and nonreligious charities among those that are 
actively involved. 
  More important, however, for many analysts (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; 
Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Schwadel, 2005; Wuthnow, 1999; McRoberts, 1999; Wood, 
2003; Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003) is the question of whether in fact religious 
social capital actually influences the political participation of individuals. But what is 
political participation? According to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 9) political 
participation is activity intended to have “the consequence of affecting, either directly or 
indirectly, government action.” In a recent study, the authors conclude that there is no 
doubt that religious factors help shape patterns of civic engagement, but do they also 
make a further important contribution to political participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & 
Kellstedt, 2003, p. 166)? They found that there is a strong relationship between civic 
engagement and political engagement (one measure of civic engagement has a strong and 
monotonic impact on levels of political participation), but key religious variables such as 
church attendance and religious tradition have little direct impact on political 
participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 167). The authors explain, 
however, that the religious effects on political participation “are more indirect, through 
their particular contribution to civic engagement, than direct in nature”—because religion 
has a profound impact on civic engagement and civic engagement on political 
participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 167). On the other hand, 
Wuthnow (1999, p. 353) in a study of the political participation of individuals from 
various religious traditions concluded that church attendance was significantly related to 
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voting in national and local elections for all religious traditions, to working to solve local 
community problems for Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants, and to having contacted 
local officials for Catholics.  
Warren (2003, p. 50) adds that faith-based organizations (e.g. Communities 
Organized for Public Service—COPS, and the Industrial Areas Foundation—IAF), a 
variety of para-church organizations, have been very successful in politically engaging 
many Americans often excluded from political participation in the urban areas. This is 
mainly a result of their conscious effort to engage religious communities in political 
action (Warren, 2003, p. 50). Then too, a recent study by the Institute of Latino Studies at 
the University of Notre Dame, found that for Chicago Latinos, church membership (thirty 
three percent of the Latino population of the city were church members) is the main form 
of community organizational membership and that “it is clear that church membership is 
an important pathway into faith based social action groups, the second most cited form of 
organizational membership in Chicago” (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3).   
Warren contends that it is a combination of authority and participation that makes 
the faith-based organizations successful at their organizing efforts and that the real 
question for “democratic renewal, at least in low-income communities, may be how to 
develop forms of accountable, authoritative leadership that encourages broad 
participation and collective responsibility (2003, p. 68). The author concludes that the 
“vigor of American religious institutions and religious culture brings comparative 
advantages for projecting political power into public life” (Warren, 2003, p. 84), and this 
is especially true of political organizing done by faith-based organizations. In the end, 
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there is no doubt that faith-based organizations affect the way congregants get involved 
in daily politics. 
 But why is political participation so important? Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
(1995, p. 1) categorically explain that “citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. 
Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in 
the governing process…political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens 
can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate 
pressure to respond.” The same analysts conclude that religious institutions are key social 
capital sites for increasing political participation particularly for low income and minority 
populations. In fact, churches in particular, can play a role in equalizing political 
participation for segments of the population that presently experience inequality in that 
area (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Warren (2003, p. 52) is cautious, however, and 
explains that “denominations vary in their theological traditions and their institutional 
structures in ways that might affect the potential for religious communities [and their 
members] to become engaged in politics.” 
 In fact, Robert Wuthnow (1999, p. 332), concerned about what he saw as a shift 
in the center of gravity in American religion towards more conservative, Evangelical, and 
fundamentalist religion away from Mainline Protestant and even Catholic religion, set out 
to study how religious tradition and organization affects the civic and political 
engagement of the individuals in Evangelical, Mainline Protestant and Catholic 
traditions. The author argues that the most significant change in the composition of 
religious participation is the “decline of so-called Mainline Protestant denominations and 
the relative rise of some evangelical and independent churches” (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 
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336).  All Mainline Protestant denominations lost members after the 1960s and some of 
them as much as a quarter of their membership by the ‘80s while conservative 
Evangelical denominations and churches have quickly grown (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 336). 
Wuthnow concludes that by 1991, 61 percent of Americans were in Evangelical 
denominations and churches, up from 56 percent in 1974 (1999, p. 336).  
 How is this related to civic and political engagement? Wuthnow (1999, p. 338) 
maintains that while Mainline Protestant churches “participated in progressive social 
betterment programs during the first half of the twentieth century, evangelical churches 
focused more on individual piety.”  When members of the different religious traditions 
are compared with regards to their membership in nonreligious voluntary association, it is 
found that Mainline Protestants are a lot more likely than Catholics and Evangelicals to 
get involved—Evangelicals actually being the least likely to participate (Wuthnow, 1999,  
p. 341). Wuthnow contends that Evangelicals may actually be more involved in their 
congregations and thus have less time to get involved in other organizations and that 
“many evangelicals attend churches that emphasize separation from “the world” or 
distinctive beliefs that may discourage them from mingling with outsiders” (1999, p. 
344).  At the same time, Evangelicals were found to volunteer a lot less with nonreligious 
organizations while Mainline Protestants and Catholics were found to volunteer more 
with nonreligious organizations (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 351). What is interesting, however, 
is the fact that when political participation was analyzed “evangelicals are just as likely as 
Mainline Protestants or Catholics to be mobilized by their religious involvement to 
participate in politics” (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 353). Wuthnow (1999, p. 357) concludes that 
“despite their apparent emphasis on their own congregations, evangelical religious 
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involvement does not discourage participation in other voluntary associations; with the 
exception of voting, it just does not encourage it…the fact that Mainline Protestant 
churches have declined in recent decades, therefore, means that civic engagement is 
probably not as strong as it would have been if these churches had not declined.” 
 Schwadel (2005, p. 159) confirms Wuthnow’s (1999) findings and concludes that 
“a conservative congregational context limits church members’ activity in non church 
organizations, potentially limiting their opportunities to build heterogeneous social 
networks and social capital that bridges church members to other people in their 
communities.” Why should this matter? According to Curry (2003, p. 140), bonding 
social capital is inward-looking, reinforcing exclusive identities and homogeneity, while 
bridging social capital is outward-looking and encompasses diverse groups of people. 
Putnam (2000, p. 22), who originally proposed that social capital can be either bonding or 
bridging, explains that bonding social capital is good for developing specific reciprocity 
and building solidarity, while bridging social capital is better to link to external assets and 
institutions as well as to flows of information. In fact, “without bridging to outside 
institutions and resources, bonding social capital might be of little worth because it lacks 
the information and ability to mobilize outside resources for the benefit of the community 
(Gittel & Vidal, 1998, pp. 15-16). 
 The conservative religion versus liberal religion framework of analysis used by 
various analysts and that has been found to have important implications for social and 
political engagement (Wuthnow, 1999; Schwadel, 2005) may have to be modified to 
address important deviations that have been documented with minority populations, and 
minority religious expressions—particularly among African Americans, Latinos, and 
 
 
50 
 
 
Pentecostals. African Americans have been found to be morally conservative, but 
otherwise fairly liberal in their approach to social and economic issues (Harris, 1999; 
Greeley & Hout, 2006). Latino Protestants, particularly Evangelicals, have also been 
found not to be as conservative as many analysts may think. In fact, although Latino 
Evangelicals are more conservative than African Americans, they have been found to be 
more liberal in social and economic issues when compared to white Evangelicals with the 
exception of moral issues where they tend to be more conservative (Pew Hispanic Center, 
2007). 
Finally, although white Pentecostals have been found to be very conservative in 
the majority of social, political, and moral issues, they have also been found to be more 
likely to vote Democrat than their other Evangelical brothers and sisters (Greeley & 
Hout, 2006). Consequently it is imperative to conduct comparative analysis of white 
Pentecostals with African American and Latino Pentecostals because, at least from the 
literature discussed here, it would seem that African American and Latino Pentecostals 
may in fact be fairly liberal in social and economic issues when compared to white 
Pentecostals. African Americans and Latinos do not seem to fit well the conservative 
Protestant mold into which they have been thrown.   
Besides the empirical and theoretical issues I have reviewed in this chapter, it is 
also important to address other issues especially as they relate to how other analysts have 
done their work and some key variables that have been found to be important, either by 
themselves or in conjunction with religious variables, in explaining individual civic and 
political engagement.         
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First, in an effort to operationalize civic engagement, several analysts have 
proposed various typologies of individual civic engagement. Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady (1995, p. 48 and pp. 74-76) proposed and used a typology that divided civic 
engagement into two large categories—political activity/participation and nonpolitical 
activity/ participation. Under political activity/participation, which they defined as 
“activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by 
affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the 
selection of people that make those policies,” they included voting, campaign work, 
campaign contributions, contacting an official, protesting, informal community work, 
membership of a local board, affiliation with a political organization, and contribution to 
a political cause (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 48). Under nonpolitical activity, 
the authors included affiliation with a non-political organization, attending a meeting of 
non-political organization, attending church services, giving time to church work, church 
contributions, giving time to charitable work, and charitable contributions (Verba, 
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, pp. 74-76). Although this typology is fairly comprehensive, 
it leaves out important nonpolitical participation activities such as church membership. 
Then too, non-political activity is too large and fuzzy a category; some organizations 
such as churches promote both political and nonpolitical activities. 
Although not as clearly outlined as Verba and colleagues’(2005), Wuthnow 
(1999) also developed and used a typology based on the civic and political engagement 
questions asked by the General Social Survey of 1997. The typology has two main 
components: civic engagement and political engagement (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348 and p. 
353). The civic engagement includes among others membership in civic organizations, 
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churches, serving on committees, doing active work in nonreligious groups, doing work 
in religious groups, writing to newspaper or magazine for the organization, and giving 
money in addition to regular dues (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348). Political engagement 
includes voting in 1984, working with others to solve political problems, contacting local 
officials, attending political meetings or rallies, and trying to show people why they 
should vote for one party or candidate among others (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 353). Although 
this typology added some variables that Verba and colleagues (1995) did not include, it 
still lacks depth particularly as it relates to civic engagement in church and para-church 
organizations.        
 Finally, it is also important to point out that education, gender, age, income and 
race have been found likewise to be important predictors of civic and political 
engagement, with education being the most important one (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 
1995; Smidt, Green, Gruth, & Kellstedt, 2003; Harris, 2003; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 
1999). In combination with religious factors such as church attendance and religious 
traditions, these demographic and economic variables can be strong predictors of civic 
and political participation (Smidt, Green, Gruth, & Kellstedt, 2003). In his work, Putnam 
(2000, p. 67) categorically concluded that “religiosity rivals education as a powerful 
correlate of most forms of civic engagement.” 
Pentecostalism, Latinos, Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
 
 A related issue of debate has been the implications of Pentecostalism for the 
public square, for civic engagement and for political action. Although up until recently 
very little work had been done on the specific topics of Pentecostalism, civic engagement 
and political engagement, fortunately (although not extensively) some of these questions 
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were addressed by the older generation of researchers dealing with Pentecostalism in 
Latin America (Williams, 1967; D’Epinay, 1968; Bastian, 1990).  
The first generation of researchers simply concluded that Pentecostalism was 
otherworldly escapism, and as such not interested in social justice, or in dealing with the 
evils of oppression, classism, racism, and other types of discrimination. In fact, 
Pentecostalism was assumed to be apolitical and concerned only with matters of private 
morality, participation in church activities, and intragroup identity and solidarity (Cleary 
& Stewart-Gambino, 1997). At best, Pentecostalism was reactionary and allied with 
North American conservative interests, and the dictators and ruling classes of Latin 
America (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997). 
There is no doubt that some sectors of Pentecostalism have dark histories of 
alliances with dictators in Guatemala (Efrain Rios Montt), Chile (Augusto Pinochet), and 
Brazil. However, recent scholarly work on the politics of Pentecostals has started to paint 
a different picture. David Stoll (1990) argues that Protestantism in Latin America should 
not be seen as a political instrument of dominant interests. Instead, Stoll (1990) maintains 
that Pentecostalism is a generator of social change whose direction is not predestined; in 
fact, the politics of Pentecostalism in Latin America are contested between progressive 
and conservative camps. In the same way that there are examples of conservative 
inclinations, the support of a significant portion of Chilean Pentecostals for Salvador 
Allende (the leftist President of Chile) clearly indicates the opposite (Stoll, 1990). The 
author recognizes that at present the conservative camp may have the upper hand because 
of the influence U.S. conservative Protestantism has been exerting, but he suggests that in 
the end the indigenous structure of Pentecostalism and the pressing social needs of its 
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adherents may result in revolution, reform, and even acceptance of the status quo—it can 
go in any direction (Stoll, 1990).  
Recently, Peterson (2004), using a social capital and networks approach, argued 
that Pentecostalism in Latin American can best be understood as a social movement that 
has gone from being insignificant to generating a critical mass of social networks that 
currently number over 50 million people. By creating parallel institutions and 
organizations, Pentecostals have accumulated social capital and expanded their networks, 
two fundamental ingredients for entrance into the national arena of politics and civil 
society (Peterson, 2004). However, the author argues that the weak democracies in Latin 
America characterized by lack of spaces for participation makes the Pentecostal entry 
into politics a very slow one, and the author concludes that instead many Pentecostals 
have opted for using community efforts and institutions as a viable alternative to direct 
political involvement (Peterson, 2004).  
 Cleary and Stewart-Gambino (1997) add that although much of the faith and 
discourse of Pentecostals could be understood as apolitical, Pentecostals’ flexible faith 
and the needs of their adherents often lead them to substantial local community and even 
national social service involvement which easily have political implications. The authors 
argue that the problem is that scholars have been looking for Pentecostal activism in the 
wrong places. Pentecostals, they propose, have from the very beginning been involved in 
local, autonomous, and often fragmental social service and community activity (Cleary & 
Stewart-Gambino, 1997). Furthermore, this has recently translated into the formation of 
political parties that are explicitly Pentecostal in El Salvador, Brazil and other countries 
of Latin America (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997). 
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 The research conducted among Latin American Pentecostalism is informative in 
bringing to our attention the need to look at the political-state context in which 
Pentecostalism operates, and how that affects its present and future engagement in the 
public square. At the same time, the issue of social capital and network building is 
fundamental because a significant number of Pentecostals and the congregations they 
attend originate and work with some of the poorest and most disenfranchised members of 
society—groups that do not have the same access to educational, and economic resources 
that have been found to be important for civic and political engagement (Verba, 
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The fact that Pentecostalism seems to be developing 
alternative ways of being active in the community is very revealing because it shows that 
it is still attempting to address the social challenges of its surroundings even with huge 
limitations.  
Unfortunately, the majority of the academic work on Pentecostalism and 
Pentecostals paints a monolithic picture of Pentecostals and their congregations—that is, 
that they all do and believe the same thing. Whereas the first generation of Pentecostalist 
scholars saw Pentecostals and their congregations as inward looking, otherworldly and 
apolitical, the new generation of scholars is starting to articulate a different perspective 
that sees Pentecostalism as potentially revolutionary and politically progressive (Martin, 
1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; Stoll, 1990). However, these scholars still show 
a tendency to see Pentecostals as monolithic and lack the refinement needed to observe 
differences among Pentecostals and Pentecostalism(s). Is it possible that some are inward 
looking, otherworldly and apolitical while others are outward looking, thisworldly and 
politically active, and other permutations between these two extremes (Ruano 2007)?  
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 Recently, Donald Miller and Tetsunao Yamamori (2007) published one of the 
most complete studies on Pentecostalism and civic engagement ever. In Global 
Pentecostalism, the authors argue that there are different types of Pentecostalisms and 
that one of the growing types is “progressive Pentecostalism” (Miller & Yamamori, 
2007). Although this strand of Pentecostalism recently emerged, its dynamic civic 
engagement is evidenced in the width and depth of the social services its congregations 
provide to its members and the community at large—with a one-person-at-a-time social 
model, it deals with numerous social problems (Miller & Yamamori, 2007). The authors 
are generally positive about civic engagement among “progressive Pentecostals,” but 
they also emphasize the fact that there are significant numbers of Pentecostals who are 
“other-worldly” and not very civically engaged. Even “progressive Pentecostals” are just 
now beginning to address structural social problems because of their inclination to stay 
out of the political arena (Miller & Yamamori, 2007).  
Although Miller and Yamamori’s work (2007) is timely and is in line with the 
work I have been doing among Pentecostals in the last few years (Ruano 2007), their 
work focuses on congregations all over the world except the United States. 
Unfortunately, there are but a couple of studies in the United State that focus exclusively 
on Pentecostal congregations—the work of McRoberts (1999) is very informative. 
However, congregational studies that, as part of their sample, included Pentecostal 
congregations have provided some understanding of the intersection of Pentecostal 
congregations and civic and political engagement (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; McRoberts, 
2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Wood, 1994). 
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Kniss and Numrich (2007), while studying immigrant congregations in Chicago, 
studied Victory Outreach—a Latino non classical Pentecostal church that focuses its 
ministry on the troubled and down trodden of society. After conducting in-depth 
qualitative research, the authors concluded that “Victory Outreach sees its primary moral 
project as the rescue, reform and rehabilitation of individuals, accomplished by 
introducing each one to faith in Jesus and a personal encounter with the power of the 
Holy Spirit.” (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 54). As a consequence, the authors add, the 
church has a “deep distrust of collectivist solutions or action and develops citizens who 
are engaged in public life as individuals confronting other individuals in parks and on 
street corners.” (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 54).  
The work of McRoberts (1999) among “activist” Pentecostal churches in a 
northeastern city reveals that several African American Pentecostal churches became 
“activist” churches mainly as a result of visionary leaders who were involved in the Civil 
Rights Movement and who decades later continued to take their social role very 
seriously.  
Some of the work has also started to shed light on Latino Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement. McRoberts (2003), Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), Kniss and 
Numrich (2007), and Wood (1994), while looking at congregations in specific localities 
(Cnaan and colleagues in Philadelphia) and as part of larger samples of congregations, 
found that Pentecostal congregations including Latino Pentecostal congregations were 
important parts of the congregational life of the geographical areas of study. McRoberts 
(2003) looked at African American and Latino Pentecostal congregations in a 
neighborhood and analyzed “if” and “how” they became active in the community; he 
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found that the majority of congregations provided social services to their members while 
some provided services to both community and church members. A few congregations 
were found to be very active in the community through the engagement of the social, 
economic, and political structures in the neighborhood (McRoberts, 2003).  
Qualitative research on three congregations by Richard Wood (1994) also shed 
some light on the political participation of congregations, one of which was Pentecostal. 
From his results, Wood (1994) concluded that Pentecostal congregations are not very 
likely to actively participate in direct political action because their meaning structures 
made them look in other directions.  
In another study, Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), while studying the 
provision of social services by congregations in Philadelphia, found that the majority of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations they came across provided a very diverse array of social 
services to both their members and to the community at large; in fact, more services were 
provided to the community at large than to the members of the congregation.  
The results of these studies show the existence of different types of Pentecostal 
congregations as it relates to civic and political participation. While some congregations 
are “activist” (McRoberts, 1999), others provide social services to their members and the 
community at large (McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002, Kniss & 
Numrich, 2007), and yet others simply do not get involved in direct political action 
(Wood, 1994). 
Although there has not been a lot of academic work that has looked at 
Pentecostalism and civic and political participation in the United States, the little work 
that has been done has mainly focused on congregations (McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Cnaan, 
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Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood, 1994). Fortunately, as of 
late, some important work has been done on Pentecostals (individuals) and civic and 
political engagement—albeit indirectly as exemplified by the Pew Hispanic Center work 
(Greeley & Hout, 2007; Pew Hispanic Center, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, 2006). 
Greeley and Hout (2006, p. 163) in a recent study about white U.S. conservative 
Christians concluded that Pentecostals are the “ultimate-conservative Christians” of the 
American religious landscape. However, the authors were pleasantly surprised to find out 
that when it came to voting, Pentecostals were comparatively more likely to vote for 
Democrats (not that the majority voted this way) than their other Conservative Christian 
brethren in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171). 
Other research from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2006) and Pew 
Hispanic Center (2007) may suggest that the ultra conservativism that Greeley and Hout 
(2006) found among white Pentecostals may be a function of race and/or culture more 
than a function of Pentecostalism itself. In other words, Pentecostalism in the context of 
white race and culture may certainly look ultra conservative with a couple of exceptions, 
while Pentecostalism in the context of African American race and culture, and Latino 
ethnicity and culture may actually look very moderate and even liberal in social and 
political issues and ultra conservative in moral issues—even more so than for white 
Pentecostals.   
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted the most comprehensive 
study on global Pentecostalism, Spirit and Power (2006), comparing Pentecostals from 
ten different countries, including the United States, on various issues including their civic 
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and political participation. The study found that on the majority of social, economic, and 
political issues American Pentecostals are a bit more liberal than Pentecostals in the rest 
of the world with a few exceptions (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006). 
When it came to the war in Iraq, only 19 percent of American Pentecostals opposed it and 
in the majority of countries with the exception of the Philippines and India, Pentecostals 
opposed it in the range of 36 to 71 percent (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 
2006, p. 52). At the same time, while the majority of U.S. Pentecostals agreed that the 
government should aid citizens in need, Pentecostals in all other countries studied agreed 
with it from 1 to 18 percent more (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 52).  
What is interesting, however, is that American Pentecostals agree with the government 
aiding citizens 11 percent more than do “other Christians,” which is the category used by 
the study for all other Christians in the U.S. that are not Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 52).  
In fact, when it came to civic engagement as measured by belonging or 
participating in voluntary associations, U.S. Pentecostals were a lot more likely than all 
other Pentecostals around the world to be civically involved in voluntary organizations 
such as social welfare service agencies, cultural organizations, labor unions, political 
organizations or parties, community action groups, women’s groups, and other groups 
(Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 49). What is revealing, however, is 
that American Pentecostals were not a lot less likely to participate in voluntary 
associations when compared to “other Christians” with the exception of cultural, social 
welfare services organizations, political parties, and other groups; in all of those the 
difference between American Pentecostals and “other Christians” was only 1 or 2 
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percentage points while the difference for political party participation was 8 percentage 
points  in favor of “other Christians” (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 
49). 
The results of this study show that once all Pentecostals are combined, white, 
African Americans and Latinos, American Pentecostals are more liberal than other 
Pentecostals around the world on social, economic, and political issues with the exception 
of the war in Iraq and agreeing that the government should help people in need (Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006). Even when Pentecostals in the U.S. are 
compared to “other Christians” (this is a catch-all category that includes Mainline 
Protestants, Catholics, and other Christians that are not Pentecostal or Charismatic and as 
such may not say much), they are more conservative but not by much (Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, 2006). In some cases, American Pentecostals are more liberal 
than “other Christians.” For instance, they are more liberal in agreeing that the 
government should aid their citizens, and in agreeing that religious groups should express 
their views on political questions (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006). 
This study, (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006) supports the results of 
other studies that indicate that Pentecostals are liberal in certain areas and conservative in 
others (Greely & Hout, 2006; McRoberts, 1999, 2003), but several important questions 
remain unanswered. How do Pentecostals in the U.S. compare in their civic and political 
engagement with Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants, and Catholics? Furthermore, is race 
or ethnicity a key variable that affects the civic and political engagement of U.S. 
Pentecostals? Namely, are Latino and African American Pentecostals more or less likely 
to become civically and politically active than white Pentecostals? 
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A recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center, Changing Faiths (2007), provides an 
imperfect picture of Pentecostal civic and political engagement. It is an imperfect, but 
very useful, picture because the “Latino Evangelical” category used by the Pew Hispanic 
Center’s study (2007) includes Pentecostal and non Pentecostal Evangelical Latinos, but 
it can be used as a proxy for Pentecostals. The fact is that Latino Evangelicals represent 
the majority, 70 percent, of non-Catholic Latino Christians (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, 
p. 9). The study found that 35 percent of Latino Protestants identify themselves as 
classical Pentecostals, but once independent and nondenominational Protestants are 
added to that category (these people are very likely to be Pentecostal in orientation) the 
share of Pentecostalism moves up to 51 percent of Protestants (Pew Hispanic Center, 
2007, p. 9). Therefore, given that the majority of Latino Evangelicals in the U.S. claim to 
be Pentecostal, Charismatic, or spirit-filled (Espinosa, Elizondo, & Miranda, 2003, p. 16), 
the results of the Pew Hispanic Center’s (2007) study are informative about the civic and 
political perspectives and involvement of Latino Pentecostals keeping in mind that the 
category “Latino Evangelical” is not an ideal proxy for Latino Pentecostal. It is also 
important to keep in mind that Latino Pentecostals may be more liberal than  
Evangelicals, especially more liberal than Baptists who represent 16 percent of Latino 
Protestants in this country (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, 9).   
The Pew Hispanic Center (2007) study found that although Latino Evangelicals (a 
category used by the authors to lump together Latino Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals) 
are more conservative than white Evangelicals in a few areas, they are also more liberal 
than their white counterparts in several other areas. That is, while 86 percent and 77 
percent, respectively, of Latino Evangelicals oppose gay marriage and believe that 
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abortion should be illegal, only 67 percent and 61 percent of white Evangelicals do so 
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).   
However, on the majority of issues, Latino Evangelicals are more liberal than 
white Evangelicals. For instance while 49 percent of Latino Evangelicals agree that using 
force in Iraq was the right choice, 60 percent of white Evangelicals agree (Pew Hispanic 
Center, 2007). Whereas 46 percent of Latino Evangelicals favor the death penalty, 73 
percent of white Evangelicals do so. Surprisingly the percentage for Latino Evangelicals 
that attend church at least weekly and favor the death penalty actually drops to 43 
percent; in other words, the more they attend church the more they oppose the death 
penalty (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).   
More important, Latino Evangelicals express fairly liberal views on economic 
issues when compared to white Evangelicals. In fact, 70, 66, and 57 percent of Latino 
Evangelicals, respectively, favor government guaranteed health insurance, would rather 
pay higher taxes for more government services, and say that poor people have hard lives 
due to lack of government services, while 58 percent and only 42 percent of white 
Evangelicals favor government guaranteed health insurance and say that people have 
hard lives due to lack of government services (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 73).  
In terms of political party identification and participation, 36 percent of Latino 
Evangelical registered voters identify themselves as Republican and 36 percent as 
Democrat, while 50 percent of white Evangelicals identify themselves as Republican and 
only 25 percent as Democrat (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). At the same time, Latino 
Evangelicals are more inclined to say that Democrats would do a better job than 
Republicans in three of seven areas identified while they favor both Democrats and 
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Republicans equally in protecting civil rights. They favor Democrats in dealing with the 
economy, dealing with immigration, and protecting the environment, and they favor 
Republicans in improving the educational system, making wise decisions about what to 
do in Iraq, and improving morality in the country (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, p. 82). 
What is even more revealing is the fact that out of all Latino religious groups that are 
eligible to register to vote, Latino Evangelicals lead voter registration at 90 percent 
followed by Catholics at 77 percent (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, p. 84).  
Although the Pew Hispanic Center’s (2007) study shows that Latino Evangelicals 
are more likely to identify themselves as Republican than Latino Catholics and Mainline 
Protestants (36 percent compared to 17 percent of Catholics and 22 percent of Mainline 
Protestants), in several areas Latino Evangelicals are more liberal than Latino Catholics 
(favoring government guaranteed health insurance, paying higher taxes for more 
government services, and opposing the death penalty).  
These results are very important given the active role that Latino Evangelicals 
claim their religion plays in their social and political perceptions. Namely, Latino 
Evangelicals are a lot more likely than Latino Catholics and Latino Mainline Protestants 
to say that their religious beliefs are a very important influence on their political 
thinking—62 percent compared to 36 percent for Catholics and 38 percent for Mainline 
Protestants (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). Latino Evangelicals are also more likely to say 
that houses of worship should express views on social and political questions. In fact 65 
percent of Latino Evangelicals favor it, while 57 percent of Latino Catholics and 52 
percent of Latino Mainline Protestants do so (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). Finally Latino 
Evangelicals are more likely than Latino Catholics and Mainline Protestants to say that at 
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their place of worship their clergy speak out on abortion, 64 percent, homosexuality, 58 
percent, candidates and elections, 30 percent, and the importance of voting, 67 percent 
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 62).  
This evidence presents a very unique and revealing picture of Latino 
Evangelicals—used in this dissertation as an imperfect proxy for Latino Pentecostals. In 
some social and political areas, Latino Evangelicals are more conservative than Latino 
Catholics and Mainline Protestants but in other areas they are more liberal and even more 
engaged. When compared to white Evangelicals, Latino Evangelicals are a lot more 
conservative in a couple of areas, but significantly more liberal in the majority of areas. 
In fact, the political party identification among Latino Evangelicals with Republicans is a 
lot lower than that for white Evangelicals. At least from this preliminary evidence, it 
seems that the move towards Evangelicalism and “renewalism” by Latinos is causing a 
religious landscape shift in the country towards moderate and liberal stances and less 
towards conservative stances with morality issues being the exception. This evidence also 
shows that the Latino move towards Evangelicalism and renewalism does not necessarily 
mean ultra conservatism when compared to Latino Catholicism (where the majority of 
Latino Evangelicals and Pentecostals originate!). Latino Evangelicals are more 
conservative in some areas when compared to Latino Catholics, but they are also more 
liberal and more civically engaged then Latino Catholics in several other areas.           
Research Gaps 
In the end, there seems to be evidence that “there are particular qualities about 
religious social capital that help to differentiate it from other forms of social capital and 
that serve to make it distinctive in nature, whether qualitatively or quantitatively” (Smidt, 
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2003, p. 216). First, the quantity of religious social capital makes it unique because “the 
social capital generated in American society through religious means far exceeds the 
level of social capital produced by other means” (Smidt, 2003, p. 217). Second, Smidt 
(2003, p. 217) argues that religious social capital may well be more durable than other 
types of social capital because religion provides a different type of motivation to be 
involved and that “motivation to remain faithful may well sustain such efforts.” Third, 
the author argues that religious social capital is also distinctive in range (Smidt, 2003). 
Because religion socializes people to deal positively with others regardless of personal 
benefits, many religious people get involved in giving a “voice to the voice-less” while 
getting involved in a wide range of activities such as voting, jury service, and giving to 
charity (Smidt, 2003, p. 217).  
Religion also seems to have a distinctive capacity to nourish social capital by 
sustaining reciprocity among the actors, and this in turn may indeed provide a stronger 
basis for group cooperation (Smidt, 2003, p. 217). Finally, Smidt (2003, 218) argues that 
religious social capital is distinctive because “of the disproportional benefits it wields 
within particular segments of American society.” Religious social capital is generated 
more democratically than the social capital generated in other areas of society as such it 
provides with civic skills and other opportunities for civic and political engagement to the 
most disenfranchised segments of the population. The disenfranchised do not typically 
have the same opportunities as other groups to get educational and economic resources, 
in the workplace and the in family—resources that are vital for civic and political 
participation (Smidt, 2003, p. 218; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). 
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 Although more and more research is being conducted on religion and civic 
engagement, mainly through the lens of congregational studies, the intersection of 
Pentecostalism, particularly Latino Pentecostalism, and civic engagement is still poorly 
understood because, with a few exceptions (McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, 
& McGrew, 2002; Wood 1994; Miller & Yamamori 2007; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Kniss 
& Numrich, 2007), there is still a lot of research needed on the subject. Only McRoberts 
(1999), and Miller and Yamamori (2007) focus exclusively on Pentecostal congregations 
while the other studies have in their samples some Pentecostal congregations.  
To date, there is no comprehensive study on Latino Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement that compares different strands of Pentecostalism and their civic engagement 
practices with those of other religious traditions. Both the McRoberts (1999) and the 
Miller and Yamamori (2007) studies are to date the most comprehensive work on the 
subject, but they either mainly focus on other places but the United States (Miller & 
Yamamori, 2007), or focus narrowly on Pentecostals of one community (McRoberts, 
1999) preventing comparisons between Pentecostals of different racial and ethnic 
backgrounds and Pentecostals with other faith traditions.  
Furthermore, Miller and Yamamori exclusively focus on progressive Pentecostal 
congregations and fail to do a comprehensive comparison between those and other types 
of Pentecostal congregations (2007). By using a qualitative approach, Miller and 
Yamamori (2007) are also not able to provide a concrete picture of the prevalence of 
civic engagement within Pentecostalism in comparison to other faith traditions.  
While Cnaan and colleagues (2002), and Greeley and Hout (2006) used 
quantitative approaches, the former only focuses on social services provision and not on 
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other types of civic engagement, while the latter, in a few pages, compares the morality 
and voting behavior only of exclusively white Pentecostals with other conservative 
Christians in the U.S.  
Even though some work has already proposed typologies of Pentecostal 
congregations as it relates to civic engagement (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 
1999), the model used is static—a Pentecostal congregation is deemed classical, 
progressive, or activist—which fails to explore the evolutionary path of many 
congregations. Namely, it is possible that a classical Pentecostal congregation might, in 
the not too distant future, become a progressive one. In research I have conducted, I 
found that some progressive congregations split from their classical origins dissatisfied, 
among other things, with their lack of engagement in the public square.  
Furthermore, very little research (with the exception of Cnaan, Hernandez, & 
McGrew, 2002 and Kniss & Numrich, 2007) has looked at Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement in the context of immigrant communities in the United States. The “mature” 
democratic system of this country offers immigrants a variety of opportunities for civic 
engagement while engulfing them in an individualistic consumer-driven culture. 
Therefore, does migration status inhibit or facilitate civic engagement? How does this 
variable affect Latino Pentecostalism’s civic engagement, if at all? 
Despite the fact that a significant number of Latino Pentecostals are poor, 
immigrants, single mothers and women in general, including people with low levels of 
education, there is no research that has looked at the opportunities that exist in Latino 
Pentecostal congregations to develop civic skills and how those skills are potentially 
transferred to the individual’s life and community outside of the church including the 
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public square. This is an important area of research because it might illuminate the role 
Pentecostal congregations play as potential contributors to the development of human and 
social capital for the disenfranchised.  
I also think is it important to question several of the assumptions underlying much 
of the religion and civic engagement literature. For instance, even though Wuthnow 
(1999) is careful to point out that being involved in the congregation and its activities is 
still civic engagement, there is a tendency to argue in favor of engagement in the public 
square as the only socially beneficial type of engagement. I would suggest, instead, that 
civic engagement both inside and beyond the walls of the congregation is beneficial to 
society because it develops the stock of social capital in individuals. In fact, for many 
people in congregations, civic engagement may be an evolutionary process. By being 
involved in their churches and the ministries and programs they offer, congregants may 
develop civic skills and an awareness of themselves, their communities, and their 
environment. Some may choose to engage their communities and society through 
congregational and other religious organizational means, while others may choose to do 
so directly through non-religious means. I would, therefore, argue that church 
engagement may actually serve as a stepping stone to other forms of civic engagement. 
Furthermore, I would propose that choosing to engage communities and societies through 
congregations or religious means does not have any less societal or individual value than 
choosing to do so through non-religious means: one is not any less than the other and 
both have the potential of addressing some of the most pressing issues in society, even 
the ones that are structural or systemic in nature.     
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Finally, there is not a lot of research that sheds light on the effect of specific types 
of congregations on the social perceptions and civic engagement behavior of Pentecostals 
let alone of Latino Pentecostals. Are Pentecostals who belong to progressive Pentecostal 
congregations as opposed to classical congregations more or less engaged inside the 
congregations, in their communities, and in the public square? 
In summary, the lack of research on the various aspects of Pentecostalism and 
civic engagement, particularly on Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, may in 
fact result in blanket statements and conclusions about a huge movement that spans the 
world and includes hundreds of millions of people—a movement that some research 
(Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999; Ruano 2007) suggests is quickly 
diversifying even in its civic engagement practices. It must then be asked who are 
Greeley and Hout referring to when they conclude that Pentecostals (in this case U.S. 
Pentecostals) are “ultra-conservative Christians”—with the caveat that they do not tend to 
vote as Republican—or  “fundamentalist” or simply “otherworldly conservative 
evangelicals” (2006)? Which Pentecostals are they talking about? Are they talking about 
classical, progressive, or other types of Pentecostals? Are they including them all? The 
lack of research on the subject and the way some of the research was conducted does not 
readily allow adequate and accurate answers for these questions.   
 In the last decade, I conducted research among Latino Pentecostals in Chicago 
and found that many of the previously discussed research assumptions simply could not 
be confirmed in the field (Ruano, 2003). As I studied family life, intra-Pentecostal 
conflict, and immigrant dynamics, the diversity of opinion and the lived social and 
religious lives of the different Pentecostal traditions and their congregations questioned 
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the generally accepted notion of Pentecostalism as a fairly monolithic, otherworldly, 
inward-looking, and an ultra conservative religious movement (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & 
Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D’Epinay, 1969; Greely & Hout, 2006; Williams, 1967; Wood, 
1994). I did find evidence that supported some of the old assumptions, but I also 
interviewed Pentecostals and observed congregations where things “seemed” different. 
Many of the congregants and their leaders were college educated, young, showed a 
degree of progressive thinking, and more importantly defined themselves not in 
opposition to Catholics (which was common practice among Latino classical 
Pentecostals) but in opposition to “los legalistas” (“the legalists”)—“esos de la senda 
antigua” (“those of the old way”)—in other words, classical Pentecostals (Ruano, 2003). 
Some of the younger leaders told the story of a split and “massive” departure of the 
younger and/or more educated leaders and congregants from the old denominations into 
new denominations or simply into independent churches.   
          Significant tensions followed these events because classical Pentecostal churches 
lost and continue to lose members, churches, and potential converts to the new types of 
congregations that emerged. “Los liberales” (“the liberals”), as the classical Pentecostals 
call them, were reportedly younger, more educated, and cared about “cosas mundanas” 
(“mundane things”). This tension even spilled onto the radio and TV waves where both 
groups went at it for a while (I studied these events a few years ago as part of my 
research on intra-Pentecostal conflict).  
 From the perspective of leaders on both sides of the fence, Latino Pentecostalism 
in Chicago had experienced a tumultuous and permanent change. The Pentecostal 
landscape had been irreversibly redrawn and the consequences religiously and socially 
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were to come. Given the gigantic size of world Pentecostalism, its major and quickly 
growing significance in Latin America and among U.S. Latinos, I wondered if the events 
among Chicago Latino Pentecostals were a microcosm of the evolutionary changes the 
movement was experiencing or was to experience in other places of the world (Ruano, 
2003).  
Originally I had been drawn to the study of Pentecostalism because of its 
prevalence among the disadvantaged in society including immigrants, the poor, the 
poorest of the poor, the uneducated, the elderly, and single women. My research interest 
was particularly focused on finding out if Pentecostalism was or could be a catalyst for 
social empowerment or if it was an inhibitor of civic engagement and indeed the “opium 
of the people” that many researchers assumed to be (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-
Gambino, 1997; D’Epinay, 1969; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). What I found, 
particularly the story of a major split within the movement among Chicago Latinos, made 
Pentecostalism attractive as an audience to whom to address my social empowerment 
questions. Was there a new strand of Pentecostalism? Was it progressive? How 
progressive? How different was it from classical Pentecostalism? Given the story of a 
split in the movement, meaning that the new strand(s) of Pentecostalism evolved from the 
classical version, could it be that there would be more steps in the evolutionary process? 
In the future might we actually see strands of Pentecostalism that address social structural 
issues in their civic engagement the way some Mainline Protestant traditions do?  
My research showed that Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago was not merely 
continuing its dynamic growth, but was also experiencing major internal changes that 
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dared to defy the assumptions in the halls of academia (Ruano, 2003). The changes 
observed, therefore, required in-depth study and observation.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed all the relevant social capital and civic engagement, 
religion and civic engagement, and Pentecostalism and civic engagement literature. I paid 
particular attention to the outlining of the literature that deals with typologies of 
congregations and congregational civic engagement, congregants and civic engagement, 
and the effects of specific types of congregations on the civic engagement perceptions 
and behavior of the congregants. I also extensively reviewed the literature that deals with 
U.S. Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement emphasizing comparative literature that 
addresses the civic engagement practices of different religious traditions. In the end, I 
discussed the shortcomings and the gaps in the literature.   
In chapter three, I will review the methodology used for this study and I will 
extensively discuss the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for 
the Study of Latino Religion of the University of Notre Dame from 2003 to 2007, which 
collected the data used for this dissertation. Finally, I will discuss the role I played in the 
study and collection of the data.  
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      CHAPTER THREE 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I outline the need for the use of a mixed methodology in this 
dissertation, placing a special emphasis on why and how that mixed methodology was 
developed by the research team (of which I was part) of the Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the 
University of Notre Dame. I emphasize that although the design included a mixed 
methodology, the main data produced was quantitative—through interviews and surveys 
of church pastors or key leaders and surveys of youth and adult congregants. The 
qualitative data collected, through various case studies, supplements the quantitative data 
by providing depth and detail to important social realities observed through the 
quantitative research phase. 
 I use a process approach for this chapter, outlining through time the various steps 
that were taken to design the methodology, identify the population, create the sample, 
design the instruments, collect the quantitative data, choose the case studies, collect the 
qualitative data, and choose the methods used for data analysis. Consequently, this 
chapter moves from a section on mixed methodology, to one on quantitative data, ending 
with a section on qualitative data and one on access issues.  
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Mixed Methodology 
This dissertation is designed to be an empirical dissertation that was a product of a 
mixed methodology. That is, although the dissertation is mainly based on the results of 
the extensive quantitative data collected by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study 
conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre 
Dame from 2003 to 2007, as it relates to Latino Pentecostals, qualitative research was 
also conducted via three separate case studies. The fieldwork conducted at the three sites 
sought to obtain in-depth data to inform the social patterns that emerged in the 
quantitative data analysis. In that sense, it is a quantitative dissertation that used 
qualitative methods to obtain more details to triangulate and confirm larger patterns 
observed from the representative sample of congregations and their congregants used in 
the study.   
A cursory look at recent sociological work shows that mixed methods approaches 
have of late become more common (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 39). In fact, some 
sociologists argue that, “given the limitations and biases inherent in each of the main 
approaches—indeed inherent in all research procedures—the best way to study most 
research topics is to combine methodological approaches” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 
393). Silverman and Marvasti (2008) add that, “many research questions can be 
thoroughly addressed by combining different methods, using qualitative research to 
document the detail of, say, how people interact in one situation and using quantitative 
methods to identify variance” (p. 12).   
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A mixed methods approach allows triangulation, which is defined as the use of 
multiple independent approaches to a research question to obtain answers and 
information (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 393). The authors propose that 
The key to triangulation is the use of dissimilar methods or measures, which do 
not share the same methodological weaknesses—that is, errors and biases. The 
observations or “scores” produced by each method will ordinarily contain some 
error. But if the pattern of error varies, as it should with different methods, and if 
these methods independently produce or “zero-in” on the same findings, then our 
confidence in the results increases (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 394).   
 
Other researchers warn, however, to “think carefully before adapting multiple methods. 
Many models suggest that we cannot simply aggregate data in order to arrive at an 
overall “truth.” Choose simplicity and rigor rather than the often-illusory search for the 
full picture” (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008, p. 159). 
 The Chicago Latino Congregations Study, directed by Dr. Edwin I. Hernandez, 
was an unprecedented effort to study Latino churches with the objective of understanding 
the factors that contribute to the growth and vitality of Latino congregations, the social 
impact of these churches in their communities through their assistance programs, the way 
Latino churches relate to other faith-based organizations and secular non-profits to more 
effectively provide services, and the role and needs of the leaders and their congregants 
to continue to be socially engaged. The study was conducted by the Center for the Study 
of Latino Religion, a program of the Institute for Latino Studies of the University of 
Notre Dame. This comprehensive study was funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the 
Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation, the Louisville Institute, and the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation. The study’s methodological intricacies are described in “The Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study (CLCS): Methodological Considerations” published in 2010 and 
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located at the center’s web site. The research team applied for and received IRB approval 
from both the University of Notre Dame and Loyola University Chicago which directly 
covered the work done for this dissertation. Prior to this dissertation, two other reports 
were published by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion using the data collected by 
this study:  “Answering the Call: How Latino Churches Can Respond to the HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic, ” (2007) and  “Healing Hands: The Health of Latino/a Churchgoers and Health 
Outreach among Latino Congregations in Chicago” (2010).  
The research team located over six hundred (N = 606) Latino churches in 
Chicago, more than half of which were Pentecostal churches, once all the “unknown” 
churches were identified (N= 325).  The study defined “Latino church” as one with a 
Latino membership of fifty percent and more for Protestant congregations, or thirty 
percent and more for Catholic parishes (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 
4).   
A proportionate stratified random sample (by religious tradition) of one hundred 
churches was then selected to participate in the study. A total of five “religious traditions 
were defined in the stratum: Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and 
Unknown” (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 7). Eighty-two (N= 82) 
churches participated in almost all the quantitative data collection phases (face-to-face 
structured interview and take-home surveys with the church pastor or key leader, and 
youth and adult surveys) once the non-response churches were replaced (Center for the 
Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 8). Of the 82 congregations, 74 completed the adult 
surveys, and 63 the youth surveys. Six churches, three of them Pentecostal, were chosen 
 
 
78 
 
 
to participate in the qualitative phase of the study. They were chosen either by their 
exemplary ability to engage in the community, or by how well they fit with the 
theoretical typology of Pentecostal churches that I developed for and use in this 
dissertation (“traditional,” “progressive,” “activist”).  
As a Research Assistant that was involved, from the very beginning, in the 
methodological design of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study, I was involved first- 
hand in the choice of methods and the instruments and other research tools used to 
conduct the study. The research team decided that given the complexity of our research 
questions, which sought to understand Latino religion and churches and how they 
engaged in social service provision and other forms of civic engagement, a mixed 
methodology was the appropriate strategy to achieve our research goals. In summary, our 
mixed methodology included surveys with youth and adult church congregants, 
structured interviews and take-home surveys with the congregation’s pastor or a key 
leader, and several congregational case studies.  
The cases studies included, at a minimum, one focus group with a fairly 
representative sample of the church’s congregants, participant observation at events 
and/or services, and analysis of literature and other documents available at the church 
(focusing on documents that provided an insight into the congregation’s and participants’ 
engagement in social service provision and other forms of civic engagement).              
I personally administered the youth and adult surveys at a large number of 
Pentecostal churches in our sample, conducted and administered the majority of 
structured interviews and take-home surveys with Pentecostal pastors (in the Pentecostal 
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churches only pastors participated in the interviews at their own preference), and 
conducted the field work at the three Pentecostal case studies included in this dissertation.  
Quantitative Data 
 All the quantitative data analyzed for this dissertation was collected, between 
2003 and 2007, by the research team of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study. The 
research team, including me, took an active part in the research design and instrument 
design stages of the project. As such, I had an opportunity to design questions and 
contribute to the understanding of topics that were relevant to the life of Latino 
Pentecostal churches and their congregants. 
 The research design included a very detailed strategy on how to locate and gain 
access to Latino congregations in Chicago. Although we were able to locate hundreds of 
churches through the use of published denominational church directories, the yellow 
pages, City of Chicago church lists, and web-based church directories, it became apparent 
early on that a significant number of Latino churches needed to be found in more organic 
ways. Organic tactics were particularly important when it came to locating highly mobile, 
unstructured, small, immigrant congregations, many of which were Pentecostal. To 
address this need, we drove along every single street in majority Latino neighborhoods 
and new Latino dispersion areas looking for congregations. In the end, we drove several 
hundred miles inside the City of Chicago in search of churches. We also developed 
relationships with well-respected Latino religious leaders from several denominations to 
help us identify the congregations we might have missed.  
 These approaches were very successful in assisting us locate churches that would 
have been impossible to locate given some of the patterns we observed in the field. 
 
 
80 
 
 
Namely, we found two or three churches in the same building, but many times they were 
not all publically identified in the church’s sign. This was particularly relevant when 
Latino churches shared a facility with a non-Latino church—some Pentecostal churches 
shared facilities with Methodist or Lutheran non-Latino churches. We found churches 
that had changed their names. We also found large percentages of independent 
Pentecostal churches that lacked an affiliation with a denomination and were not in any 
list of Chicago churches. We learned about churches, particularly Pentecostal ones, that 
had disappeared and moved but nobody knew where they had gone. Finally, we located 
Latino churches in non-Latino neighborhoods mainly as a result of Latino dispersion into 
new areas or because of the availability of facilities at non-Latino churches. 
 Once the population of six hundred and six (N = 606) Latino congregations was 
identified, the research team produced a proportionate stratified random sample of one 
hundred churches. In stratified random sampling “the population is first subdivided into 
two or more mutually exclusive segments, called strata, based on categories of one or a 
combination of relevant variables. Simple random samples then are drawn from each 
stratum, and these subsamples are joined to form the complete, stratified sample” 
(Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 150). Each stratum represented a specific faith tradition 
paying special attention to the Latino religious landscape that has large numbers of 
Pentecostal, Baptist, and Catholic churches, but very few Mainline Protestant ones. The 
sample included Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Unknown 
(Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 6).  
 Another Research Assistant and I focused on the thirty-two (32) Pentecostal 
churches that were part of the sample and the rest of the team focused on the rest of the 
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congregations. We contacted and visited denominational offices (for those that belonged 
to denominations) to inform them about the project and to request their support. We also 
recruited local well-respected Pentecostal leaders from the various strands of 
Pentecostalism to assist in creating awareness about the study and to get pastors and 
leaders to participate. We visited the churches during services and other events to speak 
to the pastor(s) about the study and to recruit them for participation. The study’s 
promotional literature and all the instruments were in Spanish and English making it 
accessible to the particular population we were studying.  
 After much work and significant amounts of time spent locating pastors, 
answering their questions, and working around their very busy schedules (the majority of 
Pentecostal pastors are dual-career, either pastor volunteers or part-time paid pastors), we 
got twenty six (N = 26)—an eighty-one per cent response rate—of the Pentecostal 
congregations to complete all the quantitative phases of the study. We had several pastors 
from the original stratified sample that declined to participate, and most of those were 
replaced with randomly selected Pentecostal congregations some of which eventually 
participated. The churches that did not respond and did not participate in the study were 
from all faith traditions, large and small. The Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, and 
Unknown had the highest rate of non response, while the Catholic and the Pentecostal 
ones the lowest (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 9). 
Out of one hundred congregations in the sample, eighty-two (N = 82) completed 
all the pastor/leadership phases of the quantitative portion of the study, an eighty-two 
percent response rate. Seventy four churches completed the adult surveys (74 percent 
response rate), and 63 completed the youth surveys (63 percent response rate). For more 
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methodological information for this study refer to “The Chicago Latino Congregations 
Study (CLCS): Methodological Considerations,” 2010.   
Congregational data. Each pastor (the respondents for all Pentecostal 
congregations were the church pastors, but at other congregations some key leaders also 
participated) had to complete two instruments as part of Phase I of the study. The first 
instrument (Version A) consisted of nine parts and was administered in a face-to-face 
structured interview format. The majority of the time the instrument was administered 
after having lunch or dinner at a restaurant and lasted approximately two hours. The 
second instrument, Version B, also consisted of nine parts and was administered as a 
take-home survey. On average, the pastors or leaders reported taking approximately one 
hour to complete it. The instrument was given to the pastor or leader the day of the face-
to-face interview and arrangements were made for pick-up by the Research Assistant one 
to two weeks later. The recovery of Version B required a significant amount of follow-up 
and time but eventually all surveys from participating Pentecostal pastors were recovered.  
 Version A of the instrument, with over one hundred and fifty questions, focused 
on the congregation, social service referrals, pastor or leader background in ministry, 
current position in the congregation, social services offered, and top programs, ministries, 
or services. Version B of the instrument, with ninety-nine questions, focused on physical 
facilities, the congregation’s financial information, staffing and leadership dynamics, 
satisfaction in ministry, the pastor’s perspective on political and social issues, the pastor’s 
religious background, the church’s belief structure, leadership profile, and the pastor’s 
financial information. 
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Congregant data. Phase II of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study focused 
on the collection of data from youth and adult congregants. The research team decided 
that the best way of making sure the majority of the congregants completed the surveys 
was to administer them either during the Sunday service or right after it; ideally the 
service would finish from forty-five to sixty minutes early to allow enough time for the 
completion of the surveys. Even with this strategy, it was very challenging for the 
research team to administer surveys at Catholic churches due to the average parish’s size 
and tight Sunday service logistics—they tend to have one mass right after the other 
throughout the day. However, this strategy worked very well at Protestant churches, 
particularly at Pentecostal and Evangelical churches (Baptist, Seventh-Day Adventist, 
and others). The Pentecostal churches tended to have, on average, seventy-five 
congregants on a given Sunday making the logistics and the time it took to administer the 
surveys more manageable.  
 At some of the Pentecostal churches, the pastor decided to administer the surveys 
at the end of their service program, without closing the service, only closing the service 
once everyone had filled out the surveys. At other churches, the pastor closed the service 
early and told the congregants “they could not leave until the surveys were completed;” 
typically the majority of the congregants would indeed leave only after they had 
completed and submitted their surveys. Regardless of the method, at Pentecostal 
churches, more than eighty-five percent of the congregants present, both youth and 
adults, completed the surveys. 
 Logistically some issues emerged. Given a lack of research culture among Latino 
Pentecostals, special attention was paid to making sure that all the adults read and signed 
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their consent forms, and the consent forms of their teenagers if they were less than 
eighteen years of age. Other issues that required a team of research assistants included 
figuring out who needed the surveys in English, helping those that struggled in reading 
and writing complete the surveys (we made sure one of the research team members 
focused on this task), and answering questions on how to use the survey—questions that 
mainly came from the older adults. On average, people took about sixty minutes to 
complete the survey, but there were several people (particularly the elderly and those that 
struggled with reading, writing, and survey instruments) at each congregation, that took a 
lot longer.  
 The youth survey was designed with seven parts including asking for information 
about: you and your congregation, about your faith, background information, your school 
experiences and activities, your family, your opinions about yourself/attitudes and life 
experiences, and social service and civic activism. The survey contained ninety-five 
questions and it took on average thirty minutes to complete. The youth, used to taking 
these types of surveys at school, had very few questions, answered mainly in English, and 
submitted their surveys with very little missing data.  
 The adult survey, similar to the youth survey, was designed with seven parts 
including asking for information about: you and your congregation, about your faith, 
public life issues, family life, personal background, health and life experiences, and 
family life if children under twenty-one live at home. This survey was designed with one 
hundred and thirty-two questions and it took on average sixty minutes to complete. The 
majority of the participants answered the survey in Spanish, and a portion of them asked 
questions about the survey design and how to answer it, or about the meaning of specific 
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questions. A small percentage of the participants, particularly older women, required our 
assistance in reading the questions and writing the answers for them. Given these 
circumstances, some of the adult surveys submitted do have some missing data, but it is 
not a high percentage given the barriers just described. 
 Once all the phases of the quantitative research were completed, the Chicago 
Latino Congregations Study research team had collected data from eighty-two (N= 82) 
Latino congregations, twenty-six (N= 26) of which were Pentecostal. At the same time, it 
had surveyed two thousand three hundred sixty-eight (N=2368) adult congregants, nine 
hundred and seventy-seven (N=977) of which were Pentecostal, and several hundred 
youth, many of them Pentecostal. After making some modifications to the original 
sample (for instance, one Pentecostal church was incorrectly categorized as Evangelical 
because it is affiliated to a U.S. non-Latino Evangelical denomination. However, the 
pastor and the majority of the congregants identified themselves as Pentecostal), the 
study ended up with data for 32 Pentecostal congregations (N= 32). Of those, only 31 
were used for this dissertation because one was dropped for having an excessive amount 
of missing data for pastor and congregant surveys. 
Contrary to original expectations, the Pentecostal and other Evangelical churches 
were the most participative in the study. Although Catholic parishes were also 
participative, important challenges were faced given their size and complex logistics. The 
most difficult to engage for participation were the Mainline Protestant congregations; 
perhaps this was a result of their small size and minimal representation within the Latino 
religious landscape.  
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 The data produced by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study is without a doubt 
the most comprehensive set of data ever collected on Latino congregations and their 
congregants in this country. Of particular importance is the fact that this set of data also 
contains the most complete set of quantitative data that has ever been collected on Latino 
Pentecostal churches in the U.S. By having congregational (contextual) and congregant 
(individual) data, these data allow sophisticated analysis of not just congregations as 
organizations and congregants individually, but also of how contextual church factors 
affect individual behavior.  
Statistical analysis. Due to the nature of the research questions this dissertation 
addresses, there was a need to use a variety of statistical methods. To address how 
different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations get civically involved, it was 
necessary to develop a typology of Pentecostal churches by the use of cluster analysis. I 
then used descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparisons of means) to analyze 
the relationship between the resulting typology of Pentecostal congregations and my 
theoretically developed typology of civic engagement. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used to test whether the differences observed through comparisons of means were 
statistically significant and Pearson Chi-Square was used to do significance testing for the 
rest of the variables with the exception of the pastor’s language where Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square was used. It is important to mention that given the small N for the church and 
congregant data (N = 31), several of the relationships were not found to be statistically 
significant. This may have resulted from having less than 5 counts for several of the cells. 
Namely, relationships that were found to be statistically significant with the congregant 
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data (large N), were, on the other hand, found to be statistically not significant with the 
pastors (small N).      
 The Chicago Latino Congregations Study was very successful at collecting data 
from Latino churches and congregants. In fact, congregant missing data averaged only 
from 10 to 18 percent with very few instances going above 20 percent. When it came to 
pastor/leader surveys, the missing data is even less, ranging from 3 to 10 percent. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, missing data was imputed with the series mean—a 
conservative approach to handling missing data.  
 To be able to generalize from the stratified sample to the population of 
Pentecostal congregations in Chicago, a weight variable was added to the analysis. This 
is only applicable to the church data and not the congregant data because the congregants 
were surveyed because they were present at a chosen (already weighted) church—for 
more information see Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 13.    
In order to address the effect of different types of Pentecostal congregations on 
their members developing civic skills and getting civically involved, it was necessary to 
use logistic regression due to the dichotomous nature of the civic engagement dependent 
variables. And to address how the civic engagement of different types of Pentecostal 
congregations compares to the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, Mainline Protestant, 
and Evangelical congregations, a theoretically developed civic engagement typology was 
used and the relationship was analyzed with descriptive statistics—specifically cross 
tabulations and comparisons of means.  
 The thesis of this dissertation is that there are different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations, and for that matter of Latino Pentecostals, which results in various modes 
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of civic engagement. Based on research and theoretical considerations (Martin, 1990, 
2002; McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life, 2006; Ruano, 2007), I hypothesized that there are three different types of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations—traditional, progressive, and activist.  
As a result, the first task in my data analysis was to develop, using cluster 
analysis, a typology of Pentecostal congregations to verify if my hypothesized typology 
was confirmed by the data. Besides this present discussion, I go into this in-depth in 
chapter four of this dissertation.  
 For the first part (typology of Pentecostal congregations) and the second part 
(typology of civic engagement) of the analysis, the unit of analysis—“the entities (objects 
or events) under study…these include individual people; social roles, positions, and 
relationships; a wide range of social groupings such as families, organizations, and cities” 
(Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 67)—is the congregation, the organization and not its 
congregants, the individuals. As such, I was very aware that the focus of the first task of 
my analysis, Latino congregations, had a small number of cases (N = 31). From the 
original stratified sample of one hundred congregations, of which thirty-two were 
Pentecostal, twenty-six Pentecostal churches (81 percent) participated in all phases of 
quantitative research in our design and five more were added as already discussed for a 
total of thirty-one (31). Although this meant a high participation rate, this also meant that 
the statistical tools needed for the development of both the congregation and the civic 
engagement typologies had to be flexible enough to deal with a small N and not produce 
large amounts of error.  
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In order to create the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations, I chose, on 
the basis of theoretical considerations (Loveland, 2005; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; 
Ruano, 2007; Schwadel, 2002, 2005), a variety of independent variables from the 
congregational surveys (Version A and Version B) the pastor or key leader had 
completed including the pastor’s age and education and the church’s budget and 
membership size (see Table 1). I then proceeded to create several composite variables 
including the congregants’ average age and annual household income (see Table 1)—
congregational variables created from congregant responses—that were also used as 
independent variables in the model. The result was that for each case, or each Pentecostal 
congregation, I had several variables that covered a range of important issues and that 
were added to the model as independent variables. 
 Once all the chosen variables were entered for each case, or each Pentecostal 
congregation, I used cluster analysis to organize and look for relationships among the 
cases. Cluster Analysis, also called segmentation analysis, “seeks to identify 
homogeneous subgroups of cases in a population. That is, cluster analysis is used when 
the researcher does not know the number of groups in advance but wishes to establish 
groups and then analyze group membership” (Garson, 2009, p. 1). This statistical method 
achieves this by identifying a “set of groups which both minimize within-group variation 
and maximize between-group variation. Later, group ID values may be saved as a case 
variable and used for other procedures such as cross tabulations” (Garson, 2009, p.1). 
Although some variations of cluster analysis, K-means clustering, and two-step 
clustering, are used for very large numbers of cases (N > 1,000), hierarchical clustering is 
appropriate for smaller samples (N < 250) making it the appropriate variation for my 
 
 
90 
 
 
analysis (N = 31). To determine how many clusters best fit the data, hierarchical 
clustering allows for the selection of a definition of distance and a linking method for 
cluster formation (Garson, 2009, p. 1).  
The first step in cluster analysis is the “establishment of the similarity or distance 
matrix. This matrix is a table in which both rows and columns are the units of analysis 
and the entries are a measure of similarity or distance for any pair of cases” (Garson, 
2009, p. 1). Once the clusters were generated, using hierarchical clustering, I verified the 
validity of the clusters using a three-criterion method suggested by Garson (2009, p.1). 
The ultimate objective of the validity test is to evaluate the utility of the clusters 
generated to see if the clusters aligned with my hypothesized conceptual propositions (my 
typology of Pentecostal congregations).  
The three criteria used to evaluate validity included size (all clusters must have 
enough cases to be meaningful, very small clusters indicate that there are too many 
clusters in the model, and very large clusters indicate there may be too few clusters in the 
model), meaningfulness (the meaning of each cluster should be clearly reflected from the 
variables used to create the clusters), and criterion validity—the cross tabulation of the 
cluster ID by other known variables to correlate with the concept which clustering is 
supposed to reflect should reveal the expected level of association (Garson 2009, p.1). 
Because this dissertation uses a mixed methodology that includes qualitative data, the 
criterion validity step also included a qualitative analysis of the congregations in each 
cluster to determine if the clusters made empirical sense. As a result of the qualitative 
evaluation, a couple of changes were made to the final clusters used for the rest of the 
analysis.   
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After completing my first task, the creation of a typology of Pentecostal 
congregations, my second task was the creation of a typology of civic engagement that 
applied to both congregations and congregants. I chose on the basis of theoretical 
considerations (Loveland, 2006; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public life, 2006; Putnam, 2000; Roozen et al., 1984; Ruano, 2007; Schwadel, 2002, 
2005; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999; Smidt, 2004; Verba et al., 1995) several variables for the 
creation of the civic engagement typology. Similar to the independent variables selected 
for the model, several of these variables were taken from the congregational surveys 
(Version A and Version B) that the pastor or key leader had completed (see Table 10 and 
Table 11).  
Because my theoretical interest was to understand the continuum of civic 
engagement congregations and their congregants participate in, I developed a theoretical 
typology that included three different levels of engagement: within the church (having a 
leadership role, among others), in the surrounding community (volunteering outside of 
the church, among others), and in the outer society (voting, among others). Besides 
creating several composite variables that reflect the civic engagement activities of the 
congregants expressed in congregational, organizational terms (percentage of the 
congregants that participate in protests, for instance), I also created several dummy 
variables (see Table 10 and Table 11) for each civic engagement activity in which the 
congregation got involved. I was careful to indicate in several of the composite variables 
the frequency with which the church gets involved in those activities to give an idea of 
the depth of the congregation’s involvement in the various activities.  
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 This typology was then used to determine the variation in civic engagement 
practices of the different types of Pentecostal congregations and their congregants, and 
was also later used to compare and contrast the civic engagement of the various types of 
Pentecostal congregations with that of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Evangelical 
churches (chapter seven). Descriptive statistics—specifically cross tabulations and 
comparison of means—were used to analyze these relationships.    
In order to address my third task, how different types of Pentecostal 
congregations affect their members in developing civic skills and getting civically 
involved, I had to perform several steps culminating with the use of logistic regression 
due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables chosen.   
Because more than eighty-five percent of the congregants present in the service 
when the adult survey data was collected actually participated (very close to a census of 
the attendees), I ran descriptive statistics, cross tabulations and comparisons of means, to 
describe the congregant population of Pentecostal churches. I particularly focused on 
congregants’ civic skills, social, political, and moral perspectives, and civic engagement 
behavior. This produced (see chapter four) a profile of the typical congregant. Second, I 
ran more descriptive statistics, this time adding control variables to determine if some 
congregants were more likely to engage in certain civic engagement activities than others 
(for instance, young people are more likely to participate in protests while older people 
are more like to volunteer at the church’s food pantry).  
Third, to determine if there was variation in congregant civic engagement 
behavior from one type of Pentecostal congregation to the next, I once again ran 
descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparison of means) on the individual types 
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of civic engagement activities in relation to the different types of Pentecostal churches. 
Given the large percentages of undocumented and documented non U.S. citizen 
congregants, the cross tabulations to test voting and political party participation only 
included U.S. citizens.   
Finally, I used logistic regression with several models designed to test the effect 
of the different types of Pentecostal congregations (contextual effect) on a variety of 
congregant civic engagement behaviors. For the last two models, voting and political 
party participation, logistic regressions were only run with U.S. citizens. Relevant 
individual independent variables were added to the models.  
This was the most complicated step in the data analysis required for task three due 
to the nature of logistic regression and the complex interpretation of its results. Logistic 
regression is used “to predict a discrete outcome based on variables which may be 
discrete, continuous, or mixed” (Gaur & Gaur 2009, p. 121). There are two types of 
logistic regression, a form of regression that can be used depending on the number of 
outcomes of the dependent variable. Binary or binomial logistical regression is used for 
dichotomous dependent variables, while “multinomial logistic regression exists to handle 
the case of dependents with more classes than two…” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).  
 Logistic regression is useful in determining the “effect size of the independent 
variables on the dependent; to rank the relative importance of independents; to assess 
interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate control variables. The 
impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios” (Garson, 2010, 
p.1).  Instead of applying ordinary least of squares (OLS) techniques, logistic regression 
uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) after transforming the dependent variable 
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into a logit, the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not 
(Garson, 2010, p.1).  
 Unlike multiple regression, interpreting the logistic regression coefficients is 
difficult (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994; Gaur & Gaur, 2009). The values may vary from – 
infinite to + infinite. The positive value means that the “odds are in favor of the event and 
the event is likely to occur while a negative value indicates the odds are against the event 
and the event is not likely to occur” (Gaur & Gaur, 2009, p. 122). Bohrnstedt and Knoke 
(1994) conclude that a “coefficient can be interpreted similarly to a linear regression 
parameter, as long as you remember that the dependent variable is not a probability, but 
rather a logarithm of the odds of the two probabilities” (p. 343). For instance, being a 
Republican, holding conservative political views, and being white (all with positive 
coefficients) each increases the odds of voting for Bush, while being more educated  
(with a negative coefficient) decreases the odds of voting for him (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 
1994, p. 343).  
 Multiple regression provides an exact R square—which tells how much of the 
variation of the dependent variable can be accounted for by the variation of the 
independent variable(s), the strength of the relationship—instead, logistic regression 
provides two approximations: the Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square 
(Gaur & Gaur, 2009). Some procedures, goodness-of-fit tests, are available to assess the 
overall fit of the logistic equation to the data, model appropriateness (Bohrnstedt & 
Knoke, 1994, p. 344; Garson, 2010, p. 1).  
 Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume “linearity of 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one, does not require 
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normally distributed variables, does not assume homoscedasticity, and in general has less 
stringent requirements” (Garson, 2010, p. 1). Garson concludes that the predictive 
success of logistic regression can be assessed by “looking at the classification table [and] 
showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomies, ordinal, or politomous 
dependent” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).    
    The last task of this dissertation was to compare the civic engagement of different 
types of Pentecostal congregations with that of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and 
Evangelical congregations. That is, I went back to the organizational unit of analysis (N = 
82 including the Pentecostal congregations, N = 31). Because I had already analyzed 
different types of Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement in task two of the data 
analysis, I proceeded to replicate that analysis with Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and 
Evangelical congregations. Once that was completed, I compared the results of this 
analysis with the previous analysis to see how more or less civically active different types 
of Pentecostal congregations and their congregants were, but this time in relation to 
Latino congregations of other religious traditions  (see chapter seven).  
Similar to the procedure used for task two, I used descriptive statistics (cross 
tabulations and comparisons of means) to articulate these relationships. Given the large 
percentages of undocumented and documented non U.S. citizen congregants, the cross 
tabulations to test voting and political party participation only included U.S. citizens. I 
also used the same typology of civic engagement I developed for task two (the scale goes 
from church activity, to community activity, to societal activity) to assure that the results 
could be compared to those obtained in task two of this analysis. Once all results were 
obtained, I compared them to those obtained for task two to identify the civic engagement 
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similarities and differences of the different types of Latino congregations (see chapter 
seven). 
In what would be considered an unusual and maybe an unnecessary practice by 
many a sociologist of religion, I separated Pentecostals from Evangelicals because in this 
dissertation I argue that, in the Latino context, that categorization does not at all reflect 
the religious landscape. That is, because there are so many more Pentecostal 
congregations and Pentecostals than all other Evangelical traditions combined—the 
Chicago Latino Congregations Study located 198 Pentecostal churches, 33 percent of the 
universe, 126 Evangelical, 21 percent of churches, and 77 Mainline Protestant churches, 
13 percent of churches, and 85 unknown, many of which were later found to also be 
Pentecostal—the lumping together of Pentecostal churches under the Evangelical 
umbrella obscures the influence Pentecostals have, numerically and more importantly 
culturally, over the Latino Evangelical, the Mainline Protestant, and even the Catholic 
traditions (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 14). It is also imperative to 
keep in mind that through the Catholic Charismatic movement, Latino Pentecostalism has 
exerted a large amount of influence on its eternal rival—the Catholic Church. 
Therefore, it is of vital importance to understand not just the differences and 
similarities among the various types of Pentecostal congregations as it relates to civic 
engagement, but also how they compare to the civic engagement of Evangelical, 
Catholic, and Mainline Protestant congregations.   
Qualitative Data  
 The qualitative portion of this dissertation’s methodology was designed to shed 
more light and provide in-depth detail on the main patterns observed from the results of 
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the quantitative methods. This portion of the research methodology is based on the case 
study approach with the use of various qualitative methods including participant 
observation, focus groups, and analysis of documents related to the life of the 
congregation and its congregants as it pertains to social service provision and other forms 
of civic engagement. 
 The “case study” has been defined as a tool to “get in-depth understanding of 
something—a program, an event, a place, a person, an organization“ (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010, p. 43). Punch (1998) explains that, “the basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a 
small number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem 
appropriate. While there may be a variety of purposes and research questions, the general 
objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible” (p. 150). In a 
case study, the focus is on the process—how things work and why—rather than 
variations in outcomes, in contexts rather than specific variables, in discovery rather than 
theory testing (Yin, 2008). Not unlike other research approaches, case studies can 
“involve many data collection methods, including direct and indirect observation along 
with structured and unstructured interviewing” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 43).  
 In this dissertation, the type of case study used is the “instrumental case study” 
defined by Stake (2000) as a case “examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to 
revise a generalization. Although the case selected is studied in depth, the main focus is 
on something else” (pp. 437-438). The “something else” in this dissertation comes from 
both the analysis of the quantitative data that was the backbone of the Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study and a typology of Pentecostal congregations I developed on the 
basis of theory (McRoberts, 1999; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007).  
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In that sense, the three case studies chosen are both a theoretical and a random 
sample. Mason explains that theoretical sampling is the done by “selecting groups or 
categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your 
theoretical position…and most importantly the explanation or account which you are 
developing” (Mason, 1996, pp.93-94).  The three case studies were chosen to represent 
the three types of Pentecostal congregations in my theoretical typology—“traditional,” 
“progressive,” and “activist.” Once the typology was empirically tested using Cluster 
analysis, a “neo-conservative” church instead of an “activist” one was found. However, it 
was actually confirmed (by verifying where the churches appeared within the clusters) 
that the three case study congregations actually matched the three churches produced by 
the empirical testing: “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive.”   
At the same time, the three congregations were part of the probability sample (in 
this type of sampling “all cases in the population are randomly selected and have a 
known probability of being included in the sample” —Singleton & Straits, 1991, p. 141) 
of Pentecostal congregations that were part of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study. 
The pastors and congregants of the three congregations had gone through the quantitative 
data collection portion of the study and agreed to be one of the Pentecostal case studies. 
Because the case study congregations were part of a probability random sample, it makes 
it possible, albeit with significant caution, to make some inferences about the whole 
population of Pentecostal churches in Chicago in ways that would not be possible if the 
case study congregations were not part of a probability sample (Silverman & Marvesti, 
2008, p. 163). By having three case studies instead of one, it is also possible to compare 
and contrast the research results of the congregations and identify nuances that make a 
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difference in ways that are relevant in light of my theoretical typology of Latino 
Pentecostal congregations. 
One of the methods used at each of the case study congregations was focus 
groups. Seven to ten participants were recruited for each focus group and the participants 
were carefully chosen to represent age (only those older than eighteen years of age), 
gender, national origin, immigrant status, and leadership position in the congregation. 
Silverman and Marvasti (2008) define focus groups as “group discussions usually based 
upon stimuli (topics, visual aids) provided by the researcher” (p. 508). If well moderated, 
focus groups are an effective way of eliciting responses to a set of open-ended questions 
from a group of participants. The group setting “stimulates discussions that would not 
occur in simple two-person interactions and encourages people to explore similarities and 
differences of opinion” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 40).  
That said, the authors recognize that focus groups develop a social dynamics that 
jeopardize the independence of participants’ responses (they feed off one another) and 
limit the distribution of responses in the group because some may dominate while others 
become passive observers (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 40). As a result, a skilled moderator 
is required to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the focus group method and 
reduce the effect of its weaknesses.  
Keeping all these issues in mind, I conducted three focus groups, one in each 
Pentecostal congregation chosen, using a focus group protocol designed by the Chicago 
Latino Congregations Study research team (see Appendix A). The focus group protocol 
consisted of four parts with a total of eighteen open-ended questions. Part I dealt with 
religious and spiritual life, Part II with civic and community engagement, Part III with 
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labor issues, and Part IV with religious identity. Each part consisted of three to seven 
questions and for each question the research team designed several probes that the 
moderator used to elicit as much information as possible. Depending on the number of 
participants, the focus group was designed to last between one and two hours. 
 I chose each congregation on the basis of how it fitted my theoretical, literature 
based, typology of Pentecostal churches (“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist”). 
Cluster analysis and qualitative validity later modified my theoretical typology. Instead of 
an “activist” type, a “neo-conservative” type was found.  I had obtained in-depth 
knowledge about each congregation from the structured interviews I conducted with the 
pastors and their congregants’ responses to the adult surveys—the youth data collected by 
the Chicago Latino Congregations Study was not used for this dissertation.  
A focus group was conducted at what I consider, on the basis of my typology, a 
“traditional” Pentecostal church of about fifty members (after the empirical testing was 
conducted using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “traditional” type). The 
church owns its own building, with capacity for around one hundred people in the 
sanctuary, and it is affiliated to a Latin American denomination that originated and is 
headquartered in Puerto Rico. The majority of the congregants are of Puerto Rican 
descent, but the pastor, a woman in her late fifties, is from another Latin American 
Caribbean country. Although the services in this church are conducted exclusively in 
Spanish, three of the nine participants (all young people in their early twenties) asked to 
answer the questions in English. Of the nine participants, five were women which was the 
overwhelming majority of the congregants—three in their fifties and sixties, one in her 
forties, and one in her twenties—and four were men (two in their early twenties, one in 
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his thirties, and one in his forties). All participants, with the exception of a lady in her 
sixties, actively participated in the focus group. At the end of the focus group, the pastor 
showed up to hear the questions that I was asking her congregants and asked to 
participate and gave answers to a couple of the questions. 
I also conducted another focus group at what I consider, on the basis of my 
theoretical typology, a “progressive” Pentecostal church (after the empirical testing was 
conducted using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “neo-conservative” 
type). This church owns two buildings with capacity for approximately two hundred 
people in the sanctuary and several spaces allocated to a numerous ministries. This is an 
independent church, but the pastor, a Latino woman in her fifties, defected from a 
“classical” Latin American Pentecostal denomination where she had been a leader for 
over twenty years. The majority, if not all the congregants, are Latinos—mainly Puerto 
Rican but with other Latino national groups also represented—and the services were 
simultaneously conducted in Spanish and English. In fact, the pastor preached in both 
Spanish and English and some of the songs were sang in Spanish while others were sang 
in English.  
The focus group was conducted in English with seven participants. Five of them 
were women, who represent more than seventy-five percent of the congregants of this 
church, and two men. Of the women, two were in their twenties, two in their thirties, and 
one in her forties. Both men were in their thirties. All actively participated in the focus 
group and there were no inconveniences.   
Finally, I conducted a focus group at a church that I qualify as “activist” on the 
basis of my Pentecostal congregation typology (after the empirical testing was conducted 
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using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “progressive” type). This church 
owns its own building with capacity for around two hundred and fifty people in the 
sanctuary and its pastor, who has a doctor in ministry degree from a liberal Mainline 
Protestant seminary, actively engages in issues related Latinos in Chicago. The pastor, a 
Latino in his forties, is a self-declared leftist who also originated in a “classical” Latin 
American denomination but left and founded an independent church. 
Although some songs are sung in Spanish and others in English, the services are 
conducted in Spanish. The focus group was conducted in both English and Spanish, the 
questions were asked in both languages. All participants were Latinos of various 
generations and of various Latino national origins with the exception of one who was an 
African immigrant who felt “at home” at this church. The focus group was conducted 
with ten participants—six women and four men. The men were all in their thirties except 
one that was in his late forties. Of the women, one was in her sixties, one in her fifties, 
one in her forties, and two in their thirties. All participants actively engaged in the 
conversation and stayed for the two hours the focus group lasted.         
 As part of the study of the three Pentecostal case studies, I also conducted 
participant observation of their Sunday services. I focused on their Sunday services 
because I was interested in researching the differences and similarities among the three 
churches when it came to dress code (a major differentiator for different types of 
Pentecostal churches), religious practice (preaching, speaking in tongues, healing), 
leadership roles, and social and religious themes that emerged through the religious 
discourse.  
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Participant observation is a research method that “puts you where the action is, 
lets you observe behavior in a natural context (behavior that might be otherwise 
impossible to observe) and lets you collect any kind of data you want” (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010, p. 41). According to the authors, participant observation involves the act of putting 
yourself as a researcher in the social environment of the subjects and experiencing the 
lives of the people being studied; it means “establishing rapport and learning to act so 
that people go about their business as usual when you show up” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
p. 41).  
Although participant observation is a very effective method to collect qualitative 
data, it also has its inherent risks. Singleton and Straits (1999) warn that there is a need to 
balance participating and observing, for the latter tends to create a marginal existence for 
the researcher (p. 330). Namely, the researcher “participates in an alien setting, with a 
desire to be accepted but also a constant sense of separation from those observed that is 
part and parcel of the observer role” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 330). Bernard and 
Ryan (2010) summarize the challenge of the participant observer as one that involves 
“immersing yourself in a culture and learning to remove yourself every day from that 
immersion so you can intellectualize what you’ve seen and heard, put it into perspective, 
and write about it convincingly” (p. 42).  
Although the participant observation I conducted was not as extensive as the one 
conducted by researchers using it as their sole research method, I did face the challenge 
of “immersion and removal.” This was particularly challenging for me because as I 
researcher that grew up in a Pentecostal environment, albeit a different Pentecostal 
environment than two of the churches I studied, I was very cognizant of the risk of going 
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native—“the researcher who ceases to be conscious of the observer role” (Singleton & 
Straits, 1999, p. 330).  
In spite of the risks faced, I felt competent to conduct the observation and also 
used an observation protocol designed by the research team of the Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study (see Appendix B). The protocol consisted of four parts, each with 
four to fifteen specific items to observe. The protocol identified the item to be observed 
and asked one to two questions about each providing very specific examples of how and 
what to observe. Part I of the protocol focused on the spatial map and was subdivided 
into physical structures, aesthetics, religious and cultural symbols, and neighborhood 
context.  Part II addressed the social map, Part III dealt with the temporal map, and Part 
IV focused on the Pentecostal practice (I added this part to the protocol to observe 
Pentecostal specific realities).  
As a result, I was able to collect very rich data from each of the case study 
congregations including the songs they sang, who sang them and how, the messages 
preached, the way the services were conducted, the way space was organized and used by 
each church, the technology that was used, the social composition of the congregants, the 
Pentecostal religious practices, the community that formed before, during, and after the 
service, the feel and look of the buildings, the literature they had posted and distributed, 
the way people become engaged during and after the service, the leadership roles and 
who held those, the generational roles, and the gender roles, among several others. 
There is no doubt that the qualitative data collected not only contributed a deeper 
understanding of the similarities and differences among the various types of Latino 
Pentecostal churches and their congregants, but also humanized my research endeavor. In 
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other words, it made it possible to experience, first hand, the variety of beliefs, practices, 
and discourse of the various modes of Latino Pentecostal existence and it made the 
statistics gleaned from the quantitative portion of the research alive and real.          
Access 
It is also important to note that gaining access to Latino congregations was an 
enormous challenge for the research team that worked on this study. Gaining access to 
Pentecostal congregations was particularly challenging given the isolated nature of many 
of these churches and the dual-career reality of the majority of their pastors, which limits 
their availability. Even after the pastor or key leader had participated in the structured 
interview and had completed the take-home survey, and their congregants had taken the 
youth and adult surveys, setting up the logistics to conduct participant observation and 
the focus groups took a very long time. At times, I wondered if I was going to be able to 
complete all phases of the research design.  
On several occasions, I had to recruit the help of one of the leaders of the church 
(a hands-on person) other than the pastor, to obtain permission from the pastor and to 
assist with the logistics. This approach was very effective because I had already known 
several of the leaders and even the pastors for ten to twenty years, and more than one saw 
their participation as a way of “helping” further my education. Something that really 
caught my attention was the seriousness with which Pentecostal congregants treated their 
pastor’s request to participate. If the pastor asked for the congregants to stay to take a 
survey, the majority (in most cases over eighty-five percent of those present) stayed and 
completed the surveys, even those that struggled with reading and writing. Once the 
logistics and pastor approval had been secured, the overwhelming majority of the 
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assigned focus group participants showed up on a Saturday morning to be part of it “at 
the request of the pastor.”  
Once the participants were in the room, there were very few inconveniences in 
conducting focus groups at the three congregations. Generally people were engaged and 
stayed for the length of the event. Some people, particularly mothers, had to walk out of 
the room for a few minutes to watch over their children waiting outside. The issue of 
bilingualism came up in all the focus groups. Several members of the younger generation, 
less than thirty years of age but particularly those in their early twenties, requested that I 
repeat the questions in both Spanish and English and they mainly responded in English. 
At times, I translated their answers if there were people in the room that did not speak 
English. A couple of the older focus group participants asked very direct questions about 
my religious affiliation and beliefs. To evade undue influence over them and on their 
responses, I would ask if we could wait to talk about those issues until the focus group 
was completed.  
I felt welcomed to these churches’ events, mainly services, when I conducted 
participant observation. The majority of the time I was allowed to sit in the back pew to 
be able to observe the social dynamics unfold, and fortunately very few people looked at 
me wondering what I was doing. The majority of the people would approach me at the 
beginning and end of the event and greet me with “Dios le bendiga! (May God bless 
you!),” the formal greeting of Latino Pentecostals, and on numerous occasions I was 
kissed and hugged as part of the social interaction that occurs in these congregations.  
There were several first-time visitors for the Sunday service and on a few 
occasions I went through their visitor tracking process. This involved the filling out of a 
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visitor slip that asked for my information, the reason for my visit (including spiritual 
and/or other types of need), whether I wanted to be visited by church leaders, and 
whether I had “accepted Christ as my lord and savior.” I was then introduced to the 
congregation as a visitor along with the other four or five visitors that showed up that 
day.              
 All the case study congregations had a team of ushers that assisted me if I had any 
questions and they were instrumental in getting me written information about their 
church, their denomination, and various other documents they had on display or available 
for congregants and visitors to take home.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I discussed the research design of the Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study, which produced the data that I collected and used for this 
dissertation. I outlined how and why I used a mixed methodology and how the 
quantitative and qualitative data were collected. I paid particular attention to the data 
analysis process used for the quantitative data and explained the different statistical 
techniques used and the reasons for their use in this dissertation.  
 Given the depth and variety of data that was collected with the mixed 
methodology used by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study and the data’s particular 
usefulness in exploring Pentecostal congregations and their congregants allowing the 
study of their similarities and differences and how they differ from other types of Latino 
congregations, this approach afforded me the opportunity to do a more comprehensive 
study than would have been possible otherwise.   
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 In chapter four, I will discuss the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations I 
developed and extensively discuss Latino Pentecostal churches’ similarities and 
differences using a variety of organizational, and pastor and congregant demographic 
characteristics. I then compare and contrast the different types of Latino Pentecostal 
churches, their pastors and congregants, on a variety of religiosity, moral, social, and 
political measures.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGATIONS  
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I create a typology of Pentecostal congregations that is 
subsequently analyzed in relation to three levels of engagement—within church, in 
community, and in wider society—which are part of the theoretical typology of civic 
engagement discussed in chapter three. I propose that the ever-pervasive perspective of 
Pentecostalism as an ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly religious 
tradition must be revised on the basis of this study’s results. The fact is that in the last 
couple of decades Pentecostalism has grown significantly, but more importantly has 
evolved into several currents some of which are characterized by progressive social 
thinking and action (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007). Little research 
(McRoberts, 2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Norman, 2007) has documented the 
emergence and development of various strands of Pentecostalism including the 
progressive type, and this dissertation looks squarely at this phenomenon and its 
prospects for the future.  
I look at Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago, both churches and their congregants, 
to shed light on this very important religious phenomenon. I pay particular attention to 
the movement’s implications for communities and society recognizing its present size 
and growth patterns among the Latino community of this country and around the world.   
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I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of congregational research, 
its strengths and weaknesses, congregational typologies, and how I apply this literature to 
Latino Pentecostalism. I then hypothesize a typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations 
and use hierarchical clustering and qualitative verification to test it, and descriptive 
statistics (cross tabulations and comparisons of means) to analyze similarities and 
differences between the different types of Pentecostal churches. 
In the end, I extensively discuss the results of this analysis and compare them to 
those obtained by other research that studied U.S. Latinos in general (at a national level) 
and other U.S. Pentecostals. It is imperative to keep in mind, however, that there has been 
very little research conducted exclusively on U.S. Pentecostals limiting the scope of these 
comparisons. I conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and questions 
in need of further research.    
Theoretical Considerations 
Putnam (2006) categorically stated that, “faith communities are arguably the 
single most important repository of social capital in America” (p. 66). Smidt takes the 
argument to a higher level and proposes that religious social capital is not just the most 
important repository of social capital, but that it is different and that consequently the 
resulting civic engagement is distinctive (2003, p. 3).   
The congregation is the theater where religious social capital emerges and from 
where its resulting civic engagement emanates. Wuthnow (1999) concludes that, “civic 
involvement has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its 
religious organizations” (p. 331). More succinctly, Cnaan and colleagues (2003) state that 
joining a congregation in the United States “necessarily involves accepting a set of 
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norms—including the norms of contributing to the building of human and social capital 
and of being willing to participate in civic affairs” (p. 20).  
It has been found, however, that the role churches play in the formation of social 
capital and the facilitation of civic engagement is a very complex one. Yet, the 
socialization experienced by the churched results in civic engagement within and beyond 
the congregation characterized by a strong motivation to participate for religious, social, 
and altruistic reasons, a socialization not necessarily mirrored by the unchurched (Harris, 
2003, p. 135).  
Congregations are particularly important in providing disadvantaged groups in 
society the ability to develop civic skills that are transferable to other spheres of life 
including the political arena (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999). These 
same authors found that Protestant congregations are more effective at developing and 
providing opportunities for practicing civic skills. Evangelical congregations, however, 
may not be as effective at transferring those skills to the outside world, thus limiting the 
production of bridging social capital (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow 
1999).   
This dissertation seeks to address, through the Latino Pentecostal context, some of 
the most important religion and social capital, and religion and civic engagement issues 
raised by the scholars discussed. Latino Pentecostal congregations in Chicago have for 
decades served the most disadvantaged segments of the community and they are fertile 
soil for the study of the development and transfer of civic skills and the study of civic 
engagement behavior. However, before the Chicago Latino Congregations Study was 
conducted (2003 to 2007), there was no other study that had comprehensively looked at 
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Latino Pentecostal congregations in this country. Some congregational studies 
(McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; 
Wood, 1994) looked at some Latino Pentecostal churches, but came short of analyzing 
the similarities and differences within Latino Pentecostalism in relation to their civic 
engagement practices.  
The research team that conducted the Chicago Latino Congregations Study faced 
numerous challenges to develop a universe of Pentecostal congregations and to later 
recruit them to participate (see chapter three). Surprisingly 26 of the 32 congregations in 
the stratified sample participated—an 81 percent participation rate. After making some 
modifications to the original sample (for instance, one church was incorrectly categorized 
as Evangelical because it is affiliated to a U.S. non-Latino Evangelical denomination. 
However, the pastor and the majority of the congregants identified themselves as 
Pentecostal), the study ended up with data for 32 Pentecostal congregations (N = 32), and 
977 of their adult congregants (N = 977). Of those, only 31 were used for this dissertation 
because one was dropped for having an excessive amount of missing data for both 
surveys. Of the 31 churches left in the sample, more than 85 percent of the congregants 
present when the surveys were administered completed them. Consequently, the Chicago 
Latino Congregations Study collected the most comprehensive and complete set of data 
that has ever been collected on Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants in 
this country. 
 The interest to research Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement came 
about as I first conducted qualitative research in their midst starting almost a decade ago 
(Ruano, 2003). As I studied family life, intra-Pentecostal conflict, and immigrant 
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dynamics, the diversity of opinion and the lived social and religious lives of the different 
Pentecostal traditions and their congregations questioned the generally accepted notion of 
Pentecostalism as a fairly monolithic, otherworldly, inward-looking, and an ultra 
conservative religious movement (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; 
D’Epinay, 1969; Greely & Hout, 2006; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). I did find evidence 
that supported some of the old assumptions, but I also interviewed Pentecostals and 
observed at congregations where things “seemed” different. Many of the congregants and 
their leaders were college-educated, young, showed a degree of progressive thinking, and 
more importantly defined themselves not in opposition to Catholics, which was common 
practice among Latino classical Pentecostals, but in opposition to “los legalistas” (“the 
legalists”)—“esos de la senda antigua” (“those of the old way”)— meaning classical 
Pentecostals (Ruano, 2003). Some of the younger leaders told the story of a split and 
“massive” departure of the younger and/or more educated leaders and congregants from 
the old denominations into new denominations or simply into independent churches.   
          Significant tensions followed these events because classical Pentecostal churches 
lost and continue to lose members, churches, and potential converts to the new types of 
congregations that emerged (Ruano, 2003). “Los liberales” (“the liberals”), as the 
classical Pentecostals call them, were reportedly younger, more educated, and cared 
about “cosas mundanas” (“mundane things”). This tension even spilled into the radio and 
TV waves where both groups went at it for a while (I studied these events a few years ago 
as part of my research on intra-Pentecostal conflict).  
 Originally I had been drawn to the study of Pentecostalism because of its 
prevalence among the disadvantaged in society including immigrants, the poor, the 
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poorest of the poor, the uneducated, the elderly, and single women. My research interest 
was particularly focused in finding out if Pentecostalism was or could be a catalyst for 
social empowerment or if it was an inhibitor of civic engagement and the “opium of the 
people,” as many researchers assumed Pentecostalism to be (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & 
Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D’Epinay, 1969; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). What I found, 
particularly the story of a major split within the movement among Chicago Latinos, made 
Pentecostalism attractive to address my social empowerment questions. Was there a new 
strand of Pentecostalism? Was it progressive? How progressive? How different was it 
from classical Pentecostalism? Given the story of a split in the movement, it meant that 
the new strand(s) of Pentecostalism evolved from the classical version, could it be then 
that there would be more steps in the evolutionary process? Might we actually see in the 
future strands of Pentecostalism that address social structural issues in their civic 
engagement the way some Mainline Protestant traditions do?  
This dissertation addresses many of these questions and it does so with both 
quantitative and qualitative data. The Chicago Latino Congregations Study produced an 
unprecedented set of data on Latino congregations and their congregants and as such it 
allows the analysis of different strands of Pentecostalism and their congregations in 
comparison to Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline Latino traditions.  
Based on the qualitative research I conducted among Pentecostal churches 
(participant observation and content analysis), their leaders (interviews), and many 
congregants (focus groups and interviews) since 2001, I hypothesized that there were at 
least three types of Pentecostal congregations—“traditional,” “progressive,” and 
“activist.” I hypothesized the “traditional” type to be the classical Pentecostal 
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congregation that finds its roots in the original Pentecostal movement of the early 
nineteen hundreds. “Traditional” congregations have been the majority of Pentecostal 
churches and have represented the movement for decades particularly among Latinos.   
On the other hand, “progressive” and “activist” congregations are the newcomers 
to the Latino Pentecostal landscape; they became prevalent in the last two to three 
decades and have now taken a leadership role in Chicago. I also hypothesized that the 
“progressive” type evolved from the “traditional” one, but with time there would be 
“progressive” churches originating from other “progressive” churches with little or no 
direct roots to the “traditional” types. Finally the “activist” type evolved from the 
”progressive” church and is on the vanguard of the movement particularly as it relates to 
civic and political engagement. “Activist” congregations address the social and structural 
inequalities prevalent in society for the benefit of the most disadvantaged segments of the 
population. They are a small minority of Pentecostal congregations, but they have the 
potential of showing the way for other churches to follow, and more important they have 
the ability to seriously empower the most disadvantaged segments of society. 
 With time, “progressive” congregations eventually take the quantitative leap into 
becoming “activist” ones. As they do this, besides providing internally for the needs of 
their congregants, “activist” churches get more involved in the surrounding communities 
and engage social structures to address social issues relevant to their congregants and the 
most disadvantaged in society. Finally, I hypothesized that the various types of 
Pentecostal congregations influenced their congregants’ beliefs and practices. The 
congregants’ civic and political engagement behavior reflects the influence of the type of 
Pentecostal congregation they attend.  
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There was another important trend I noticed in my research of Latino intra-
Pentecostal conflict several years ago. The new types of congregations seemed to have 
major disagreements among themselves particularly in regards to prosperity theology (a 
teaching that emphasizes material possession, consumerism, and upward mobility) that 
has become central to the life of many Pentecostal churches. Therefore, I hypothesized 
that even though some “progressive” congregations would eventually evolve into 
“activist” ones, others would remain as “progressive” types modeling themselves around 
U.S. Pentecostal churches that emphasize prosperity theology.       
Cluster Analysis of Pentecostal Congregations 
Given the hypothesized Latino Pentecostal church typology—“traditional,” 
“progressive,” and “activist”—I used cluster analysis to test if the thirty one Pentecostal 
churches in my sample would cluster in such a way as to confirm or disprove the 
typology. The literature on cluster analysis (Garson, 2009) warned that a large enough N 
was needed for the procedure to produce accurate results (low levels of error). An N of 
31 (the number of Pentecostal congregations in the sample) was low and likely to 
produce high levels of error. I, however, did not have any other statistical option and 
decided to use a mixed methods approach. This approach required the use of cluster 
analysis in an exploratory way and the use qualitative validity (based on an extensive 
qualitative knowledge of the congregations) to verify the accuracy of the resulting 
clusters. Consequently, it is important for future research with a large enough N to 
statistically confirm, via cluster analysis, the final Pentecostal church typology that was 
developed with this mixed methodology.    
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Cluster analysis “seeks to identify homogenous subgroups of cases in a 
population. That is, cluster analysis is used when the researcher does not know the 
number of groups in advance but wishes to establish groups and then analyze group 
membership…Cluster analysis implements this by identifying a set of groups which both 
minimize within-group variation and maximize between-group variation” (Garson, 2009, 
p. 1). I chose hierarchical cluster analysis as my method because it allows the selection of 
a definition of distance, a linking method for forming clusters, and a determination of 
how many clusters best suit the data (Garson, 2009). Whereas other clustering approaches 
such as K-means and two-step clustering require a large N, hierarchical clustering works 
well with an N of less than 250 (Bacher, 2002, p. 3; Garson, 2009).  
I clustered the cases in an exploratory mode (namely, only specifying the 
variables and cases to be used) without specifying the exact number of clusters desired. I 
then chose an agglomerative approach in which each cluster consists of one single object 
(case or variable) and the clusters are combined step by step. In each step, two clusters 
with the smallest dissimilarity or the highest similarity are merged and iteration is 
continued until all objects are in one single cluster (Bacher, 2002, p. 44).  
I used the Ward linkage, which has a fixed dissimilarity measure, as the 
agglomerative hierarchical method because it uses criteria that are well known from other 
procedures (such as, cluster sum of squares) and it does not minimize the sum of squares 
for a specific solution (Bacher, 2002, p. 55). The Ward linkage method also allows for a 
clear interpretation and guarantees a continuous increase of agglomeration levels 
(Bacher, 2002, p. 55). More important, Ward linkage is recommended as the method of 
choice for the clustering of cases when the variables are interval-scaled variables 
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(numerical) or can be treated as such (Bacher, 2002, p. 54). This approach was a good fit 
for this study taking into consideration that more than half of my variables are interval 
scaled variables while the rest are dummy variables. In the end, all the variables were 
converted into Z scores as a way of standardizing the data for analysis.  
Simulation studies that have looked at the factors that influence the results of 
cluster analysis have demonstrated that even when outliers, irrelevant variables, and 
incorrect dissimilarity measures are added to the model only about 9.7 percent of wrong 
classification has occurred (Bacher, 2002, p. 98). Although researches have concluded 
that the selection of variables and the inclusion of irrelevant variables are the most 
important factors affecting the results of cluster analysis, the risk is not very significant 
(Bacher 2002, p. 98). 
Once the analysis is run, clusters are identified using the dendogram, and the 
icicle plots produced. The dendogram (Figure 1) shows the pattern of clustering the cases 
with connecting lines to the right indicating more distance between cases and clusters 
(Garson, 2009, p. 8). The icicle plot is a “visual way of representing information on the 
agglomeration schedule but without the proximity coefficient information” (Garson, 
2009, p. 9). In the vertical icicle plot (Figure 2), the bottom row shows all cases on the 
model as separate one-case clusters except the first pair clustered while subsequent rows 
show further clustering steps (Garson, 2009, p. 9).  
In order to empirically create a typology of Pentecostal congregations, I used 
several important variables that have been identified in the sociology of religion and 
social capital and civic engagement literatures (Chavez, 2004; Greeley & Hout, 2006; 
Loveland, 2005; Schlozman, et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba, et al., 1995; 
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Wuthnow, 1999, 2004) including variables for both the pastor or key leader of the 
congregation and its congregants. These characteristics of churches and pastors include 
the pastor’s age and education, the church’s membership size and budget, and the 
congregants’ average age and annual household income (see Table 1 for more details). 
Table 1. Church/Pastor and Congregant Variables Used for Cluster Analysis  
Congregant Variables  Church/Pastor Variable  
Immigrant status Latino origin 
Gender Denominational status 
Number of children Paid staff 
Home ownership Church budget 
Annual household income Size of church membership 
Religious orientation Language of worship services 
Educational attainment Pastor’s religious orientation 
Latino origin Pastor’s language 
Age Pastor’s age 
Language Pastor’s gender 
Religious switching Pastor’s education 
 Pastor’s immigrant status 
N =  977 N = 31 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), and Surveys 
2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007. 
Note: the congregant variables were converted into aggregate variables before being 
analyzed. For example, the mean age of the congregants was used as a congregational 
variable.  
 
While the pastor or key leader variables included in the analysis came directly 
from the surveys the pastor or key leader completed, the congregant variables had to go 
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through a process of conversion to be used as aggregate congregational variables. For 
instance, the mean of the age of the congregants (obtained from each congregant survey) 
was used as a congregational variable.  
The hierarchical clustering technique I used produced two clearly distinguishable 
clusters of congregations (see Figure 1 and Figure 2): one with seventeen churches, and 
the other with fourteen.   
According to Garson (2009), the utility of clusters must be assessed by three 
criteria. First, the issue of size—all clusters need to have enough cases. One or more very 
small clusters indicate the researcher has chosen too many clusters, and a very large 
dominant cluster may be evidence that too few clusters have been chosen (Garson, 2009, 
p. 1). Second, the resulting clusters should be “substantially interpretable” 
(meaningfulness); and third, the results should pass the test of criterion validity. Namely, 
the cross tabulations of the cluster “identification numbers by other variables known from 
theory or prior research to correlate with the concept which clustering is supposed to 
reflect, should in fact reveal the expected levels of association” (Garson, 2009, p. 1).  
The assessment of the two clusters using Garson’s criteria produced generally 
satisfactory results. Namely, Cluster 1 had seventeen congregations, 55 percent of all 
congregations, while Cluster 2 had fourteen or 45 percent—each of the clusters was large 
enough. I proceeded to conduct an evaluation of substantive meaningfulness and validity 
by running cross tabulations of relevant variables and by qualitatively analyzing the 
clusters based on first-hand knowledge of most of the churches in the sample. After 
analyzing the results of this evaluation, I concluded that the fourteen congregations in 
Cluster 2 were “traditional” while the seventeen in the other cluster were “non-
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traditional” churches. Important differences were identified between these two types of 
congregations after running cross tabulations and comparisons of means on key 
demographic and social and political orientation variables.  
For instance, it was found that while 89 percent of the “non-traditional” Latino 
Pentecostal pastors had completed a Bible institute certificate or had an undergraduate 
degree or more, 79 percent of the “traditional” congregation pastors had done so. The 
results of other cross tabulations further confirmed the differences. For instance, while 50 
and 37 percent of “traditional” and “non-traditional” Pentecostal church pastors, 
respectively, stated that the Bible is the word of God that must be taken literally. Then 
too, 50 percent of “traditional” church pastors claimed to be conservative religiously 
speaking, but only 27 percent of their “non-traditional” counterparts made such a claim. 
Also, only 43 percent of “non-traditional” congregation pastors compared to 50 
percent of the “traditional” ones stated that abortion is never acceptable. Finally, while 43 
percent of “non-traditional” church pastors reported mainly speaking English at home 
and with friends, none of their “traditional” counterparts reported the same.      
Therefore, cluster analysis clearly produced two fairly distinctive types of 
Pentecostal congregations, “traditional” (Cluster 2) and “non-traditional” (Cluster 1). Of 
relevance is the fact that 55 percent of congregations were found to be “non-traditional.”  
In other words, “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches were found to be in the 
minority. When all the “traditional” churches were analyzed based on their 
denominational affiliation and other qualitative knowledge, it was found that an 
overwhelming majority are classical Pentecostal congregations, the original Latino 
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Pentecostal church. This preliminary analysis hints at the fact that there are now more   
Latino Pentecostal congregations that are not classical in nature.  
While inspecting these clusters, I concluded that three of the congregations in 
Cluster 1 (cases 2, 4, and 20) and three in Cluster 2 (cases 22, 25, and 26) were not 
similar to the other churches in their respective clusters. From first-hand qualitative 
knowledge of those congregations, it did not make substantive and empirical sense to 
place them in the cluster were they had been placed. The case 2 and 4 churches were 
found to be different than the rest of Cluster 1 churches because they were affiliated, for 
decades, to Church of God which in the Latino context is a very conservative and 
traditional denomination. The churches’ pastors were also known for being very classical 
in their belief and practice. Case 20 was also found to be different than their peers in 
Cluster 1 because it is affiliated to one of the most conservative U.S. Latino Pentecostal 
denominations in Chicago. In fact, this church is one of the oldest Latino Pentecostal 
churches in the city (54 years of age) and has always been affiliated to the same 
conservative denomination. Its pastor is without a doubt one of the most conservative 
Pentecostal pastors in the city of Chicago.  I proceeded to switch Case 2, 4, and 20 from 
Cluster 1 (“non-traditional”) to Cluster 2 (“traditional”) in order to reflect the qualitative 
knowledge of the congregations. 
The Case 25 and 26 churches were also found to be different than the rest of 
Cluster 2 churches because they were affiliated from their very founding with Central 
American denominations that are well documented as not being classical in their belief 
and practice. At least one of them is a well-knows Latino mega church (300 to 500 
members) and it attracts large segments of the Central American middle classes of the 
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city. The Case 22 church was also found to be different than its peers in Cluster 2 because 
it has, from the very beginning, been affiliated to the Assemblies of God which in the 
Latino context is a fairly moderate denomination and not very classical in its belief and 
practice. The pastor is also known for his prosperity theology teachings.  I proceeded to 
switch Case 22, 25, and 26 from Cluster 2 (“traditional”) to Cluster 1 (“non-traditional”) 
in order to reflect the qualitative knowledge of the congregations. 
After having switched Cases 2, 4, 20, 22, 25, and 26,  I re-inspected the clusters 
qualitatively, and I was satisfied that all the churches in the “traditional” cluster (Cluster 
2) were indeed very similar to each other.  However, a similar  re-inspection of the 
churches in the non-traditional Cluster 1 showed that a handful of the churches included 
in that cluster (Cases 1, 10, 15, 18, 21) were not very similar to their peers nor were they 
similar to Cluster 2 churches. Cases 1, 10, and 15 are recently founded independent 
churches that trace their origins back to classical Pentecostal churches but they left their 
denominations due to irreconcilable differences. Their pastors are very young and highly 
educated and well known for getting involved in a variety of social causes. At least one 
of the churches has a sister church which is one of the largest Latino mega churches in 
the City. The other two churches share very interesting commonalities. First, they are 
both affiliated to conservative denominations; in fact, one of them is affiliated to the most 
conservative U.S. Latino denomination in the city. However, both pastors, who are highly 
educated (one of them having a doctorate’s degree from a well-known liberal Mainline 
Protestant seminary), do not align with their denominations’ beliefs and practices. Both 
are well known for their liberal stances and the causes they get involved in.  
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Five churches (case 10, 21, 1, 18, and 15) were separated from Cluster 1 and 
further quantitative analysis was conducted to verify if the pattern observed qualitatively 
could be confirmed quantitatively.   
Figure 1. Dendogram 
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Cross tabulation and comparisons of means were conducted to analyze education, 
political affiliation, and social, religious, and political perspectives of Pastors and 
congregants comparing the five churches isolated from Cluster 1 (“non-traditional” 
churches) to the twelve churches left in Cluster 1 (this after the three churches described 
before had been switched from Cluster 2 to Cluster 1).  
The results of the analysis show major differences between the churches. In fact, 
while 80 percent of 5-church cluster pastors had a B.A. or more, 58 percent of the rest of 
the pastors in Cluster 1 had similar levels of education. Also, whereas none of the 5-
church cluster pastors reported being religiously conservative, the majority (54 percent) 
of the rest of the pastors in Cluster 1 reported such a stance. The difference in political 
party affiliation was even more dramatic—60 percent of 5-church cluster pastors 
compared to 23 percent of the rest of the pastors in Cluster 1 reported affiliating to the 
Democratic Party.  
In other words, there is no question that “non-traditional” congregations are 
significantly different than “traditional” congregations. However, “non-traditional” 
congregations also showed large variation among themselves. It was, therefore, found 
that the “non-traditional” category served as an umbrella for two fairly distinctive types 
of congregations, the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” types. Consequently, the final 
analysis produced three distinctive, although somewhat different than I originally 
hypothesized, types of Chicago Latino Pentecostal congregations: “traditional” (45 
percent), “neo-conservative” (39 percent), and “progressive” (16 percent).   
The Chicago Latino Congregations Study as a result of its qualitative data 
collection phase also collected in-depth data at one of each of these three types of 
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congregations. I conducted focus groups, performed participant observation at services 
and other events, analyzed printed documents about the congregation, and also analyzed 
literature they had for display or distribution. Although I originally thought I was 
conducting research at a “traditional,” a “progressive,” and an “activist” church (my 
theoretical typology of congregations), cluster analysis results confirmed (based on the 
cluster that each church ended up in) that they were a “traditional,” a “neo-conservative,” 
and a “progressive” church instead.   
Figure 2. Icicle Plot  
 
Legend: Neo = Neo-Conservative, Trad. = Traditional, Prog. = Progressive 
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As a result of the analysis, my hypothesized typology of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations underwent changes. Two types of congregations were confirmed 
(“traditional” and “progressive”), but instead of an “activist” type, a “neo-conservative” 
type was found (see Figure 2). 
Overview of traditional, neo-conservative, and progressive churches. In 
general (more detail to be provided in the next sections), the results of the analysis show 
that “traditional” Pentecostal congregations are attended and pastored by very religious 
individuals that are also very morally conservative. However, they are also socially and 
politically progressive—much more so than expected! They are, generally, immigrant 
congregations where worship services and activities are mainly conducted in Spanish, 
and the majority of the congregants are women, poor, or borderline poor, and with 
relatively low levels of education. A large number of these congregations are affiliated to 
U.S. Latino or Latin American Pentecostal denominations and very few are independent 
churches. The pastors are more educated than expected both theologically through Bible 
institutes and secularly with undergraduate degrees.  
 “Neo-conservative” congregations, on the other hand, have a mixture of long-
term immigrants and U.S. born Latinos (the overwhelming majority of the members are 
U.S. citizens), almost half of whom mainly speak English at home and with friends, and 
the congregation’s services are mostly conducted in English or bilingually. Surprisingly, 
the pastors are not as educated as would have been expected. Although they have the 
highest levels of theological education through Bible institutes, they have significantly 
lower levels of higher education when compared to “traditional” church pastors. Their 
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congregants, however, have some of the highest levels of higher education (if the “some 
college” education category is added) among all Latino Pentecostal congregants.  
Although many “neo-conservative” churches originated in “traditional” 
congregations (they are now affiliated to U.S. non-Latino Pentecostal denominations 
(Church of God, Assemblies of God and others), U.S. non-Latino Evangelical 
denominations even when the church self identifies as Pentecostal (Swedish Evangelical 
Covenant, Christian and Missionary Alliance, among others), or are simply independent. 
“Neo-conservative” churches are almost as morally and religiously conservative as 
“traditional” ones, and are certainly more morally and socially conservative than 
“progressive” ones. In fact, they are also more conservative on some important social and 
political issues than their “traditional” counterparts.  
“Progressive” congregations, on the other hand, are comparatively more 
progressive than their Pentecostal brethren morally, and are socially and politically 
significantly more progressive. What is revealing is that many if not the majority of 
“progressive” churches also originated from “traditional” ones. Most of the churches are 
independent or are affiliated with non-Latino U.S. denominations. The pastors of these 
congregations tend to be highly educated (in fact, two pastors have doctor in ministry 
degrees from a well-known liberal theological seminary in Chicago) and their 
congregants also have higher levels of education and income. Services are generally 
conducted in both English and Spanish, and both languages are spoken by congregants 
and pastors. 
Surprisingly, although “traditional” Latino Pentecostal congregations are very 
morally conservative, they are generally socially and politically progressive, even more 
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so than “neo-conservative” ones. “Neo-conservative” churches are as conservative 
morally and religiously as “traditional” ones, and socially and politically more so. Only 
“progressive” congregations show some moral progressiveness, and significant social and 
political differences in comparison to both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches. 
However, I emphasize that “traditional” churches are not far behind “progressive” ones in 
several social and political issues. “Progressive” congregation pastors are by far the most 
educated pastors; almost all of them have a B.A. degree or more. All Latino Pentecostal 
congregations, without exception, are very religious with strong Bible beliefs. 
The qualitative research conducted among the representative case study 
congregations seemed to hint that while “progressive” congregations, particularly their 
pastors, displayed a humanistic perspective of life and their role in society, “traditional” 
churches had a spiritualistic perspective. Whereas “progressive” pastors and even their 
congregants seemed to believe, as reflected by their discourse, that it is human beings that 
cause problems and fix them with the help of God, their “traditional” brothers believed 
that it is angels and demons that influence people to do what they do and God, after 
defeating the devil and his evil soldiers, fixes it—mainly supernaturally and sometimes 
through the use of his anointed. Research may show that both of these mind sets are 
operational at the same time, but certain types of Pentecostals emphasize one more than 
the other at a given time or place. The “neo-conservative” pastors and their congregants 
aligned more with what was observed with their “progressive” brethren than with 
“traditional” types.  
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Demographic Profiles of Traditional, Neo-Conservative, and Progressive Churches 
 Significance testing using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Chi-Square (Pearson 
and Likelihood Ratio) was performed on all congregant and pastor relationships. All 
congregant relationships with the exception of having three of more children were 
significant (p < .05). Given the small N for pastors (N = 31) resulting in small cell counts, 
three relationships (age, gender, and U.S. citizenship status) were not statistically 
significant, but the rest were all significant at p < .05 with the exception of one 
(language) which was significant at p < .10.    
 The mean age of congregants at the three different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations is very similar ranging from 38 to 41 years of age. Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to test whether the age differences observed among different types 
of Latino Pentecostal congregants were significant. The null hypothesis (there are no age 
differences for the congregants of the three different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations) is rejected (p = .025).  A similar pattern is observed with the gender 
structure of the congregations; women are the majority of the congregants ranging from 
58 to 66 percent with “neo-conservative” congregations experiencing the highest point in 
the range and “traditional” ones the lowest. This was the extent of the demographic 
similarities among Latino Pentecostals in Chicago.  
Among the churches, significant differences are observed on immigration and 
citizenship status, language, education, and the annual household income of congregants 
(Table 2). Whereas 25 percent of the congregants of “traditional” churches have some 
college education or more, 42 and 43 percent of those that attend “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” churches, respectively, report the same. Even more important, while 75 
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percent of “traditional” church congregations report having H.S./GED or less, 58 and 57 
percent of their “neo-conservative” and “progressive” counterparts, respectively, report 
the same.  
The educational achievement of the congregants directly affects their annual 
household income. Therefore, while 39 percent of those that attend “traditional” 
congregations report an annual household income of $24,999 or less, those numbers drop 
to 31 and 32 percent, respectively, for those attending “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” churches. 
Even more important is the fact that Latino Pentecostal congregations, 
particularly “traditional” ones, are still havens for the poor and disfranchised of society—
still there after one hundred years. In fact, 25 percent of “traditional” church congregants 
report annual household incomes of $14,999 or less and it drops to 23 and 18 percent for 
those that attend both “progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregations, respectively. 
On the other hand, 18 percent of “neo-conservative” church congregants report annual 
household incomes of $50,000 and more (only 1 percent higher than “progressive” 
church congregants), which is three hundred percent more than the 6 percent of 
“traditional” church congregants that report the same annual household income.  
These data are starting to paint a revealing picture of the Latino Pentecostal 
churches of Chicago. It shows that all Latino churches are the homes of women, the poor, 
and working classes, but it also reveals that both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” 
congregations although still having the poor and uneducated in their midst are also 
quickly becoming the home of the college educated and middle classes of the Latino 
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community. More important, these data confirm that “traditional” Pentecostal churches 
continue to be the home of the truly disadvantaged of the Latino community. 
Table 2. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Congregants 
by Church Type 
 
Characteristic Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
Mean age  38 41 39 39+ 
Percentage     
Women 58 66 63 62* 
Citizenship     
       Undocumented 27 5 9 14* 
       Legal Resident 40 22 22 28* 
       U.S. citizen 31 73 69 58* 
Household Income     
       < $15,000 25 18 23 34* 
       < $25,000 39 31 32 22* 
       < $50,000 94 82 83 86* 
       $50,000 and above 6 18 17 14* 
Education     
        H.S./GED or less 75 58 57 63* 
        Some college plus 25 42 43 37* 
Have 3 or more children 49 51 49 50** 
Language at home and with 
Friends     
        More or only English 4 30 27 20* 
        Only or more Spanish 79 48 44 57* 
        Both languages equally 17 22 29 23* 
N 480 312 185 977 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
**Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
+ Significantly different from an overall mean at p<.05 
These data are starting to paint a revealing picture of the Latino Pentecostal 
churches of Chicago. It shows that all Latino churches are the homes of women, the poor, 
and working classes, but it also reveals that both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” 
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congregations although still having the poor and uneducated in their midst are also 
quickly becoming the home of the college educated and middle classes of the Latino 
community. More important, these data confirm that “traditional” Pentecostal churches 
continue to be the home of the truly disadvantaged of the Latino community. 
 The annual household income and education reported by the congregants of the 
different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations is directly related to their immigrant 
and citizenship status in this country. Whereas 27 percent of those that attend 
“traditional” congregations report being undocumented, this drops precipitously to only 9 
and 5 percent for “progressive” and   “neo-conservative” churches respectively. On the 
contrary, only 31 percent of “traditional” church attendees report being U.S. citizens 
compared to a very high 73 and 69 percent for those attending “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” congregations, respectively. In fact, 30 percent of “neo-conservative” 
church congregants report speaking more English than Spanish or only English at home 
compared to 4 percent of those attending “traditional” congregations. In other words, 
“traditional” church congregants are generally recent Latino immigrants that are not well 
integrated into mainstream U.S. culture, while those that attend the other Latino 
Pentecostal churches are generally Latinos born in the U.S. or long term immigrants that 
are better integrated into this country’s culture. Several of these patterns were confirmed 
with the qualitative research. When the focus groups were conducted at “neo-
conservative” and “progressive” congregations, it was necessary to do them mainly in 
English (“neo-conservative” church) or bilingually (“progressive” church) because the 
majority of the congregants could not fully participate in Spanish.      
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 When looking at the national origin of those that attend the different types of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations, it is evident that the majority of “traditional” church 
attendees are of Mexican descent (58 percent), followed by those of Central American 
(20 percent) and Puerto Rican (9 percent) origin—these three Latino origin groups 
represent an amazing 87 percent of those that attend “traditional” churches.  However, 
the distribution quickly reverses for “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations. 
“Neo-conservative” churches have 43, 23, and 14 percent, respectively, of Puerto Rican, 
Mexican, and Central American descent congregants. This same pattern is observed at 
“progressive” churches. Congregants of Puerto Rican descent represent almost half of 
Latinos that attend “progressive” congregations at 48 percent followed at a distance by 
those of Mexican origin at 20 percent and those of Central American descent at 12 
percent.  
 A review of these statistics clearly shows that although there are some similarities 
among Latinos Pentecostals, particularly related to gender and age, there are significant 
differences among them in education, annual household income, immigration and 
citizenship status, language, and even national origin. In essence, Latino Pentecostal 
congregations are not as heterogeneous as might have been thought. They are either 
attended by immigrants (significant numbers of which are undocumented) with lower 
levels of education, many of which live on less than $24,999 of annual income, mainly 
speak Spanish at home and with friends, are women, and of Mexican descent 
(“traditional” congregations) or are attended by Latinos that are almost exclusively U.S. 
citizens, many of whom speak more English or only English at home and with friends, 
live on more than $24,999 of annual income, are women, have medium levels of 
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education and are of Puerto Rican descent (“neo-conservative” congregations). Latinos 
that attend “progressive” congregations are more similar to those that attend their “neo-
conservative” counterparts than they are to those that attend “traditional” churches.  
In other words, Latino Pentecostal congregations are hardly diverse religious 
organizations that mirror the diversity of national origin and the wide social diversity of 
the Latino community. Instead these churches seem more and more to attract national 
groups and social classes with a growing distinction between those that exist primarily to 
serve the needs of the truly disadvantaged and disfranchised of the Latino community 
(‘traditional” churches) and those that focus on serving the needs of the working and 
middle classes, the upwardly mobile, of the Latino community (the “progressive” and 
“neo-conservative” churches, particularly the latter ones).  
Further evidence of this disparity was found when I attended church events to 
conduct participant observation. Although all the churches were located in Latino 
neighborhoods, the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregations had comfortable 
larger facilities where they conducted services and delivered programs—both buildings 
were church buildings. The “traditional” church, although it owned its own building, was 
housed in a facility that had a rental apartment in the second floor and was in need of 
repair—it was in essence a storefront church. In fact, we had a hard time finding space 
adequate to conduct the focus group. Further evidence to underscore this was obtained 
when the make and model year of the cars parked at the churches’ parking lots was 
observed.     
 Do some of the same patterns observed with congregants also hold true with the 
church pastors? Because several of the pastor relationships were not found to be 
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statistically significant, the analysis of the results of those relationships does not allow for 
comparisons of the different types of Pentecostal pastors to be made (see Table 3). 
However, the results clearly show that the overwhelming majority Latino Pentecostal 
pastors (84 percent) are male and although some variation among the different types is 
hinted it cannot be confirmed because gender was not found to be statistically significant. 
Having 16 percent women pastors is not a significant sign of equal sharing of power at 
the highest level in Latino Pentecostalism, but the number serves to illustrate the power 
spaces that women have enjoyed among Pentecostals from the very begging—spaces that 
they presently do not even enjoy in many Christian traditions. In fact, both the “neo-
conservative” and the “traditional” Pentecostal church case studies included in this 
dissertation were pastored by women, while the “progressive” one was pastored by a 
man.      
 When it comes to age, 60 percent of all Latino Pentecostal pastors are 50 years of 
age or younger. Although some differences among the various types of Pentecostal 
pastors are hinted by the data, they cannot be confirmed because age was found not to be 
statistically significant. What is clear is that the majority of Latino Pentecostal pastors are 
fairly young. An overwhelming, 93 percent, majority of Latino Pentecostal pastors report 
being U.S. citizens whiles only 2 percent report being undocumented. This is a major 
difference when compared with their congregants. What is really telling is that none of 
the “traditional” church pastors claim to speak more or only English at home and with 
friends in comparison to 46, and 40 percent of those that pastor “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” congregations, respectively. In fact, 93 percent of “traditional” church 
pastors report speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends.  
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Table 3. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by 
Church Type 
 
Characteristic Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
Percentage     
< 50 years old  57 64 60 60 
Men 80 92 80 84 
Citizenship     
       Undocumented  7 0 0 2 
       Legal Resident 13 0 0 4 
       U.S. citizen 80 100 100 93 
Education     
       Some college or less 21 14 0 12* 
Bible institute or   
diocesan lay program 43 64 20 42* 
       B.A. degree or more 36 21 80 46* 
Language at home and with 
friends     
       More or only English  0 46 40 29** 
       More or only Spanish  93 46 60 66** 
       Both languages equally 7 8 0 5** 
N 14 12 5 31 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.   
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
** Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
A huge difference is also observed when the pastor’s education is analyzed. 
Whereas 21 percent of “neo-conservative” church pastors report having a B.A. degree or 
more, 36 percent of their “traditional” and 80 percent of their “progressive” counterparts 
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report the same. Namely, there is a significant education gap (almost sixty percentage 
points) between the education of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” church pastors 
and (more than forty percentage points) between the education of “traditional” and 
“progressive” congregation pastors. By far, the level of education is the largest difference 
observed among the pastors of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations in 
Chicago.  
Surprisingly, “traditional” church pastors report having higher levels of education 
than their “neo-conservative” counterparts. Once the “some college” educational category 
is considered, “neo-conservative” church pastors significantly go up to 35 percent 
compared to 57 percent for their “traditional” counterparts. It seems, however, that “neo-
conservative” church pastors have emphasized, by far, a Bible institute education more 
than a seminary one where higher education degrees are granted. Namely, 64 four percent 
of “neo-conservative” pastors report having a Bible institute certificate compared to 43 
and 20 percent of their “traditional” and “progressive” colleagues, respectively. 
Qualitative research showed that several Latin American denominations have, in the last 
ten years, started to send missionaries to open churches in Latino barrios in U.S. cities. 
One pastor explained that he was recruited to come to the U.S. once he had completed his 
seminary education in Central America. This may be the reason why “traditional” church 
pastors report higher levels of education than “neo-conservative” ones. The education 
differences observed should, at least in theory, result in differences in religious, social, 
and political beliefs and practice. 
The differences among Latino Pentecostal pastors were confirmed through 
qualitative research. Both the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” case study church 
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pastors went back and forth from English to Spanish as they preached in the Sunday 
service. The “neo-conservative” church pastor preached in both languages doing her own 
simultaneous translation. Then too, the “progressive” church pastor has a doctorate in 
ministry degree from a well-known Mainline Protestant seminary in Chicago.       
In summary, when the pastors of the different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations are compared on a variety of social and demographic dimensions, 
significant differences emerge particularly in education and the use of the English 
language. The differences are more significant between “traditional” congregation pastors 
and both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” ones than they are between these last two 
types. That is not to say that “progressive” and “neo-conservative” pastors are very 
similar, it is just that their differences are less marked than the differences with 
“traditional” church pastors.   
The analysis up to this point shows that whereas the majority of Latino 
Pentecostal church congregants are women, the overwhelming majority of the pastors are 
men who pastor very young congregants with a mean age of 39. More important, there is 
a very significant education gap between the congregants and the pastors of “progressive” 
congregations, a pattern that is not completely replicated at “traditional” and “neo- 
conservative” churches. This same pattern is repeated with immigrant and citizenship 
status where there is a significant U.S. citizenship gap between the pastors of 
“traditional” congregations and that of their congregants (93 versus 58 percent). In other 
words, at least at “traditional” congregations, whereas the pastor is a long term immigrant 
or U.S. born citizen, the majority of the congregation is either undocumented or 
documented but more recently arrived in the United States.  
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The education gap between “progressive” church pastors and their congregants 
does not seem to have been a major barrier. A congregant from one of these churches 
indicated that she thinks the church has grown significantly in the last few years because 
“you are accepted just the way you are, your opinion really counts in this church. At the 
same time, our pastor teaches at a level that we can all understand.” The same lady added 
that “he does not use a lot of technical terms and whenever he does he explains them in a 
way you can understand. He uses a lot of examples; he uses himself as an example which 
teaches me that he is just the same as me.”  
Religiosity, Social, and Political Profiles of Traditional, Neo-Conservative, and 
Progressive Churches     
An analysis of the different Latino Pentecostal congregations’ attendees and their 
pastors as it relates to religious, social, political, and moral issues also illustrates 
significant differences among the different types of congregations. Results of significance 
testing show that all the relationships tested for congregants are significant at p < .05. 
Although most relationships tested for pastors were also found to be significant at p < 
.05, three of them (abortion, giving undocumented immigrants a path for legalization, and 
the U.S. intervention in Iraq) were not statistically significant.    
Of major importance is the fact that while 54 and 50 percent “neo-conservative” 
and “traditional” congregation pastors, respectively, claim to be religiously conservative, 
the number dramatically drops to 0 percent for pastors of “progressive” churches (see 
Table 4). In fact, 40 percent of “progressive” church pastors claimed to be religiously 
liberal or progressive and none of the other pastors made such a claim. Similarly, 
although 54 and 50 percent of both “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church pastors, 
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respectively, believe the Bible to be the literal word of God, only 20 percent of their 
“progressive” congregation counterparts believe so. These numbers clearly demonstrate 
that both “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church pastors are fairly religiously 
conservative and that a huge difference exists when both are compared to “progressive” 
pastors. Even more interesting, however, is that “neo-conservative” pastors are more 
conservative, religiously, than their “traditional” church counterparts, albeit by only a few 
percentage points.  
Table 4. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by 
Church Type   
 
 
Behavior/Perspective 
 
Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive 
 
Total 
Percentage     
Religiously conservative 50 54 0 35* 
Bible-literal word of God 50 54 20 41* 
N 14 12 5 31 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
* Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
When it comes to moral issues, however, the differences among the pastors of the 
different types of Latinos Pentecostal congregations generally disappear (Table 5). The 
fact is that almost all Pentecostal pastors, regardless of the type of congregation, disagree 
with granting homosexuals the right to same-sex marriage. Only 20 percent of 
“progressive” church pastors agree with such a proposal (none of the other pastors follow 
suit) while 93 percent of “traditional” and 92 percent of “neo-conservative” church 
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pastors strongly disagree. When it comes to the abortion issue, only 45 percent of Latino 
Pentecostal pastors believe that it is never acceptable. I certainly expected the number to 
be higher.  
As this evidence shows, when it comes to moral issues (others may call them 
social issues), there has been a significant liberalizing of beliefs in relation to abortion. 
However, almost all Pentecostal pastors continue to stand against homosexual marriage 
albeit with a little less opposition from “progressive” congregation pastors (60 percent 
oppose it).    
The area where the majority of Pentecostal pastors, with the surprising exception 
of those of “neo-conservative” churches, show significant progressive perspectives is in 
relation to a gamut of social and political issues (see Table 5). For instance, 93 of Latino 
Pentecostal pastors, respectively, favor giving undocumented immigrants the opportunity 
to legalize their situation in this country. In fact, a leader of one of the “progressive” 
churches, talking about his pastor’s immigration views, clearly put it: “when it comes to 
immigration, this church following the teachings of the pastor is going to do everything 
necessary to defend those that are not fortunate to have their legal documents.” He 
continued, “I have seen the pastor cry when a brother has to leave the country [due to 
their immigration status]; he has gone to the City and other representatives to see what 
can be done for those brothers to stay.”  
Furthermore, while 100 percent of “progressive” church pastors disagree or 
strongly disagree with the death penalty for individuals convicted of murder, 64 percent 
of “traditional” church pastors join them in that belief (in fact, only 7 percent strongly 
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agree or agree). Surprisingly, a mere 23 percent of “neo-conservative” congregation 
pastors disagree or strongly disagree with the death penalty.  
Table 5. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by 
Church Type  
 
Perspective Traditional  Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
Percentage     
Abortion—never acceptable 50 46 40 45 
Same-sex marriage—
disagree  93 92 60 82* 
Undocumented 
immigrants—agree to 
legalize 
93 85 100 93 
Death penalty—disagree  64 23 100 62* 
Ordination of women—
agree 50 69 100 73* 
Gender equality at home—
agree  93 77 100 90* 
Iraq War—disagree  50 31 80 54 
Politically conservative 64 62 20 49* 
Democratic Party—
affiliation  43 23 60 42* 
Republican Party—
affiliation  0 15 20 12* 
N 14 12 5 31 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
* Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
The pattern of “neo-conservative” congregation pastors holding more 
conservative stances than even their “traditional” church counterparts also holds true for 
the equality of men and women at home. Whereas 100, and 93 percent of pastors from 
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“progressive” and “traditional” congregations believe that in the home men and women 
are equal and should share equally in all decision making that number drops considerably 
to 77 percent for “neo-conservative” pastors.  
Although there may be some variation between the various types of Latino 
Pentecostal pastors when it comes to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, those cannot be 
analyzed because the relationship was not statistically significant. However, 54 percent of 
pastors disagree with the intervention.  
With respect to the ordination of women, “progressive” pastors once again are on 
the vanguard of Latino Pentecostalism. Whereas 100 percent of “progressive” 
congregation pastors believe that women should be allowed to be ordained and pastor 
churches, 69 and 50 percent of pastors of “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches 
believe the same. The ordination of women is the only issue where “neo-conservative” 
congregation pastors show relatively more support than their “traditional” counterparts.  
When it comes to politics, there are also relevant differences among the pastors of 
the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations. For instance, while 64 and 62 
percent of “traditional” and “neo-conservative” pastors described their current stand on 
political issues as conservative, only 20 percent of “progressive” pastors did so. More 
important, 40 percent of “progressive” pastors identified themselves as liberal politically 
speaking while none of the “traditional” and “neo conservative” pastors identified 
themselves in that manner. Even then, 60, 43, and 23 percent of “progressive,” 
“traditional,” and “neo-conservative” church pastors, respectively, lean to or are solidly 
affiliated with the Democratic Party. The highest percentage of affiliation (leans to or are 
solidly) to the Republican Party was 20, which surprisingly came from “progressive” 
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pastors. This may, in fact, be as a result of the prosperity theology prevalent in several of 
these churches. The fact that the majority of “traditional” church pastors claimed to be 
politically conservative and still none of them had an affiliation to the Republican Party is 
outright puzzling. Even more surprising, however, is that “neo-conservative” 
congregation pastors once again, this time in politics, confirm their conservative 
inclination in comparison to those of “traditional” churches by affiliating a lot less with 
the Democratic Party.      
The differences observed so far among the different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations do not hold true when political efficacy is analyzed. In fact, the pattern is 
reversed. While 60 percent of “progressive” pastors claim that their congregations have a 
lot of influence over local/city government decisions, 31 and 29 percent of “neo- 
conservative” and “traditional” pastors, respectively, agree with the same statement. 
Namely, “traditional” church pastors (closely followed by “neo-conservative” ones) feel 
the least power to affect local government. This seems to indicate that those that lead and 
serve the needs of the powerless may also feel politically powerless even though both 
“traditional” and “neo-conservative” church pastors are overwhelmingly U.S. citizens.     
With a few exceptions and to my surprise, “traditional” church pastors come 
second after those of “progressive” congregations in their progressive, even liberal, 
stances on several key social and political issues. Even more surprising is the fact that 
“neo-conservative” congregation pastors, although assimilated to U.S culture, rank last 
on social and political issues. That is not to say that “neo-conservative” pastors are 
generally socially conservative; the results of the analysis simply do not support such a 
conclusion. They are, instead, conservative in some issues and progressive in others. 
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What is not arguable is the fact that “neo-conservative” pastors are politically more 
conservative than their “traditional” counterparts who claim to be conservative but 
ultimately in practice are not.   
The analysis so far shows that when it comes to social and political issues there 
are significant differences among the various Latino Pentecostal traditions, at least as 
demonstrated by the perspectives of their pastors. However, the churches’ differences are 
considerably reduced when it comes to religious and moral issues. “Progressive” pastors 
demonstrate having very progressive perspectives in all aspects analyzed except in the 
issue of homosexual marriage where they are comparatively more progressive but 
conservative nonetheless. “Traditional” church pastors, on the other hand, have very 
conservative religious and moral views, but unusually progressive views on a gamut of 
social and political issues, even more so than their “neo-conservative” colleagues. “Neo- 
conservative” church pastors are without a doubt a lot less liberal than “progressive” 
pastors in religious and moral issues, and even appear to be the most conservative of all 
Latino Pentecostal pastors on several social and on all political issues with the exception 
of the ordination of women where they show more support than their “traditional” 
counterparts.  
When the different Latino Pentecostal congregations’ attendees are studied, 
similar patterns are observed in relation to religious, social, political, and moral issues 
albeit with less variation than those observed with their pastors (see Table 6 and Table 7). 
A very high 84, 82, and 75 percent of “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and 
“progressive” church congregants, respectively, believe that the Bible is the word of God 
to be taken literally. In fact, 80 of all Latino Pentecostal church congregants report 
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praying on a daily basis, while 55, 48, and 45 percent of “traditional,” “neo-
conservative,” and “progressive” church attendees, respectively, read the Bible daily. 
There is no doubt that the great majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants, with minor 
variation among the various types, are a very religious bunch. So far, significant gaps are 
evidenced between the religiosity of the congregants and that of their pastors. This is 
particularly the case with “progressive” Pentecostals.    
Table 6. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Congregants by 
Church Type  
  
 
Behavior/Perspective 
 
Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
Percentage     
Religiously conservative 24 31 23 26* 
Bible-literal word of God 84 82 75 80* 
Daily praying 80 80 80 80* 
Daily Bible reading  55 48 45 49* 
Weekly church 
attendance—once or more 94 92 89 92* 
Very or extremely close to 
God 85 76 82 81* 
N 480 312 185 977 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
* Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
The pattern thus far observed with congregants is replicated with moral issues (for 
some people these are also social issues)—Table 7. Whereas 83 percent of “traditional” 
congregants believe that the moral teachings of the church are unchanging, 74 and 81 
percent of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregants, respectively, believe so. 
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Furthermore, 79, 68, and 65 percent of “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and 
“progressive” church congregants, respectively, believe that abortion is never acceptable. 
In summary, when it comes to moral issues, once again, the evidence shows that the 
differences among the various types of Pentecostal congregants are not that large. It can 
be safely said that the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants is morally conservative 
including those that attend “progressive” churches. In fact, all congregants are a lot more 
morally conservative than their pastors particularly as it relates to abortion. Because the 
focus group results (for the “neo-conservative” and “progressive” church case studies) 
indicate that a significant number of the participants had switched from “traditional” 
churches, it is not surprising that all Latino Pentecostal congregants are religiously and 
morally very similar and very conservative. Although the “progressive” church pastor 
studied came out of a “traditional” denomination, he consciously and actively decided to 
depart from their beliefs and practices. It is important to keep in mind that both the “neo-
conservative” and the “progressive” case studies (the pastors and many of the focus 
group participants) came out of “traditional” churches.     
Like “traditional” and “progressive” pastors, their congregants hold progressive 
views on social and political issues. Namely, while 89 percent of “traditional” church 
congregants agree that undocumented immigrants should obtain legal status in the U.S., 
77 and 82 percent of their “neo-conservative” and “progressive” counterparts, 
respectively, see it the same way. Almost 50 percent of all Latino Pentecostal 
congregants disagree with going to war in Iraq while no more than 10 percent agree with 
it. Whereas 88 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations believe that men 
and women should be equal in decision making at home, 87 and 86 percent of Latinos 
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that attend “progressive,” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively, agree. 
However, when it comes to the role of women in the highest spheres of power at the 
church, the pattern observed up to now changes. Namely, while 83 percent of 
“progressive” church congregants believe that women should be allowed to be pastors, it 
significantly drops for those attending both “neo-conservative” (62 percent) and 
“traditional” (42 percent) churches. It is surprising that “traditional” church congregants 
would hold such beliefs when out of all types of Latino Pentecostals, they seem to have 
the largest percentage, along with “progressive” churches, of women pastors. One of the 
focus group participants (conducted at a “neo-conservative church), a lady in her mid 
forties, when asked about her pastor being a woman answered, “I was very close to the 
other pastor that I had [a man] but I could never be as close as I am to her because she is 
a female.” A young lady added, “I tell a lot of people that my pastor is a woman, and they 
look at me and say “a woman,” like they never heard of it.”  
There is no doubt that while the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants are a 
very religious bunch, they also demonstrate to be a socially progressive bunch. “Neo- 
conservative” Pentecostals congregants, however, lag behind “progressive” types except 
in disagreement with the War in Iraq where they are tied with “traditional” church 
attendees. “Traditional” church congregants lead in all areas, except in support of 
women’s ordination, and are closely followed by those from “progressive” congregations.   
The progressive social perspectives of Latino Pentecostal congregants also extend 
to the realm of politics. An impressive 72 percent of “traditional” congregants claim to be 
affiliated (leaning or solid) with the Democratic Party while 71 and 69 percent of 
“progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregants make such a claim. Remarkably, only 
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14 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants claim any affiliation (lean or solid) with the 
Republican Party.  
Table 7. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pentecostal 
Congregants by Church Type  
 
Perspective Traditional  Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
Percentage     
Abortion—never acceptable 79 68 65 71* 
Undocumented 
immigrants—agree to 
legalize 
89 77 82 83* 
Ordination of women—
agree 42 62 83 62* 
Gender equality at home—
agree 88 86 87 87* 
Iraq War—disagree  47 47 44 46* 
Democratic Party—
affiliation  72 69 71 71* 
N 480 312 185 977 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
* Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
  
The analysis of Latino Pentecostal congregants provides a very telling and unique 
picture. On the one hand, these congregants are very morally and religiously conservative 
(81 percent of them claim to feel very close or extremely close to God most of the time), 
but, on the other hand, they are very progressive and liberal, with a few exceptions, in 
social and political issues. In order to assess how progressive Latino Pentecostal 
congregants really are in the larger religious landscape, the results discussed will be 
compared later on in this dissertation to those of Latinos and whites from other religious 
traditions.  
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A couple of important qualifiers are necessary at this juncture. Although all 
Latino Pentecostal congregants have the puzzling duality of being very conservative and 
fairly progressive at the same time (a phenomenon that is unusual for American religion 
with the exception of what is typically observed with African Americans), “traditional” 
congregants, with one exception—the ordination of women—lead the way in both 
directions. They are the most morally and religiously conservative and the most socially 
progressive, leading all others in affiliation with the Democratic Party, albeit by only a 
few percentage points. Second, it must be clearly stated that when it comes to social and 
political issues, only in the ordination of women, do “progressive” congregants show a 
significantly more liberal stance than their counterparts because in all other areas all 
Latino Pentecostal congregants are progressive with minimum variation in their stances.     
These data also confirm the existence of a pastor-sheep gap among Chicago 
Latino Pentecostals. Pastors in general but particularly the “progressive” ones, are a lot 
less religious and morally conservative, at least based on their religious orientation, 
perspective of the Bible and abortion, than their congregants. A similar pattern is 
replicated in all social and political issues; however, congregants are found to be more 
politically liberal than their pastors with the marked exception of “progressive” church 
pastors. In fact, the difference in Democratic Party affiliation of the congregants and their 
pastors is an amazing 29 percentage points.   
Given the findings of the analysis of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their 
congregants, how do they in general, but particularly those who attend “progressive” 
congregations, compare to non-Latino U.S. Pentecostals? This comparison should be 
enlightening at this point particularly because those that attend church more often in the 
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non-Latino context have been found to be more conservative than those that do not 
(Greeley & Hout, 2006). Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout’s analysis in The Truth 
about Conservative Christians is very informative in addressing this question (2006). 
Their study very ably compares individuals from different U.S. Christian traditions on a 
variety of beliefs and practices. It includes the typical Mainline Protestant versus 
Conservative Protestant analysis, among others. What is unique to their study is the 
comparison of beliefs and practices of Pentecostals (white Pentecostals) with other 
Conservative Protestants.  
The authors conclude that with very few exceptions Pentecostals are “easily the 
most conservative of Conservative Christians” (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171). However, 
they do not vote the way they “should.” That is, “one would expect…they would be more 
likely to vote for Republican candidates than Democratic in the presidential elections. In 
fact the opposite is the case” (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171). The authors clarify that “it 
does not follow that the majority of them voted for Democrats but only that they were 
more likely to vote for Democrats than their fellow Conservative Christians” (Greeley & 
Hout, 2006, p. 171). 
A comparison between Chicago Latino Pentecostal congregants and their white 
Pentecostals counterparts (as reported by Greeley & Hout, 2006) shows that the latter are 
a lot more religious and Bible believing as demonstrated by every variable analyzed. 
Namely, 80 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants (75 percent of “progressive” ones) 
believe that the Bible is the word of God to be taken literally, and 73 percent of white 
Pentecostals believe the same. Whereas 49 percent of those that attend Latino 
Pentecostals churches (45 percent of “progressive” ones) read the Bible daily, 45 percent 
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of white Pentecostals do so. In fact, 92 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants (89 
percent of “progressive” ones) attend services once or more a week compared to 60 
percent of white Pentecostals. And 80 percent of Latino Pentecostal church attendees 
(same percentage for “progressive” ones) pray daily compared to 78 percent of white 
Pentecostals who do so. Finally, whereas 81 percent of Latino Pentecostals congregants 
(82 percent of “progressive” ones) claim to be either very close or extremely close to 
God, only 57 percent of white Pentecostals claim the same (a proxy was used for this 
variable because the question asked was different—“working with God as partners”).  
This analysis shows that if white Pentecostals are the super religious and Bible 
Christians of Conservative Protestants in the U.S. as Greeley and Hout (2006) conclude, 
Latino Pentecostal congregants are indeed the ultra religious and ultra Bible Pentecostals 
of U.S. Pentecostalism. What is really fascinating is that the same ultra religious and ultra 
Bible believing Latino Pentecostals are significantly more politically progressive than 
their white Pentecostal brethren (as reported by Greeley & Hout, 2006). Although the 
Chicago Latino Congregations Study includes a significant number of social and political 
variables on Latino Pentecostals, Greeley and Hout (2006), unfortunately, mainly 
analyzed politics (p. 171). It is important to keep in mind that voting for a political party 
candidate is not the same as affiliating with a political party, but this is the best possible 
comparison given the differences in the two research studies. Whereas 71 percent of 
Latino Pentecostals (the same for “progressive” ones) affiliate with the Democratic Party, 
the authors found that the majority of white Pentecostals do not vote for the Democratic 
Party. Instead the authors clarified that ” it does not follow that the majority of them 
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voted for Democrats but only that they were more likely to vote for Democrats than their 
fellow Conservative Christians” (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171).  
Although the comparison is not of Latino Pentecostals with white Pentecostals, 
but instead of white Pentecostals with Latino Pentecostal congregants, tentative 
conclusions can be made. Namely, Latino Pentecostal congregants in general, including 
the “progressive” types, seem to be a lot more religious and Bible believing than white 
Pentecostals. At the same time, they also seem to be a lot more politically progressive, 
including the “neo-conservative” types, than their white counterparts. Unfortunately, 
Greeley and Hout’s limited analysis of social and political variables does not allow for a 
more extensive comparison, but a trend seems to emerge. Latino Pentecostals 
congregants seem to be the ultra religious and ultra Bible believing Pentecostals with the 
huge caveat that they are socially and politically progressive. This comparison seems to 
confirm that Latino Pentecostal congregants have a distinctive duality that is atypical in 
the landscape of U.S. religion with the notable exception of the Black church and its 
followers.  
What seems to be certain at this point is that all Latino Pentecostal congregations 
are socially and politically progressive with the “progressive” and “traditional” types 
leading the way and the “neo-conservative” types less so (the “neo-conservative” pastors 
were actually found to be fairly conservative in several areas particularly in politics). In 
other words, a split from the “legalistas” (“legalists” as many “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” Pentecostals call those from “traditional” churches) has not necessarily 
resulted in a significant advancement of a Latino Pentecostal progressive agenda because 
“traditional” congregations—where a lot of the new types of churches originated—have 
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been documented in this dissertation to be already socially and politically progressive. 
Instead, it seems that the emergence of “neo-conservative” congregations, depending on 
the route they take as part of their evolutionary trajectory, may in the future cause a 
backlash to that progressive agenda to the detriment of the most disadvantaged in the 
Latino Pentecostal community.  
What this research shows is that as Latino Pentecostals have become upwardly 
mobile with higher levels of education and income, and as they have assimilated to U.S. 
culture, some have taken the path of progressive religion while others (the majority of the 
new churches) have not done so as much. It may, in fact, be that “neo-conservative” 
congregations are still maturing before taking the leap into the “progressive” camp. On 
the contrary, these congregations may also be on the brink of taking the path towards 
conservative religion similar to non-Latino U.S. Evangelical and Pentecostal religion.     
Several issues may actually contribute to help understand why so many Latino 
Pentecostal congregations have become “neo-conservative” instead of “progressive” 
types. The majority, of “neo-conservative” churches are recent arrivals (58 percent of the 
churches are 16 years of age or younger) and as such may still be trying to figure out their 
role and identity in the landscape of Latino and American religion. In their search for 
identity and resources, many churches and their congregants have engaged white 
Pentecostal and Evangelical denominations and individual congregations, the majority of 
which are conservative. Surprisingly, very few Latino congregations look at Black 
churches with their fascinating mixture of intense religiosity, conservative morality, and 
liberal politics as a model to emulate. Instead many “neo-conservative” church 
congregants and pastors listen to conservative Evangelical radio, read their literature, 
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attend their seminaries, enjoy their music, and even join their denominations. That is, a 
significant portion of “neo-conservative” church congregants and their pastors have 
become consumers of white Evangelical and Pentecostal religion and culture and have in 
so doing effectively distanced themselves from the U.S. Latino or Latin American 
Pentecostal movement and the social and political realities of their communities and even 
a portion of their own congregants.    
“Neo-conservative” Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are, at 
least at present, more progressive than both white Evangelicals and white Pentecostals, 
particularly in their social and political views, but important questions remain. Although 
the evolution of Latino Pentecostal congregations will be extensively discussed later on 
in this chapter, several questions are relevant at this point. Will “neo-conservative” 
churches evolve into “progressive” congregations that advance a more liberal agenda that 
ultimately addresses some of the problems faced by the most disadvantaged? Or will they 
go in the opposite direction joining the American conservative Protestant status quo that 
contributes to perpetuating the system? Are “neo-conservative” churches simply a 
different type of Latino Pentecostal congregation that are more conservative than their 
brethren in some areas, but still generally progressive and will remain so in the future? 
The answers to these questions are very important. The fact that a large number of 
Latino Pentecostals in Chicago are part of the truly disadvantaged and that the share of 
those that choose to join this religious tradition is increasing makes the evolution of 
Latino Pentecostalism an important social phenomenon to watch. Almost 20 percent of 
Latino congregations are already “progressive” types. Will these become “activist” 
congregations that proactively address the great structural problems of this society? At 
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least one of the “progressive” church pastors who was interviewed for this study 
identified himself as a “leftist.” That same pastor has been very active in the immigration 
debate and in an intra-racial dialogue among whites, African Americans, and Latinos. 
These are indeed encouraging signs.   
Empowerment of the Disenfranchised 
As it relates to social empowerment, has the rearrangement of the landscape of 
Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago, as documented in this chapter, resulted in significant 
improvements for the most disadvantaged groups in society? A closer look at the results 
of this study shows that women are still the majority of congregants at 62 percent for all 
Latino Pentecostal churches. All the types of Pentecostal congregations serve and are 
attended by significant numbers of working class people (39, 32, and 31 percent of 
congregants have an annual household income of $24,999 or less at “traditional,”  
“progressive,” and “neo-conservative” congregations, respectively). Even more 
pronounced is the fact that 25, 23, and 18 percent of those that attend the same churches, 
respectively, have a household income of $14,999 or less. Namely, a quarter of 
“traditional” church congregants are the poorest of the poor. When education is looked at, 
a similar pattern emerges. A very high 75 percent of “traditional” congregation attendees 
have H.S./GED education or less (58 percent of “neo-conservative” and 57 percent of 
“progressive” ones report the same). Finally, whereas 67 percent of “traditional” church 
congregants are not U.S. citizens, only 27 and 31 percent of those attending “neo-
conservative” and “progressive” congregations report the same (see Table 2).  
“Traditional” congregations have their hands full serving the needs of their own 
congregants. In fact, almost half of all congregants (similar to “neo-conservative” church 
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attendees) report that the church or someone in church helped them with food and 
clothing —this is 10 percentage points higher than what “progressive” church 
congregants reported.  Similar numbers report that “traditional” churches or someone in it 
helped them find a job. Finally, 29 percent of those that attend “traditional” 
congregations claim to have received help to find housing (24 and 23 percent of “neo-
conservative” and “progressive” church congregants report the same).  
These data show that even though Latino Pentecostal churches in Chicago 
generally continue to be a haven for women (62 percent), the working classes (34 percent 
have household incomes of $24,999 or less while 50 percent of families report having 
three children or more), the very poor (22 percent live on a household income of $14,999 
or less), immigrants (14 percent are undocumented) and the uneducated (63 percent have 
H.S./GED less), it eloquently highlights the fact that as congregations become “neo-
conservative” and even “progressive,” they increasingly lose significant ground with the 
most disadvantaged groups of the Latino community (see Table 2).  
It is very telling that although 27 percent of congregants at “traditional” churches 
are undocumented immigrants, the number drops precipitously to 9 percent at 
“progressive” and even more to 5 percent at “neo-conservative” ones. Whereas 25 
percent of “traditional” church congregants have household incomes of $14,999 or less—
the poorest of the poor of the Latino community—18 percent of “neo-conservative” 
congregation attendees do so. This trend is pervasive among those that have lower levels 
of education. While 75 percent of “traditional” church congregants have a H.S./GED 
education or less that number drops significantly to 57 percent for “progressive” 
congregations (see Table 2).  
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Without a doubt Latino Pentecostal congregations continue to be attended by and 
serve the most disadvantaged groups in society—immigrants and undocumented 
immigrants, women, the working classes, the very poor, and the uneducated. However, as 
Latino churches become less “traditional,” (less classical) they also progressively lose 
touch with some of these groups. On the other hand, “traditional” Pentecostal 
congregations, faithful to a history of over one hundred years, continue to be the haven of 
the disenfranchised.  In fact, this analysis suggests that as Pentecostal congregations 
evolve to address the needs of the upwardly mobile (the lower and middle middle classes 
and the college educated) of the Latino community, the “traditional” church consolidates 
itself more and more as the home of the truly disadvantaged. The problem is that 
“traditional” congregations are quickly losing ground in the Latino Pentecostal landscape 
of Chicago going from leading the movement just a couple of decades ago to becoming a 
diminishing minority at present.  
Evolution of Latino Pentecostal Congregations 
Both the quantitative and qualitative data generally support my original 
hypothesis that proposed that Latino Pentecostal congregations have taken an 
evolutionary path through time. In fact, a clear pattern is observed by studying the age of 
the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations (see Table 8). Whereas 50 percent 
of “traditional” Pentecostal churches were founded 16 or less years ago, the number 
climbs to 58 percent for “neo-conservative” churches and 60 percent for “progressive” 
ones (See Table 8). In fact, the oldest Latino Pentecostal church in the sample that was 
studied was a “traditional” church founded 80 years ago while the youngest one was a 
“progressive” one founded just 2 years ago. In other words, although “neo-conservative” 
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and “progressive” congregations still have older congregations in the midst, the majority 
of their congregations are either new churches altogether or new churches that split from 
other churches or denominations in recent years as shown by their founding date. The 
qualitative information collected from the three case study congregations confirms this 
pattern. 
Table 8. Frequency of Year of Founding of Latino Pentecostal Churches  
Traditional  Neo-Conservative Progressive 
1998 1978 1998 
1984 1927 2003 
1926 1983 1991 
1997 1993 1952 
2001 1968 1970 
1985 1991  
1975 1982  
1993 1997  
2000 1995  
1988 1998  
1995 1993  
1951 1990  
2000   
2000   
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
 
The “traditional” case study congregation is lead by an older woman pastor that 
was ordained by a conservative Latin American denomination over twenty years ago and 
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continues to be affiliated with that denomination. In fact, this congregation took over the 
building that was left empty when the original owner—one of the case study churches 
already discussed—left that denomination over doctrinal and leadership differences 
almost twenty years ago. The denominational leadership, all of them in their late 50s and 
60s, accused the younger and more progressive leadership of the church of violating 
foundational beliefs and practices of “el evangelio completo” (the complete gospel) and 
tolerating behavior unbecoming to Pentecostal Christians. 
Both the “neo- conservative” and one “progressive” case study congregations 
originated in a conservative Latin American denomination, probably the most 
conservative one of all. Both pastors grew up and later became youth leaders in 
“traditional” churches. They left the denomination fifteen to twenty years ago over 
“irreconcilable doctrinal and leadership differences” and founded independent churches 
that have remained so up to the present.  
One pastor, who was ordained at the conservative Latin American denomination, 
immediately after leaving founded a “neo-conservative” congregation; she was followed 
by a significant number of people from her old denomination and continues to be a “neo-
conservative” congregation. In a recent conversation she indicated that she had registered 
at a liberal seminary to complete her Master in Divinity degree. The other pastor was 
actually ordained at an independent “neo-conservative” congregation that had split from 
the same conservative Latin American denomination. He left his church to open a new 
“progressive” church.  
The survey data also shows that some “neo-conservative” and most “progressive” 
Latino Pentecostal congregations emerged in response to and from a split with 
 
 
162 
 
 
“traditional” churches in Chicago (some “neo-conservative” congregations have from the 
very beginning been affiliated with U.S. non Latino Pentecostal denominations). In fact, 
80 percent of “progressive” and 36 percent of “neo-conservative” church pastors reported 
switching or changing religious denomination or tradition and only 20 and 33 percent, 
respectively, reported being affiliated to a U.S. Latino or Latin American denomination. 
Although 40 percent of “progressive” congregations are independent, this drops 
dramatically to 17 and 7 percent for “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches, 
respectively. By contrast, 43 percent of “traditional” churches are affiliated to U.S. Latino 
or Latin American denominations, and some “neo-conservative” congregations have from 
the very beginning been affiliated to U.S. non Latino Denominations. In fact, 57 percent 
of Latino “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches reported being presently affiliated to 
non Latino or non Latin American denominations (only 21 percent reported being 
affiliated to U.S. Latino or Latin American denominations) and 64 percent reported never 
switching denominations before.   
In other words, the split produced three important organizational patterns among 
Latino Pentecostal congregations. First, almost half of “traditional” and many of the 
“neo-conservative” types are affiliated with Latin American or U.S. Latino 
denominations, the norm in the past. When many leaders and their churches left, a large 
portion became independent congregations (this is particularly the case with 
“progressive” churches). But many also affiliated with non-U.S. Latino or non-Latin 
American denominations, mainly the “neo-conservative” ones. In fact, several churches 
affiliated with non-Pentecostal and non-Latino denominations even though the church is 
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still Pentecostal in its belief and practice—the Evangelical Swedish Covenant Church and 
the Christian Missionary Alliance are two good cases in point. 
 I hypothesized that Latino Pentecostal congregations would evolve from 
“traditional” to “progressive” to “activist” with an ever-increasing emphasis on 
community and societal engagement. However, the results of this research have shown 
that the “activist” church does not presently exist, at least not in the Latino context of 
Chicago, and it may or may not be the next stage of development for “progressive” 
churches. Given the contested nature of “progressive” congregations, resulting from the 
fact that many espouse prosperity theology and its emphasis on unrestrained materialism, 
individualism, and upward mobility (not necessarily the virtues of Christian leftists), the 
“activist” church, if it emerges, may end up being a small portion of the Latino 
Pentecostal universe, at least in the near future. One of the leaders of a “progressive” 
Pentecostal church, talking about her experience at another church where prosperity 
theology was taught, said “in those churches they focused on how you were dressed, what 
you had on, and they did not give freedom to the Holy Spirit to do with the brothers and 
sisters what he desired.” She added, in this church “they do not see how you come, if you 
have expensive clothes on, what matters here is that you come to receive from the Lord 
and that I did not use to feel at the other church.”   
Furthermore, the unexpected progressive social and political stances of 
“traditional” congregations (to the point of rivaling those of “progressive” churches) 
contrasted with the “less” progressive stances of “neo-conservative” ones, particularly 
those of their pastors, make it necessary to rethink the evolution of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations. Instead of Pentecostal congregations necessarily evolving into ever more 
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progressive types, it may also be possible, this research suggests, that they evolve into 
less progressive churches (“neo-conservative” churches) that may or may not eventually 
become “progressive” types.           
Given the fact that even “progressive” Latino Pentecostal congregations seem to 
lose touch with the truly disadvantaged in the Latino community (in the sense of 
attracting them to be members of their congregations) and that “traditional” 
congregations were found to be socially and politically progressive—a lot more than 
expected—and the haven of the truly disadvantaged, will “traditional” congregations ever 
take an active role in addressing oppressive social structures? Is it for them an issue of 
limited resources or of limited perspective? 
Unfortunately, the systematic answering of these questions is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. A lot more research, particularly longitudinal congregational research, is 
needed to effectively do so. What is clear is that the answers are central to help untangle 
the role Latino Pentecostal churches will take in society—to confront the social structures 
that afflict the most disadvantaged or to contribute to the perpetuation of those structures.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed the need to understand Latino Pentecostal 
congregations and their congregants particularly focusing on the diversity among this 
very large religious movement in Chicago. In an effort to systematically study their 
similarities and differences, I proposed a typology of congregations: “traditional,” 
“progressive,” “activist.” Cluster analysis was then used to empirically test the proposed 
typology. The analysis produced a typology with two types of congregations—
“traditional” and “non-traditional.” Further analysis of the resulting “non-traditional” 
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churches by use of a qualitative validation produced two types of churches (the 
“progressive” and the “neo-conservative” types) which were confirmed by use of cross 
tabulations and comparisons of means. In summary, the use of the methodology 
described produced three distinct types of Latino Pentecostal congregations: “traditional” 
(45 percent), “neo-conservative” (39 percent), and “progressive” (16 percent). In other 
words, the proposed theoretical typology was only partially confirmed by the empirical 
testing. Instead of an “activist” congregation, a “neo-conservative” one was found.    
 Because the majority of both “progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal 
congregations emerged from a major split that occurred within Latin American and U.S. 
Latino denominations, I argued that Latino Pentecostal churches have taken an 
evolutionary path.  As a result, several questions beg for an answer. Will “progressive” 
congregations become “activist” ones and fight social structures in pursuit of social 
justice for the most disadvantaged segments of society?  Will “neo-conservative” 
congregations eventually evolve into “progressive” ones or will they consolidate 
themselves as conservative churches that contribute to perpetuating the status quo? Are 
there two trajectories these congregations take, one towards progressive religion and the 
other towards conservative religion? Is there even another step of development for these 
churches?  
With some exceptions, the new types of congregations discussed emerged from 
the “traditional” type. Consequently, it follows, I propose, that other types of 
congregations will eventually also emerge from those that were at one point the new 
types and little by little there will be more distance from the original type.  
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Because my ultimate interest is the empowerment of the most disadvantaged 
groups of the Latino community (women, undocumented immigrants, the poorest of the 
poor, and the uneducated) the answers to these questions are very important. 
Unfortunately, tackling these issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and so 
further research, particularly the longitudinal type, will be needed to tease them out. 
The comparison of the different types of Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches 
produced very informative results. What is truly remarkable is that at least in the Latino 
Pentecostal context, religiosity (particularly that of congregants) does not seem to be a 
good predictor of social and political beliefs and practice. With minor differences, all 
Latino Pentecostals, pastors and congregants, are intensely religious. Although 62 and 54 
percent of “progressive” and “traditional” church congregants respectively (compared to 
51 percent of “neo-conservative” ones) claimed to be religiously moderate or liberal, 
their religious practices do not at all support this. The fact is that church membership 
ranges from 80 to 91 percent for “progressive” and “traditional” churches respectively. 
As discussed earlier, similarly high numbers of Latino Pentecostal congregants report 
attending worship once or more a week and praying daily. In summary, all Latino 
Pentecostal congregants, regardless of the church type they attend, are profoundly and 
uniformly religious. 
What is even more fascinating is that the ones that are the most intensely religious 
of all, the congregants of “traditional” churches, are also the most progressive in a variety 
of areas including the legalization of undocumented immigrants, equality of women at 
home, and opposition to going to war in Iraq. What was truly unpredictable is the fact 
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that 72 percent (the highest of any Latino Pentecostal congregant group) of those that 
attend “traditional” churches affiliate with the Democratic Party.  
Whereas the higher levels of education, annual household income, U.S. 
assimilation, among other variables, may provide an indication of why “progressive” 
church congregants show progressive stances in key social and political indicators, a 
different set of forces may be operating to influence those that attend “traditional” 
congregations. Namely, it seems that “traditional” church congregants are pragmatists. 
They either do not let their intense religiosity get in the way of dealing with daily life 
challenges (they are the most religious and morally conservative Latino Pentecostals) or 
their religiosity fuels their progressive social and political stances. Because the majority 
of those that attend “traditional” churches are women, it is understandable why they want 
gender equality; because they themselves are immigrants and many of their family 
members and friends are undocumented, they also want legalization for undocumented 
immigrants. Finally, because many of their children and the children of poor and working 
class families they know are in the military, it is understandable why they oppose the war 
in Iraq. 
Of significance is the fact that “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches and their 
congregants have little contact with non-Latino U.S. Pentecostal and Evangelical 
churches and denominations. They are not assimilated to the U.S. Evangelical 
establishment and are strongly connected to other Latino congregations in the U.S. and in 
Latin America. That is, “traditional” congregations and their congregants seem to have a 
very indigenous mode of belief and existence and may, in fact, be operating with the 
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social and political liberal ethos characteristic of some portions of the masses in Latin 
America with their decisive turn to leftist politics in the last decade.         
In conclusion, among Latino Pentecostals, particularly among those that attend 
“traditional” congregations, religiosity does not seem to be a good predictor of social and 
political beliefs and practices the way it is for other religious groups in this country 
(Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 2003). If political affiliation is used as the indicator, Latino 
Pentecostals that attend “traditional” churches are extremely progressive in comparison to 
their white Pentecostal counterparts.    
Then too, the evolution of Latino Pentecostal churches from “traditional” to “neo- 
conservative” and “progressive” has not made any of those congregations and their 
congregants a lot less religious or Bible believers. What it has caused instead is for a new 
type of congregation, the “neo-conservative” one, to emerge as one whose congregants 
are as religious as all other Latino Pentecostals, but are socially and politically, in 
comparison to “traditional” churches, a little more conservative. This is a puzzling 
finding in itself because many, if not most, “neo-conservative” congregations originated 
in “traditional” ones. This is not to say that Latino Pentecostals that attend “neo-
conservative” congregations are socially and politically conservative. The results of this 
analysis do not support such a conclusion. Instead, these congregants are progressive but 
at a diminishing rate particularly as compared to “traditional” congregations. Instead of 
becoming more progressive with education, higher income, and assimilation, they are 
becoming more conservative. That is really the case with “neo-conservative” church 
pastors who were found to be conservative in several areas, but particularly in politics. It 
is important to keep in mind that education generally has a mixed effect on liberalism—
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education tends to increase liberalism, but education also increases wealth which in turn 
decreases liberalism.   
More important of all, “progressive” congregations have emerged where pastors 
and their congregants are also religious, arguably less so than the others, but more 
progressive than all other Pentecostals—congregants but particularly pastors—on almost 
all social and political indicators. It is important to note, however, that there is a 
significant gap between the views and beliefs of “progressive” church pastors and those 
of their sheep.  
The results of the analysis of Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago paint a fairly 
different picture than I originally hypothesized. The Latino Pentecostal landscape has 
indeed radically and irreversibly changed. Instead of being the majority, “traditional” 
churches are now only 45 percent of the total. The majority of churches is now a 
combination of “neo-conservative” (39 percent) and “progressive” (16 percent) 
congregations. What has not changed much is the religiosity of Latino Pentecostals; all of 
them are indeed, by every measure used, a very religious and Bible-believing sector of 
the Latino religious universe. However, Latino Pentecostals from “progressive” churches 
are experiencing a diminishing religiosity, particularly the pastors.  
More important, it is very surprising that “traditional” church congregants and 
their pastors are a lot more progressive socially and politically than I originally 
hypothesized to the point that they are on all social and political issues (with the marked 
exception of the ordination of women) more progressive than their “neo-conservative” 
brothers and sisters. Once all social and political variables are analyzed, “progressive” 
churches, their congregants and pastors, lead the way in progressive perspectives, 
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followed by “traditional” congregations leaving the “neo-conservative” ones last. It is 
important to emphasize that all Latino Pentecostals, congregants and pastors, are socially 
and politically progressive (with the noted exception of “neo-conservative” church 
pastors) except that those that attend “traditional” congregations are more so than 
expected and those that attend “neo-conservative” are less so than expected.    
Another important finding is that “traditional” not “progressive” Latino 
Pentecostal congregations are the haven of the truly disadvantaged in the Latino 
community. That is, although all types of Latino Pentecostal congregations have the 
disadvantaged among them, they only represent the majority of congregants in 
“traditional” churches and a diminishing minority in “progressive” and “neo- 
conservative” ones. It appears that even though “progressive” congregations may believe 
in addressing the plight of the disadvantaged, large portions of the disadvantaged have 
instead chosen to keep as their home the “traditional” Pentecostal church.  
In chapter five I will discuss the typology of civic engagement I developed and 
extensively discuss the results of the testing of the relationship between the different 
Latino Pentecostal churches indentified in this chapter and the different levels of civic 
engagement included in the typology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGATIONS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
Introduction 
I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of civic engagement and 
civic engagement typologies, and a short description of how I apply this literature to 
Latino Pentecostalism. I then develop a theoretical typology of civic engagement and test 
how it relates to the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations developed and tested in 
chapter four. I use descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparison of means) to 
analyze relationships between the types of Pentecostal congregations and different levels 
of engagement.  
I developed a theoretical typology of engagement paying special attention to the 
work of several researchers that have specifically studied congregations (McRoberts, 
2003; Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood, 1994), and 
those that have proposed typologies of individual civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman, 
& Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999). 
I extensively discuss the results of this analysis and compare them to those 
obtained from Latinos in general (at a national level) and other U.S. Pentecostals. It is 
imperative to keep in mind, however, that there has been very little research conducted 
exclusively on U.S. Pentecostals, and that this limits the scope of any comparison. I 
conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and research questions 
needing further study. 
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Theoretical Considerations and Typology of Civic Engagement 
One of the key questions this dissertation seeks to address is whether the 
evolution of Latino Pentecostalism from a landscape almost exclusively dominated by 
“traditional” congregations twenty years ago to one now dominated by both “neo- 
conservative” and “progressive” churches has resulted, or has the potential of resulting, in 
increased civic engagement.   
Unlike other researchers (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999), I 
propose that engagement within the congregation’s walls is as important as engagement 
in the community and in wider society. In other words, I question the notion that 
somehow within the church walls engagement is really not “civic engagement” or is of 
lesser importance. I emphasize that although much of the effort of congregations and 
their congregants go towards self-maintenance and the advancement of their religious 
beliefs, a key focus of those beliefs, as some researches argue, is the advancement of 
social justice and the welfare of human beings (Cnaan, 1997; Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancie, 
2003). A focus group participant discussing the role they played in the immigration 
marches in Chicago, a couple of years ago, mentioned that they were part of the 
organizing effort and the marches because it was part of what they had been taught 
biblically about social justice.    
The addressing of social inequalities and injustice and the confrontation of 
oppressive structures is not only the mission of secular organizations and their members. 
The fact is that congregations, their leaders and congregants, are as capable and 
instrumental in confronting those as any other organization or group in society. The 
instrumentality of the Black church, their congregants and leaders, to the origin and 
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ultimate success of the Civil Rights Movement clearly exemplifies this point.  Although it 
is important that churches form strategic partnerships and alliances with all kinds of 
organizations that fight for the same causes, it is also important to understand that 
community and societal change can be effectively caused through the church. 
As a result of the racial and social class segregation prevalent in American 
suburbia and many city neighborhoods, and the flight of white churches (even those of 
liberal conviction) from the inner city, the social and geographical distances between the 
haves and the have-nots, the advantaged and the disadvantaged, have considerably 
increased. By necessity, then, the conviction and the act of socially engaging to address 
the needs of the disadvantaged requires a mediating structure capable of reducing those 
distances. In that sense, the local church with its community approach is not the most 
effective vehicle at reaching the needy on the other side of town unless it does so through 
partnerships with other churches or other types of organizations. Instead, a secular or a 
para-church organization with a wider mission and reach becomes the better channel for 
civic engagement. It makes perfect sense to join in membership, contribute financially, 
and even devote a substantial amount of time to these organizations—for they can be an 
effective channel for civic engagement.      
However, because Latino Pentecostal congregations serve the truly disadvantaged 
of society inside their own walls and right outside their doors, within church engagement 
becomes an effective channel for civic engagement. Congregants of “traditional” 
Pentecostal churches do not have to go to the other side of town looking for the hungry, 
the exploited, and the outcast, nor do they have to use extra church mediating 
organizations to link them to the needy. They simply have to see who is sitting next to 
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them in the pew and they are likely to be staring at the disadvantaged in society. With so 
much need around them, their imperative is to start from the inside out.  
Not only are the disadvantaged of society recipients of services at church but, as 
Verba and colleagues (1999) point out, they also get a unique opportunity to participate 
in the life of the congregation and in the process learn and practice civic skills. Both 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Wuthnow (1999) argue that the development of 
civic skills and the opportunity to apply them is very prevalent in Protestant 
congregations, even more so at the less structured ones. This is particularly the case at 
Latino Pentecostal congregations where there is a long and established tradition of using 
volunteers to run even the most complex of administrative tasks. Even when the church 
develops its organizational structures and secures a healthier budget that allows the hiring 
of paid staff (generally no more than one or two), church congregants are expected to 
actively participate in the design, delivery, and administration of church services, 
programs, and even full departments. When asked about leadership opportunities in the 
congregation and how the pastor would react to an initiative to start a new program, a 
focus group participant answered, “she’ll [the pastor] say go for it, what do you need, 
how long is it going to take, what are you waiting for, when do you want to do it?”  
In other words, for the truly disadvantaged, engaging within the walls of the 
Latino Pentecostal congregation is really a training camp to learn and use civic skills that 
can be potentially transferred to the local community and the wider society. The question 
some researchers have asked is whether the transferring of skills and experience really 
occurs? Wuthnow (1999) found that Evangelical Christians are not nearly as effective as 
Mainliners in successfully making that transfer. They, in fact, are less involved in non-
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religious organizations where those skills and experience can be instrumental (Wuthnow, 
1999). I propose, instead, that the transferring of skills and experience beyond the 
congregation is only one of several possibilities. Another important possibility is the 
active use of those skills and experience in addressing community and social problems 
through church or para-church organizations’ programs. To somehow assume that the 
joining of secular or extra church organizations is necessary to civically engage is to 
dismiss the fact that there are a variety of ways and means to engage in the resolution of 
the community’s and society’s problems. The church is one of those legitimate channels 
and it can be very effective at causing change for the collective good.       
Consequently, I argue in this dissertation that an adequate typology of 
engagement should have at least three levels—within congregation, in community, and in 
society at large. That is, for Latino Pentecostals, many of whom are the most 
disadvantaged in society, engaging in congregations is not just a training camp to acquire 
and practice civic skills but also an effective means of addressing the needs of the 
community albeit one person and one community at a time. It is also important to keep in 
mind that Latinos, besides joining civic organizations, may also be getting involved in 
community through informal social networks and one-on-one assistance. That is, the lack 
of membership in civic organizations (so much promoted by Putnam and Wuthnow) does 
not necessarily equate to an absence of engagement. Instead, the mode of community 
engagement may, in fact, be an informal one.    
I hypothesize that Latino congregations in Chicago all engage at the church, 
community, and societal levels. The question is not whether or not they engage at all 
levels. Instead, it is a matter of degree and priority, which is largely determined by both 
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social commitment and available resources. I use a scale to hypothesize the engagement 
of congregations. The scale goes from high level, the most engagement, to low level, the 
least engagement.  
I propose that “traditional” congregations and their congregants mainly and 
intensely focus (high level) on within church engagement with moderate (medium level) 
engagement in the community and even less so in wider society (low level)—see Table 9. 
“Neo- conservative” congregations and their congregants also intensely focus on within 
church engagement (high level), and moderately on both community (medium level) and 
wider society. Finally, “progressive” churches and their congregants, on the other hand, 
intensely focus on within church engagement but at a lesser rate than their “traditional” 
and “neo-conservative” counterparts (high/medium level), and intensely on both 
community (high/medium level) and societal (high/medium level) civic engagement.  
Table 9. Hypothesized Typology of Congregational Civic Engagement (N = 31)  
 Type of Civic Engagement 
Type of Pentecostal 
Congregation 
Within 
Congregation In Community In Wider Society
Traditional High Medium Low 
Neo-Conservative High Medium Medium 
Progressive High/Medium High /Medium High/Medium 
Note. The engagement levels were determined qualitatively and are meant to provide an 
idea about the intensity and priority each type of congregation gives to the various levels 
of engagement.  
 
For disadvantaged segments of the Latino community that have not had the 
opportunity at work or in school to learn about civic engagement and to develop the skills 
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necessary to do so, within congregation engagement becomes a great first step and one of 
the very few opportunities available to them to learn the ropes that could potentially 
result in community and societal engagement (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). At 
church, people learn about public speaking, teaching, planning and running activities, 
programs and even full departments, conflict management, financial planning and budget 
management, and more importantly problem solving and decision making which are both 
based on a critical thinking foundation. Congregants, particularly those that get involved, 
learn about legal issues and some key characteristics of the “system” such as interfacing 
with City departments and other organizations. In other words, by getting involved in 
church, congregants are able to develop both the human and social capital that is so 
important to the individual’s success in the family and at work and is also instrumental in 
addressing community and societal problems.   
Civic Engagement  
I used cross tabulations and comparisons of means (Pearson Chi-Square and 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square were used for significance testing) to test the different types 
of Latino Pentecostal congregations against a variety of variables that were chosen to 
represent different levels of civic engagement.   
It is very telling that although the average church congregant is fairly young, 39 
years old (they could be doing other things with their lives!), a full 87 percent of all 
Latino Pentecostal congregants are members of their churches with little variation among 
the various types of churches (see Table 10). Furthermore, a remarkable 64 percent of all 
congregants report having a leadership role in the congregation and another 79 percent 
indicate they have helped organize an event at church often or sometimes. The 
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overwhelming majority of Latino Pentecostals (70 percent) report spending three hours or 
more a week in church-related activities. Given the low annual household income of large 
numbers of Latino Pentecostal congregants, an amazing 51 percent also report 
contributing from $50 to $200 per month to their church. Without a doubt the majority of 
Latino Pentecostals are very engaged in their congregations either as members, leaders, 
or assistants; they also spend a lot of time in church-related activities, and contribute 
significant financial resources. With the exception of the “traditional” Pentecostal 
congregation case study where congregants did not seem to be as hopeful and energetic, 
“progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants seemed very “happy“ 
overall. In fact, focus group participants expressed very positive experiences. One lady 
explained that “at my church it is not about what you wear or how you look on the 
outside, it’s about what’s inside, what you are going through, what you are dealing with. 
Let us help you build from the inside out.” A lady from another congregation indicated, 
“I like everything about this church, the sisters, it does not matter about your history, and 
they accept you for who you are. They are not trying to change anything about you, 
because they know it is not their job.”   
An important trend is that those that attend “traditional” and “neo-conservative” 
congregations are more engaged within their churches, albeit minimally so, than those 
that attend “progressive” ones. Specifically, congregants that attend “traditional” 
churches report church membership at 91 percent (89 and 80 percent for those from “neo- 
conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively), leadership roles at 64 
percent (64 and 63 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” 
churches, respectively), and helping with the organization of an event, sometimes or 
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often, at 85 percent (78 and 74 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” congregations, respectively). The majority of those that attend “traditional” 
churches (74 percent) also reports spending three hours of more in church related 
activities (75 and 60 percent of those that attend “neo-conservative” and “progressive” 
congregations, respectively, do the same). Finally, 56 percent of “traditional” church 
congregants contribute from $50 to $200 per month to the church—49 percent for those 
from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations report similar contributions. In 
other words, although “traditional” church congregants, in general, have lower annual 
household income than their Pentecostal brethren, they contribute more. Even though 
they may be working longer hours to make ends meet, these same congregants also invest 
more time than their “progressive” church counterparts in church-related activities.  
It is important at this juncture to discuss not just active participation but the 
meaning that individuals get from participating particularly if it is done in a context of 
“freedom” and “acceptance” as many “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregants 
claimed their engagement to be. The focus group conducted among “traditional” 
Pentecostal congregants revealed some apathy towards involvement in church 
particularly from the younger participants. One of the younger participants in the focus 
group mentioned that, “I think parents are always on top of us to come to church, but it 
should be God that should make you go to church.” One of the church leaders added that 
the church imposes all kinds of rules on the youth and that is why “the denomination has 
experienced a large decrease in the interest and attendance of young people.”   
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Table 10. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pentecostal Congregants 
by Church Type 
 
Civic Engagement Behavior  Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive Total  
Percentage     
Church member 91 89 80 87* 
Church leader 64 64 63 64* 
Event organizing—
sometimes/often  85 78 74 79* 
Church activities--three hours 
or more weekly  74 75 60 70* 
Monthly contribution--$50 to 
$200 56 49 49 51* 
Outside of church 
volunteering—> once a month 57 48 54 53* 
Helping needy in 
community—sometimes/often 80 79 74 78* 
Helping someone find job—
sometimes or often  82 80 77 80 
Lending money to non 
family—sometimes or often 73 75 77 75 
Voted in 2004 election 75 74 77 75** 
Attend political party events—
sometimes or often 11 13 20 15* 
N 480/150a 312/227 185/128 977/505 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
a. Only U.S. citizens were analyzed both for voting and attendance to political party 
events.  
* Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
** Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
The civic engagement analysis so far has shown that all Latino Pentecostals are 
intensely engaged within the walls of their congregations and that those that attend 
“traditional” and “neo-conservative” congregations are particularly engaged while those 
that attend “progressive” churches are less so mainly as it pertains to church membership, 
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number of hours invested in church related activities on a weekly basis, and assisting in 
organizing church events. However, both from the participant observation and the focus 
groups it was clear to the researchers that there was a sense of freedom, desire to 
participate, to be part of the organization, pride of belonging, and meaning in both “neo-
conservative” and  “progressive” churches, but that was not observed at the “traditional” 
church studied.  
Given the amount of time and financial resources invested inside the walls of the 
church, do congregations and their congregants also get involved beyond the walls of the 
church in their surrounding communities? This research shows that Latino Pentecostal 
churches, pastors and congregants, all get involved in the community (Table 10 and 
Table 11). 
The congregation itself makes a variety of programs and services available for 
congregants and community members. Besides benefiting the congregants as recipients 
of servicers, it also provides them with an opportunity to actively participate in the 
delivery of a gamut of those services. On average Latino Pentecostal churches offer 28 
programs and services for church and community members. Because this relationship 
was not statistically significant, it is not possible to quantitatively analyze differences 
among the various types of churches. However, due to the average size of “neo-
conservative” congregations (54 percent of “neo-conservative” churches have 151 
members or more, and 29 and 0 percent of “traditional” and “progressive” churches, 
respectively, boast of that), it was expected that they would have had many more services 
than the other types. Interviews with the pastors and leaders of the congregations show 
that that “progressive” churches place a significant emphasis on programming and 
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services. This is not the case with “neo-conservative” churches, which, though typically 
larger than their “progressive” counterparts, offer fewer services and programs. 
Table 11. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pentecostal Churches and 
Pastors by Church Type 
 
Civic Engagement Behavior  Traditional Neo-Conservative Progressive Total 
# of church programs for church 
and community members  25 29 31 28 
# of organizing/advocacy issues 
the church is involved in 5 3 6 5 
Percentage of Pastors     
Contacted public representative 71 85 80 79 
Signed a petition 27 39 60 42 
Hold membership in 4 or more  
associations/organizations 36 85 100 74 
Voted in 2000 election 72 92 100 88* 
Participated in direct action 20 0 40 20 
N 14 12 5 31 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
 How formal are the programs and services offered for church and community 
members? The qualitative research revealed that Latino Pentecostal churches in general, 
but particularly “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches offer a variety of fairly 
formal services and programs. In fact, some of the churches did so much that when asked 
if they volunteered thorough non-religious organizations, one of the participants said “we 
get ourselves involved in everything; we seriously don’t have time with everything we do 
here.”    
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An analysis of the nature and number of specific services offered hints at the 
formality, volume, and target audience of the services and programs offered. There are 
important differences among the various Latino Pentecostal congregations particularly 
related to the audience they target. Namely, “progressive” congregations lead the way in 
the provision of community services at an average of 3 programs (1.7 and 2.1 for 
“traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively), health services at 5.2 (3.2 
and 4.0 for “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches respectively), and services for 
low-income people at 4.2 (3.4 and 3.7 for “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches, 
respectively). Despite their size, “progressive” congregations also lead all Latino 
Pentecostal congregations in programs and services for adults and families, children and 
youth, cultural, and educational and job services. In fact, of the eleven categories 
measured, “progressive” congregations lead in seven while “traditional” ones lead in two 
(programs and services for seniors and for immigrants), and “neo-conservative” ones 
only lead in two (programs and services for international causes and for economic 
development and housing issues).  
These results indicate that “progressive” congregations lead the way in 
programming and services, and they particularly focus on those that not only serve 
congregants but more importantly serve the community at large. In fact, one of the 
leaders of a “progressive” congregation put it very clearly when she stated that “the 
vision that we all share in this church is to go to the community; staying within the four 
walls of the church is worthless.” She added “God has placed us here together to do great 
things for God and for the community. We are not here for ourselves, if anyone needs us, 
we are going to be there for them.”   
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Although “traditional” congregations trail “neo-conservative” ones in the number 
of services and programs offered, they (besides being the main provider of programs and 
services in two categories) lead “neo-conservative” churches in three categories— 
educational and job services, services for immigrants and services for seniors—while 
being tied with them on services for adults and families. This is indeed remarkable 
because “traditional” congregations, in general, have a lot less resources than all other 
Latino Pentecostal churches. To my surprise, 36 percent of “traditional” congregations 
have annual budgets of $30,999 or less and none have budgets over $100,999. On the 
other hand, 23 percent of “neo-conservative” congregations have annual budgets of 
$100,999 or higher and none have annual budgets of $30,999 or less.  
Also remarkable is the fact that although “progressive” congregations offer more 
programs and services than “neo-conservative” ones, 40 percent of “progressive” 
congregations have annual budgets of $50,999 or less while none of the “neo-
conservative” churches fall in that category. In other words, given the size and budget of 
the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations, “progressive” and “traditional” 
congregations lead the way in services and programs for congregants and the community. 
“Neo-conservative” congregations do not provide nearly as many services and programs 
given their size, their annual budgets, and their human resources.  
There are also other ways that Latino Pentecostal congregations engage the 
communities around them. They also get involved by themselves or in partnership with 
other organizations in addressing important community issues. On average, Latino 
Pentecostal churches are involved on five organizing or advocacy issues.  
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The results of qualitative research have also shown that although “neo-
conservative” churches may not have as many programs as “progressive” churches, they 
do share with them a deep commitment to serving the community. A “neo-conservative” 
church congregant, when asked about how important civic engagement was for them, 
stated that it is very important “because there’s less fortunate people and we’re showing 
them that we care, that there is a God up there that cares.” When asked about the church’s 
commitment to involvement in the community, a participant responded that, “she’s [the 
pastor] pretty much involved in everything, in every sense of the community.” He 
concluded that, “her [pastor’s] concern is the people out there and what is going on 
around us.” When asked if the church is supposed to be involved, another participant 
asked, “What would Jesus do?” Another followed and said, “He [Jesus] was the perfect 
example. He was not always around the high classes and the religious people; he really 
went to people and presented what he was all about.”  
Unfortunately, the community commitment observed among “neo-conservative” 
and “progressive” churches was not observed at the “traditional” church studied. After 
discussing their food pantry, the participants were asked if there were any other ways the 
church and its congregants could get involved in the community, one of the participants 
responded that “where there’s a will there’s a way, it could be done but I don’t know we 
just have not done it.” When asked if there are needs in the community around the 
church, the same participant responded “there is, there is, and I just didn’t really think 
about that until now.” Another participant added, “I feel like we can do stuff but I think 
that the church is not that big enough…we do not have sufficient funds…”    
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Besides the involvement of the church as an organization, the church pastor as a 
representative of that church also gets involved in the community (see Table 11). When 
asked about attending a meeting regarding a social and educational issue, 68 percent of 
the pastors of report doing so. As regards signing a petition, 42 percent of Pentecostal 
church pastors had done so and another 79 percent reported contacting a public 
representative to address issues relevant to their congregations and community. When 
asked about their participation in community organizations and associations other than 
the church, 74 percent of church pastors reported participating in up to four of them. That 
is, when it comes to community involvement by Latino Pentecostal church pastors are 
fairly involved. It was not possible to analyze differences among the various types of 
Latino Pentecostal pastors because none of these community engagement relationships 
were statistically significant.    
Are the patterns of community civic engagement documented of churches as 
organizations and their pastors also replicated among their congregants? Besides formally 
engaging in their communities by volunteering to do community service outside the local 
church, congregants also get involved informally (see Table 10). Informal engagement in 
the Latino community is as relevant as formal engagement. Through existing networks 
significant amounts of resources, financial and otherwise, flow to address community 
members’ needs. Given the immigrant nature of the majority of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations and the role that networks play in immigrant communities, it is not unusual 
that those same networks are at play at churches affording congregants with an 
opportunity for civic engagement.      
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When congregants were asked about their volunteering outside the local church to 
do community service, 57 percent of those that attend “traditional” churches reported 
doing it more than once a month while 54 and 48 percent of those that attend 
“progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively, reported the same. Even 
more prevalent was the congregants’ reported informal involvement in addressing the 
needs of the community. While 80 percent of “traditional” church congregants reported 
often helping the needy in the community, 79 and 74 percent of those that attend “neo-
conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively, reported the same. As 
important was the fact that 80 of Latino Pentecostal church congregants claimed to have 
helped someone, sometimes or often, find a job in the previous twelve months. In fact, 
one of the congregants mentioned, “when I worked at [department store], one of the 
members of the congregation got me started working there temporarily. I kind of was 
hesitant to apply, but he put in a good word for me, and I think that’s what helped me get 
the job.” Finally, 75 percent of church congregants reported lending money to non-family 
members sometimes or often in the previous twelve months.  
In other words, not only are all Latino Pentecostals similarly engaged in their 
communities through membership and voluntarism in civic organizations, they are also 
very engaged in informal ways.  The differences among the different types of Pentecostal 
churches are not very large; however, “traditional” church congregants lead in 
volunteering and in helping the needy in the community.    
In summary, the results of the civic engagement analysis after looking at within 
church and community engagement practices of Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches and 
their congregants show that they are all very much engaged within their congregations 
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and that the different types of churches, led by the “progressive” ones, offer a gamut of 
programs and services to their congregants and the community. “Traditional” church 
pastors are not nearly as engaged as their “progressive” counterparts with “neo-
conservative” pastors in between. However, “traditional” church congregants lead the 
way in community engagement closely followed by “progressive” and “neo-
conservative” ones. When other factors such as the size of the congregation, its annual 
budget, and available human and other resources are taken into consideration,  
“progressive” congregations (counting both congregant and pastor engagement) are 
undoubtedly the trail blazers followed by the “traditional” and the “neo-conservative” 
types.  
Finally, political engagement, which is emphasized a lot in the social capital and 
civic engagement literature (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Schwadel, 2005; 
Wuthnow, 1999; McRoberts, 1999; Wood, 2003; Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003), 
is also important in the life of all Latino Pentecostal congregations in Chicago. In fact, 
100 percent of “progressive” congregation pastors reported voting in the 2000 election 
compared to 92 and 72 percent for their “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church 
counterparts. Then too, 20 percent of Latino Pentecostal church pastors reported 
participating in direct action such as protests or rallies in the last three years. In terms of 
political efficacy, 60 percent of “progressive” church pastors believe that their 
congregation has a lot of influence over local/city government decisions, but this drops 
dramatically for “neo-conservative,” and “traditional” church pastors (31 and 29 percent, 
respectively) who believe the same.  
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Do the societal engagement patterns observed with the pastors of Latino 
Pentecostal congregations hold true with their church’s congregants? Whereas 77 percent 
of “progressive” church congregants reported voting in the 2004 election, 75 and 74 
percent of “traditional” and neo-conservative” church attendees, respectively, reported 
the same. Then too, of those that attend “progressive” congregations, 20 percent reported 
sometimes or often participating in political party activities in the last twelve months. 
That number drops considerably to 13 percent for “neo-conservative” and 11 percent for 
“traditional” church congregants. Given the large percentages of undocumented and 
documented non U.S. citizen congregants, the cross tabulations to test voting and 
political party participation only included U.S. citizens.    
There is no doubt that “progressive” Latino Pentecostal congregations and their 
attendees are the most politically engaged by every measure analyzed. “Neo-
conservative” churches come second helped by the engagement of their pastors, and 
“traditional” congregations come last, not far behind “neo-conservative” ones.  
Given that 71 percent of registered Latino voters voted at a national level in 2000, 
the fact that 75 percent of Latino Pentecostal church congregants who are U.S. citizens 
(77 percent of “progressive” ones) voted in the last election, in 2004, is encouraging (Pew 
Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). Also relevant is the finding that while 
16 percent of registered Latino voters nationally attended a political party meeting or 
function, 15 percent of Latino Pentecostal church congregants, who are U.S. citizens, in 
Chicago reported attending such events (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2004).  In other words, the societal civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal 
congregants in general, but particularly the behavior of the “progressive” Pentecostal 
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types, is either at or above the level reported of Latino registered voters nationally. This 
is an encouraging finding given the already discussed perspective of Latino Pentecostals 
as inward looking and other-worldly, not very concerned with the here and now.    
The observed patterns of engagement clearly indicate that “progressive” 
congregations and their congregants are very engaged within the congregation (a bit less 
than is the case for “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches). They are also actively 
engaged in their local communities by providing a variety of services and programs and 
participating in organizing efforts and other activities relevant to their communities. 
Finally, “progressive” churches and their congregants are also significantly engaged in 
the wider society as measured here by their voting record and their participation in 
political party activities.  
“Traditional” congregations and their attendees were found to be most engaged 
within the congregation, and less engaged in their community and wider society 
particularly in comparison to “progressive” churches and their congregants. However, 
when compared to “neo-conservative” churches, “traditional” congregations and their 
attendees are a little more engaged within their congregation, in the surrounding 
community, and even in wider society with the exception of congregant participation in 
Political party activities.  
  Although these results largely confirm the hypothesized civic engagement 
behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregations (see Table 9), it also shows that I 
underestimated the engagement of “traditional” congregations and their attendees in both 
community and wider society. In fact, “traditional” church congregants are the most 
engaged both formally and informally. At the same time, there is no doubt that 
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“traditional’ congregation pastors vote at lower rates than their “progressive” church 
counterparts and that their congregants also replicate that pattern, but “traditional” 
Pentecostal congregations concentrate a large number of the less educated and poor 
members of the Latino community who have traditionally been less engaged in politics 
regardless of their religion.  
The conclusion, therefore, is that “progressive” congregations and their 
congregants are not just intensely engaged within their congregations but are also actively 
and significantly engaged in their communities and wider society—they were 
documented to have a strong commitment to the lives of their communities. “Traditional” 
and “neo-conservative” congregations and their attendees are very much engaged within 
their congregations and engaged in their communities and wider society to a lesser 
degree. In fact, “traditional” churches were found to be more engaged in the surrounding 
community and in the wider society (in voting) in comparison to “neo-conservative” 
ones. In other words, “traditional” churches and their congregants were not found, as 
originally expected, to be the Latino Pentecostals that are the least engaged beyond the 
walls of the church. Although “neo-conservative” congregations were documented 
through the qualitative data to be very committed to the lives of their communities, 
similar to “progressive” ones, that was not the case with “traditional” churches. It may 
be, however, that “traditional” churches are more engaged in the community informally 
due to the strong immigrant networks they belong to and that the services offered are 
mainly for those that belong to the community of faith. Even if that is the case, it is 
important to keep in mind that “traditional” churches are typically places where the most 
disadvantaged of the local communities go.   
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Summary of Findings and Proposed Explanations 
Table 2 clearly shows that a significant number if not the majority of those that 
attend “traditional” Pentecostal congregations have comparatively lower levels of 
education, are mainly women, are recent immigrants, and live on an annual household 
income that barely provide subsistence in an expensive city like Chicago. Furthermore, a 
very large percentage of these congregants are also the poorest of the poor including 
undocumented immigrants that do not speak English or barely get by. This means that the 
“traditional” Pentecostal congregation is in itself a place where the needy and 
disadvantaged go seeking assistance—many if not most of the congregants themselves 
are the needy and the disadvantaged from the communities surrounding the church. In 
other words, Latino Pentecostal congregations in general serve as a place where the 
needy get services and assistance, but this is particularly the case at “traditional” 
churches.   
The evidence analyzed by this dissertation does not support the notion that 
“traditional” churches and their congregants are inward-looking and otherworldly. These 
churches and those that attend them do focus more on within congregation engagement 
but not exclusively so; they are still actively engaged in their communities and in wider 
society, albeit at lower rates than “progressive” churches and their congregants, and 
engaged in more informal ways. It is reasonable to conclude that “traditional” churches 
and their congregants may be more engaged within their congregations because of the 
immense needs of those that join them and the communities that surround them. Given 
their limited resources, providing for internal needs first and then for those of the 
surrounding community is a legitimate rational choice.  
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It is indeed remarkable that even with so many barriers and internal needs, and a 
cultural and political system that is not designed to integrate the truly disadvantaged (a 
system that is difficult to understand and navigate even for the native born), that 
“traditional” Pentecostals and their churches are that much engaged in their communities 
and wider society. It takes resources, human, social, and financial, to run programs and 
services for church congregants and the community. It takes time, effort, and know-how 
to organize and mobilize people for social causes. Given the “traditional” church’s 
limited resources (many of them cannot even afford a full-time pastor), looking beyond 
the walls of the congregation, it seems to me, is a sign of social commitment.  
It is, on the other hand, understandable how and why “progressive” churches and 
their congregants are much more engaged in community and society. Higher incomes, 
higher levels of education, English language skills, U.S. citizenship and consequently 
knowledge of this society and its systems all give these congregations and their 
congregants a comparative advantage. These churches are better equipped to address 
issues that afflict them and those around them and to take advantage of the opportunities 
in their communities and wider society. Aided by healthier annual budgets, significantly 
more human resources and social capital, “progressive” Pentecostal churches are well 
positioned not just to engage within their congregations, but to also lead the way in civic 
engagement beyond the walls of the church. What is surprising, however, is that “neo- 
conservative” churches and their congregants are only as engaged within the church walls 
as “traditional” congregations are, and comparatively less so in community and wider 
society even when they have a significant resource and social capital advantage over both 
their  “traditional” and “progressive” counterparts .  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed the need to understand Latino Pentecostal 
congregations and their congregants particularly as it related to their civic engagement 
practices. I proposed and developed a typology of engagement that included, besides the 
commonly accepted community and societal civic engagement, within church 
engagement. The argument is that for the disadvantaged in society (who are the majority 
of “traditional” church congregants and important portions of those that attend 
“progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches) within church engagement is not only a 
way to develop instrumental civic and organizational skills and civic engagement 
awareness, but it is also a unique opportunity to practice those skills while serving the 
needy. Discounting within church engagement as irrelevant or unimportant undermines 
how large proportions of the disadvantaged start their civic engagement careers. It also 
biases our understanding of civic engagement by simply focusing on the community and 
societal types when in fact many people may actually only get to those levels of 
engagement through the church or only after learning at church. 
 When the different types of Pentecostal congregations were compared to the 
chosen types of civic engagement behavior via the use of carefully chosen variables, it 
was documented that all Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are involved 
in all three levels of engagement. Instead, the difference was found to be the focus and 
priority given to each of the levels. While “traditional” churches and their congregants 
are very involved within their church, they place a lesser emphasis on community and 
societal engagement at least in comparison with their “progressive” counterparts. On the 
other hand, while “progressive” congregations and their attendees are also very engaged 
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within their churches (less so than “traditional” churches), they also very actively engage 
the community around them and society at large. Surprisingly, “neo-conservative” 
congregations and their congregants mirror very closely the within church engagement of 
“traditional” ones. However, “traditional” churches and their attendees are more engaged 
in community and in society than their “neo-conservative” counterparts once the issue of 
undocumented and non-citizen legal residents is taken into account.  
It can safely be said that the emergence of “neo-conservative” congregations has 
not resulted in more community and societal engagement or a more progressive agenda. 
Instead, the opposite seems to be happening. That is not to say that “neo-conservative” 
churches and their congregants are conservative. In fact, all Latino Pentecostals and their 
congregations are fairly progressive, but in some key social and political indicators “neo- 
conservative” churches and their congregants (particularly their pastors) are more 
conservative than “traditional” congregations when the opposite, at least as hypothesized, 
was expected (see chapter four). What is not in question is the commitment “neo-
conservative” congregations, at least as documented though the case study, have to their 
local communities, a commitment that was only surpassed by “progressive” churches.   
 What is surprising is how engaged “traditional” congregations are given their 
limited human, social, and financial resources. These churches and their congregants are 
still fairly engaged in community and society even when they have their hands full 
serving the multifaceted needs of their own congregants who also happen to be some of 
the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. It is important to mention, however, 
that the results of the “traditional” church case study showed involvement in the 
community but more through informal and individual means than organizational ones.  
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Even then, the fact is that the truly disadvantaged have chosen “traditional” Latino 
Pentecostal churches to serve and to be served by and not “progressive” congregations as 
might have been expected.   
In chapter six, I will analyze and discuss the effects of the various types of Latino 
Pentecostal congregations on their congregants’ civic engagement behavior.  I will use 
the typology of engagement developed in this chapter—church, community, and 
society—to test if congregants that attend different types of congregations are more or 
less likely to get involved in different forms of engagement.          
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGANTS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, using the typologies of Latino Pentecostal congregations and civic 
engagement developed in chapters four and five, I analyze the factors that contribute to 
the understanding of different modes of congregant civic engagement. I am particularly 
interested in studying if and how the type of Pentecostal church the individual attends 
affects his or her civic engagement behavior. The same variables used to study 
congregational civic engagement in the previous chapter will also be used for 
congregants. The civic engagement typology already developed and tested in chapter five 
includes three levels of engagement: within church, in community, and in society. The 
results obtained in chapter five allowed us to conclude that all Latino Pentecostal 
congregations are engaged at each of the three levels with a difference in intensity and 
focus.   
 In order to build a model to understand the effect, of any, the type of Pentecostal 
church the individual attends has on his or her civic engagement behavior, relevant 
variables documented in the literature will be included as controls (Chavez, 2004; 
Greeley & Hout, 2006; Loveland, 2005; Schlozman, et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 
2000; Verba, et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Other important variables identified 
through the analysis of congregational civic engagement in the Latino context (chapter 
five) will also be added to the model(s). Finally, congregational variables will be added to 
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the model to test the effect, if any, the church has on the civic engagement behavior of its 
congregants.  
 I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of engagement keeping in 
mind that most of the civic engagement literature, including the one that looks at religion, 
has mainly researched individuals (as the unit of analysis) which may or may not later be 
connected to a congregation. In my case, however, the individual congregants were only 
studied because they were present at a church (congregation being the main unit of 
analysis) that was part of our stratified sample. In essence, the conclusions of this study 
can be widely generalized to all Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches, but conclusions 
about individuals can only be made about the congregants of those churches and not 
about Latino Pentecostals in general because I have a convenience sample.  
 Therefore, in drawing parallels in the literature, one must be extremely careful not 
to confuse how and at what level the data was collected. For instance, when comparing 
the voting of Latino Pentecostal congregants and that of national Latino registered voters 
one must bear in mind that the comparison is between “Latino Pentecostal congregants” 
and “national Latino registered voters” (two different units of analysis) and not “Latino 
Pentecostals” and “national Latino registered voters.”    
  I then proceed to create several models to test if the hypotheses proposed about 
the effect of the control and congregational variables on different types of civic 
engagement behavior are accepted or rejected.  I use logistic regression (the binary type) 
to run all the proposed models.  
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I extensively discuss the results of this analysis, in light of the results and 
conclusions of church civic engagement discussed in chapter five, and conclude with a 
summary of findings, issues and concerns, and questions needing further research.    
Theoretical Considerations 
Although there is a considerable amount of research that has looked at religious 
individuals and their civic engagement (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Schlozman et al., 1999; 
Smidt, 2003; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004), very little research has analyzed 
the individual within the congregational context (Kniss& Numrich, 2007; Loveland, 
2005). After analyzing the contextual effects on the behavior of individuals using 
hierarchical modeling with the United States Congregational Life Survey (CLS) national 
dataset collected by Cynthia Woolever and Deborah Bruce in 2001, Loveland (2005) 
concludes that “the missing theoretical step is to demonstrate that contextual factors of 
congregations influence the behavior of individuals” (p. 7). In a similar vein, Kniss and 
Numrich (2007) conclude that their research shows “the powerful influence 
congregations and congregational leaders exert on their members and affiliated 
constituents.” (p. 217). 
Some research has specifically looked at the religious context and its influence on 
attitudes, particularly focusing on abortion and support for public figures, and has 
generally found that congregations influence the attitudes of individuals (Cook, Jelen, & 
Wilcox, 1993; Huckfeldt, Pluzter, & Srague, 1993; Jelen, 1992).  Although attitudes and 
beliefs certainly influence the behavior of individuals, it is the study of the effect of 
churches on concrete civic engagement behaviors that is the missing link and still needs 
attention. More recently, Loveland (2005) studied congregational impacts on voluntary 
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association membership, community organizing, and evangelism and found that church 
networks (social ties) are important because they “serve as conduits of information about 
opportunities to participate in public life” (p. 137).  The author concludes that the church 
context affects the congregants’ behavior and that “congregations matter, independently 
of personal characteristics, in the civic lives of their members” (Loveland, 2005, p. 135). 
Therefore, there still remains much to be done in order to develop an in-depth 
understanding of how churches affect their congregants’ civic engagement behavior. I use 
what we presently know about contextual effects and apply it, in this chapter, to Latino 
Pentecostals in Chicago.   
Models 
 Past research has found that several factors are important predictors of civic 
engagement. Putnam (2000, p. 67) documented that religiosity and education are key 
predictors, while others have found that gender, age, marital status, and income are also 
important (Chavez, 2004; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Loveland, 2005; Schlozman et al., 
1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). From the 
analysis of congregational civic engagement (the civic engagement of churches as 
organizations) conducted in chapter five, it seems that, in the Latino Pentecostal context, 
the citizenship status of congregants along with language, national origin, and whether 
they switched denominations in the past also matter.  
 As a result, the models I use to test the contextual church effects on congregants 
include as control variables the congregant’s education, income, age, gender, citizenship 
status, church attendance, language, marital status, national origin, and denominational 
switching (see Table 6.1). In order to test the specific congregational effect on the 
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individual, three other variables were added to all the models: the type of Latino 
Pentecostal church attended, the education of the congregation’s pastor, and the church’s 
denominational affiliation. The first contextual variable, type of Latino Pentecostal 
church attended, includes the three types of congregations found to exist in the Latino 
Pentecostal context of Chicago—“traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive.” 
The education of the pastor was included because it was found, as I record in chapter 
four, that by far the most significant differences among the different types of Latino 
Pentecostal congregations was the pastor’s education. Finally, the church’s 
denominational affiliation was also included because the analysis in chapter five seemed 
to indicate that it plays an important role in explaining the civic engagement patterns of 
the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations.  
 These variables, entered as independent variables, will be used to help predict 
changes in the different forms of civic engagement behavior (see Tables 12 and 13 for all 
variables included in models). Given the three-level civic engagement typology 
developed in chapter five, which includes engagement within the congregation, the 
community, and the wider society, specific models were developed for each of the levels. 
Each model tests the control and contextual effects on a specific civic engagement 
behavior. For the within church level of engagement (Level 1), church membership 
(Model 1), currently having a leadership role in the church (Model 2), and the frequency 
of helping organize an event or program at church (Model 3) were used.   
 The participants’ civic engagement behavior at the community level (Level 2) 
was tested with community volunteering outside of the church more than once a month 
(Model 4), frequency of helping the needy in the community (Model 5), frequency of 
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helping someone find a job in the previous twelve months (Model 6), and frequency of 
lending money in the previous twelve months to someone outside the family (Model 7).  
 Finally, the congregant’s civic engagement behavior in society at large (Level 3) 
was also tested. The specific behaviors to be analyzed include voting in the 2004 
presidential election (Model 8), and participating in political party activities (Model 9).  
Table 12. Independent Variables for All Logistic Regression Models (N = 977) 
Independent Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Education (congregant) 2.16 .914 1 4 
Gender (congregant) 1.39 .487 1 2 
Age (congregant) 38.58 11.904 0 93 
Annual household income 
(congregant) 2.14 .900 1 4 
Citizenship status (congregant) 1.65 .751 1 3 
Language (congregant) 1.54 .765 1 3 
Religious switching (congregant) 1.39 .489 1 2 
Marital status (congregant) 1.70 .459 1 2 
Latino origin (congregant) 2.23 1.359 1 5 
Church attendance (congregant) .92 .268 0 1 
Abortion perspective 
(congregant) .27 .446 0 1 
Pentecostal church type 1.70 .768 1 3 
Denominational affiliation 
(church) 11.86 1.425 10 14 
Education (pastor) .36 .481 0 1 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
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 By looking at each of the nine models individually, it will be possible to 
determine the effects of the control variables on the specific civic engagement behavior. 
More important, however, this analysis will show the existence, if any, of contextual 
church effects on each of the chosen congregant civic engagement behaviors. In the end, 
by aggregating the control and contextual effects (in the results discussion), a larger 
perspective of the effect on the general civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal 
church congregants will be obtained.  
Table 13. Dependent Variables for All Logistic Regression Models (N = 977*) 
Civic Engagement Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
Level 1: Within Church Engagement   
Church membership .88 .324 
Leadership role .63 .482 
Helping organize event or program .80 .398 
Level 2: Community Engagement   
Volunteering outside of church .36 .479 
Helping needy in community .78 .413 
Helping someone find a job .81 .395 
Lending money to non-family members .75 .435 
Level 3: Engagement in Wider Society   
Voting in 2004 .56 .497 
Participating in political party activities .14 .350 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and 
participating in political party activities (N = 505).    
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Hypotheses. From both the literature reviewed and the descriptive findings of 
congregational civic engagement discussed in chapter five, several hypotheses can be 
proposed and tested (see Table 14).  
Given that education was found in the literature and in chapter four to be a very 
strong predictor of civic engagement, it is expected that Latino Pentecostal congregants 
with higher levels of education will be more engaged in general than those with less 
education (Putnam, 2000). Relatively better educated congregants will be more likely to 
be engaged in the community (Level 2), which should be reflected in Models 4, 5, 6, and 
7, and in society (Level 3), reflected in Models 8, and 9, due to a better knowledge and 
understanding of the “system.” Those with less educational achievement will be more 
likely to be engaged within the congregation (Level 1), reflected in Models 1, 2, and 3, as 
a result of familiarity and attachment to the local faith community and church network. 
Education should, in fact, rival Latino Pentecostal congregation type as the factor with 
the most impact on the civic engagement behavior of congregants.  
Because Latino Pentecostal women were found to be the majority of the 
congregants and very active participants in the lives of the three case study congregations 
researched be it as leaders (two of the case study churches were led by women pastors) or 
assisting with the various activities and administrative functions of the church, it is 
expected that women will be more active than men at the congregational level (Model 1, 
2, and 3). Women are also hypothesized to be more active than men at the community 
level (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7) because it can be argued that community caring  is not a 
farfetched extension of the care work that women already perform in the family and at 
church; it is all caring for others.  
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Table 14. Hypothesized Relationship Effects (N = 977*) 
 
 
Civic Engagement Models 
    Within Church             Community              Society 
Independent Variable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education (better educated 
versus less educated) 
- - - + + + + + + 
Gender (women versus men) + + + + + + + - - 
Age (older versus younger) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Annual household income 
(higher versus lower) 
- - - + + + + + + 
Citizenship status (non U.S. 
citizen versus U.S. citizen) 
+ + + + + + +   
Language (Spanish versus 
English) 
+ + + + + + + - - 
Religious switching 
(switched versus not 
switched) 
+ + + - - - - - - 
Marital status (not married 
versus married) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latino origin (Central 
American & Mexican versus 
Puerto Rican) 
+ + + -    - - - - - 
Church attendance (once a 
week or > versus less often) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abortion perspective (favor 
versus oppose) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pentecostal church type 
(“progressive” versus others) 
- - - + + + + + + 
Denominational affiliation 
(independent versus others) 
+ + + + + + + + + 
Pastor’s education (B.A. or 
more  versus less education) 
- - - + + + + + + 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and 
participating in political party activities (N = 505). Notes: + = positive effect; - = negative 
effect; 0 = no hypothesized effect. All variables are congregant variables, except 
Denominational affiliation (church variable), and Pastor’s education. 
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On the other hand, women are expected to be less engaged in society (Models 8 
and 9). With so much time and energy invested in the family, at church, and the 
community (there may be a time ceiling), the realm of politics may take the least priority. 
It is also important to keep in mind that significant numbers of Latinos, particularly those 
that were born in Latin America, have also been deeply disappointed by the democratic 
system and its political establishment in their countries of origin which may, at present, 
negatively affect the political efficacy and participation of Latinos in this country. 
Also, as household income increases, Latino Pentecostal congregants are expected 
to be more engaged particularly at the community (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7) and societal 
levels (Model 8 and 9). With an increase in household income, which typically results 
from higher levels of education, people have more at stake socially and politically but at 
the same time have access to other activities and pastimes that compete for time and 
resources with various forms of civic engagement.  
 Citizenship status is expected to have a mixed effect on the civic engagement 
behavior of Latino Pentecostal church congregants. Those who are recent and even 
undocumented immigrants are expected to be more engaged at the congregation and 
community levels. For one, they cannot vote, and are also not likely to be integrated into 
the political and social culture of this country. Given their knowledge of the culture, the 
system, and their high stakes in this country, U.S. citizens, on the other hand, are 
expected to be engaged at all levels particularly at the societal level. Because of the large 
percentage of non U.S. citizen documented and undocumented Latino Pentecostal 
congregants, it was decided that only U.S. citizens would be analyzed for Model 8 
(voting) and Model 9 (participation in political party activities).  
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 When it comes to language, the expected civic engagement behavior is similar to 
that of citizenship status. English language skills are pretty much a prerequisite for 
engagement in society while less so for engaging in the community. More important, the 
English language is not at all a prerequisite for engagement at the Latino Pentecostal 
church, especially at the “traditional” types, because services and other activities are 
mainly conducted in Spanish.  
 National origin is expected to produce very different results for the various Latin 
American national groups. Because there are by default no “undocumented” immigrants 
from Puerto Rica and they are birthright U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans are expected to be 
engaged at all levels of civic engagement particularly in wider society. The exception 
may be those that attend “traditional” congregations as a result of a lesser focus on 
beyond-the-church-walls engagement. Due to their recent arrival and the larger numbers 
of undocumented immigrants in their midst, Mexicans and Central Americans are 
expected to engage a lot more in their congregations (Models 1, 2, and 3) than in the 
community. For the same reasons, they are expected to be the least engaged in society 
(Models 8 and 9). 
 Denominational switching is hypothesized to produce complex patterns of 
congregant civic engagement. Congregants that switched from other churches are 
expected to be less engaged at the community and society level than those that had not 
switched at all. As was documented in chapter four, in the last couple of decades there 
has been a significant defection out of “traditional” Pentecostal congregations and into 
“neo-conservative” and “progressive” types. These congregants may be more inclined to 
participate within the church and even in the community, but less so in society. On the 
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other hand, congregants that have never switched denominations and that are either new 
at their churches or have always been at those churches (particularly those that attend 
“progressive” congregations) are more likely to engage at all levels.  
 Although it is important to test the impact of the control variables to verify if the 
results of past civic engagement research are replicated in the Latino Pentecostal context, 
and to test the effect of new variables observed (qualitatively and quantitatively) through 
this study to be relevant to the Latino reality, the particular focus of this chapter is the 
study of the contextual church effects on the civic engagement behavior of congregants. 
Namely, the congregational variables in the model will allow us to verify, thorough the 
use of logistic regression, whether the church really has an effect on the civic engagement 
behavior of those that attend Latino Pentecostal congregations and if it does, how much 
and through which factors.  
 The type of Pentecostal church attended is hypothesized to show that those that 
attend “progressive” congregations are to be more engaged in community (Models 4, 5, 
6, and 7) and society (Models 8 and 9) than those that attend “neo-conservative” and 
“traditional” congregations. Those that attend “traditional” and “neo-conservative” 
churches are expected to be similarly engaged in church while those who attend 
“progressive” ones less so. The type of congregation the individual attends should be the 
most important factor explaining, in most if not all models, the different forms of civic 
engagement.   
 With the evolution of Latino Pentecostalism and the emergence of new types of 
congregations, new denominational forms or lack thereof have emerged which, I propose, 
ultimately affect the civic engagement behavior of congregants. Namely, being affiliated 
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to a U.S. Latino or Latin American denomination is expected to increase the congregants’ 
within church engagement and to reduce their community and societal engagement. 
Those that attend independent churches, on the other hand, are expected to be as engaged 
within the walls of the church, but to more actively engage both at the community and 
society levels. Because of the independent churches’ lack of connection with a larger 
religious organization, a denomination, they build relationships with organizations like 
their own and with community-based organizations. At the same time, this affords them 
the freedom and flexibility to plan and execute civic engagement interventions on their 
own, or in partnership with others of similar interests, and in response to the pressing 
needs they see around them.  
 Finally, through the qualitative and quantitative data of this research, it was 
consistently found that the education of the pastor is a very important factor for 
understanding the civic engagement practices of the congregation. Could it be possible 
that the pastor’s education has a contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of 
their congregants? After all, pastors, through their teaching, preaching, and actions, play 
a fundamental role in their congregants’ socialization and the development of their social 
and political values. It is then hypothesized that the more educated the pastor, the more 
engaged the congregants will be in general but particularly at the community and societal 
levels. This factor should in fact have a large impact on civic engagement behavior when 
compared to the other factors included in the models. 
 The confirmation or rejection of these hypothesis, determined on the basis of the 
established civic engagement literature, the results of the descriptive analysis presented in 
chapter four, and the results of the qualitative portion of this study, should shed light on 
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the intricacies of the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal church congregants 
in Chicago. Their confirmation or rejection is particularly relevant for understanding the 
effect contextual church factors have on the behavior of their congregants.  
Results   
 Logistic regression was chosen as the statistical method to test each of the nine 
models developed (one for each type of civic engagement behavior) and it is used “to 
predict a discrete outcome based on variables which may be discrete, continuous, or 
mixed” (Gaur and Gaur 2009, p. 121). There are two types of logistic regression (a form 
of regression) used by researchers depending on the dependent variable’s number of 
outcomes. Binary or binomial logistic regression is used for dichotomous dependent 
variables, while “multinomial logistic regression exists to handle the case of dependents 
with more classes than two…” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).  
 Logistic regression can be used to determine the “effect size of the independent 
variables on the dependent; to rank the relative importance of independents; to assess 
interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate control variables. The 
impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios” (Garson, 2010, 
p.1).  Instead of applying Ordinary Least of Squares (OLS) techniques, logistic regression 
uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) after transforming the dependent variable 
into a logit—the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not 
(Garson, 2010, p.1).  
 Unlike multiple regression, interpreting the logistical regression coefficients is 
difficult (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994; Gaur & Gaur, 2009). The values may vary from – 
infinite to + infinite. The positive value means that “odds are in favor of the event and the 
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event is likely to occur while a negative value indicates the odds are against the event and 
the event is not likely to occur” (Gaur & Gaur, 2009, p. 122). Bohrnstedt and Knoke 
(1994) conclude that a “coefficient can be interpreted similarly to a linear regression 
parameter, as long as you remember that the dependent variable is not a probability, but 
rather a logarithm of the odds of the two probabilities” (p. 343). For instance, being a 
Republican, holding conservative political views, and being white (all with positive 
coefficients) each increases the odds of voting for Bush, while being more educated (with 
a negative coefficient) decreases the odds of voting for him (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, 
p. 343).  
 Multiple regression analysis provides an exact R square, which tells how much of 
the variation of the dependent variable can be accounted by the variation of the 
independent variable(s), the strength of the relationship. Instead, logistic regression 
provides two approximations: the Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square 
(Gaur & Gaur, 2009). Some procedures and goodness-of-fit tests are also available to 
assess the overall fit of the logistic equation to the data, or what is known as the model 
appropriateness (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 344; Garson, 2010, p. 1).  
 Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume “linearity of 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one, does not require 
normally distributed variables, does not assume homoscedasticity, and in general has less 
stringent requirements” (Garson, 2010, p. 1). Garson concludes that the predictive 
success of logistic regression can be assessed by “looking at the classification table [and] 
showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomies, ordinal, or polylitomous 
dependent” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).    
 
 
212 
 
 
    In summary, logistic regression was necessary for running all the models 
developed in this chapter because all the dependent variables (all the types of congregant 
civic engagement behavior) were dichotomous, dummy, variables.  
The results of the logistic regression testing of the nine models are summarized in 
Table 15 (See also Appendices D through L).  The discussion that follows will first focus 
on the results of the individual models and how the control variables and, more 
important, the contextual variables affect specific congregant civic engagement 
behaviors. The second part of the discussion will focus on the aggregate impact of the 
same variables, particularly the contextual ones, on congregant civic engagement 
behavior per level of engagement and then for civic engagement in general.  
 Based on the nine different models developed, the following null hypotheses 
apply: 
Null hypothesis: Model 1. There is no association between the independent variables  
 included and being a member of a Latino Pentecostal congregation. 
Null hypothesis: Model 2. There is no association between the independent variables 
 included and currently having a leadership role in the congregation. 
Null hypothesis: Model 3. There is no association between the independent variables 
included and assisting, sometimes or often, in organizing an event or program at 
church. 
Null hypothesis: Model 4. There is no association between the independent variables 
included and volunteering to do community service (outside of the church) more 
than once a month.  
Null hypothesis: Model 5. There is no association between the independent variables 
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 included and helping, sometimes or often, the needy in the community.  
Null hypothesis: Model 6. There is no association between the independent variables 
included and helping someone, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, find 
a job. 
Null hypothesis: Model 7. There is no association between the independent variables 
included and lending money, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, to 
someone outside one’s family.  
Null hypothesis: Model 8. There is no association between the independent variables 
 included and voting in the 2004 presidential election. 
Null hypothesis: Model 9. There is no association between the independent variables 
included and participating, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, in 
political party activities.  
Of the nine models tested, all except Models 6 (helping someone find a job) and 7 
(lending money to non-family members) were highly statistically significant (see Table 
15). In fact, with the exception of Model 4 (helping the needy in the community) and 8 
(participating in political party activities), all the models that were statistically significant 
were so at p < .000. Model 4 and Model 8, instead, were significant at p < .001. The p, 
probability value, tells us the “likelihood that the degree of statistical dependence 
observed in a sample is simply due to the luck of the random draw” (Kendrick Jr., 2000, 
p. 478). In fact, the lower the p value, the less likely it is that the relationship observed in 
a sample is a result of chance. By rule of thumb in statistics, to reject the “null hypothesis 
[the hypothesis of no association between variables] we have to reach the critical value of 
the chi-square associated with the .05 alpha level” (Kendrick Jr., 2000, p. 478).  
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Consequently all null hypotheses, expect those for Models 6 and 7, are rejected 
due to the fact that there is enough evidence that demonstrates that there is an association 
between the independent variables in the model(s)—all the models have the same 
independent variables—and the dichotomous dependent variable that measures civic 
engagement behavior for each model. On the other hand, there is not enough evidence 
that demonstrates  (the two models were not statistically significant at p < .05) that there 
is an association between the independent variables in Models 6 and 7 and the dependent 
variables and that as such the null hypotheses, one for each, cannot be rejected. 
Table 15. Logistic Regression Models Results (N = 977*) 
Model Statistical 
Significance 
(p < .05) 
Negelkerke R 
Square 
Null Hypotheses 
Within Church Engagement–
Church Membership .000 .210 Rejected 
Within Church Engagement–
Leadership Role .000 .095 Rejected 
Within Church Engagement–
Helping organize event .000 .138 Rejected 
Community Engagement–
Volunteering outside of church .001 .078 Rejected 
Community Engagement–
helping needy in community .000 .103 Rejected 
Community Engagement–
helping someone find a job .108 .058 Not rejected 
Community Engagement–
lending money to non family .086 .056 Not rejected 
Societal Engagement –voting 
in 2004 .001 .138 Rejected 
Societal Engagement–
participating in political party 
activities 
.000 .196 Rejected 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and 
participating in political party activities (N = 505). 
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 The analysis will proceed with seven out of the nine original models. Despite 
dropping two models because they were statistically insignificant, there are still three 
models to test the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal church congregants within the 
congregation (Level 1), two models to test their engagement in the community (Level 2), 
and two models to test their engagement in society (Level 3). 
 Even though Model 6 (helping someone find a job) and Model 7 (lending money 
to non-family members) were not statistically significant, they tell us plenty about the 
community engagement practices of Latino Pentecostal congregants. Namely, not being 
statistically significant means that there is not a lot of variation among Pentecostal 
congregants when it comes to these two types of civic engagement. Congregants 
similarly perform these engagement behaviors. Chapter five showed that all congregants, 
regardless of the type of Pentecostal congregation they attended, were very engaged in 
helping someone find a job, and lending money to nonfamily members.       
Model 1 is intended to verify not just whether there is association between the set 
of independent variables included in the model with being a member of a Latino 
Pentecostal church, but also to test which of the independent variables is statistically 
significant in that association (Table 15). The results show that not being married, being 
affiliated to an American, U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination, and attending 
worship services once a week or more are all statistically significant factors (p < 05). 
Namely, this model reveals that a Latino Pentecostal church congregant who attends a 
church that is affiliated to an American, U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination is 
positively and significantly associated with being a church member.  In fact, the odds of 
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church membership are two to three times higher (factor of 5.008) for congregants in 
U.S. Latino denominationally-affiliated churches compared to congregants in 
independent churches.  
At the same time, attending worship services at least once a week is also 
positively and strongly associated with church membership in comparison to not 
attending that frequently. Not being married, however, negatively and significantly 
affects the odds of being a church member as opposed to being married. In fact, the odds 
of being a Latino Pentecostal church member compared to not being one are multiplied 
by a factor of .532 by not being married rather than married or living together.    
In other words, in the Latino context, regardless of the type of church attended, 
the congregant is likely to actively participate in that community of faith by becoming a 
member. As expected, the individual is also more likely to be a church member if he or 
she attends worship services at least once a week. Unmarried congregants, on the other 
hand, are also less likely to be members of the congregation. Although those that attend 
non-independent congregations might have been expected to be more likely to be church 
members, the increase in the odds of being a member of such churches is surprising.  
Model 2 which tested the association of the independent variables with currently   
having a leadership role in the congregation produced very revealing results. Attending 
worship services at least once a week, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with 
friends, and the congregant’s age were all found to be statistically significant factors (p < 
05). It was found that speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends was 
significantly and negatively associated with currently having a leadership role in the 
congregation as compared to speaking more or only English at home and with friends. On 
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the other hand, both age and attending worship services at least once a week are 
positively associated with having a leadership position at church. 
The odds of currently having a leadership role are multiplied by a large factor of 
2.915 if a congregant attends worship services at least once a week rather than not doing 
so. Then too, speaking more or only Spanish at home is significantly but negatively 
associated with currently having a leadership role in the congregation. In other words, the 
odds of currently having a leadership role at church compared to not currently having a 
leadership role are multiplied by a factor of .579 by speaking more or only Spanish at 
home and with friends rather than speaking more or only English at home and with 
friends. On the other hand, being older is significantly and positively associated with 
currently having a leadership role in the congregation, all other things being equal, when 
compared to being younger.  
In the Latino Pentecostal context those that attend worship services at least once a 
week are more likely to have leadership roles in the church than those that do not, 
replicating the pattern for those that are older. The lack of English skills has been 
documented to reduce leadership opportunities at the workplace, but to find a similar 
pattern at church is surprising. It is through leadership opportunities, primarily, that 
individuals learn, develop, and practice civic skills. For the most disadvantaged sectors of 
the Latino community, not learning those skills at church means that they may not have 
other venues to do so.   
The results of Model 3, which tested the association of the independent variables 
with assisting, sometimes or often, with the organizing of an event or program at church 
show that four factors were statistically significant at p < .05. Being a U.S. citizen, 
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attending a “traditional” Pentecostal church, having an annual household income of 
$14,999 or less, and attending worship services at least once a week were all significant 
factors in the model. Being a U.S. citizen (p = .008), attending a “traditional” 
congregation (p = .004), and attending worship services at least once a week (p = .000) 
are positively associated with assisting, sometimes or often, with organizing an event or 
program at church. On the other hand, having an annual household income of $14,999 or 
less (p = .007) is negatively associated with helping out at church.  
The analysis indicated that the odds of helping out compared to not helping out at 
church are significantly improved (multiplied by a factor of 2.287) by being a U.S. 
citizen rather than an undocumented immigrant, controlling for all other variables in the 
model. As strong of a relationship was found with citizenship status. The odds of 
assisting with organizing an event or program at church compared to not doing so are 
multiplied by a factor of 4.406 by attending church at least once a week rather than 
attending less often, controlling for all the variables in the model. These results are really 
not surprising because those that attend worship services frequently tend to do so because 
they are invested in the church and by the mere fact of being present are more available 
to help out. The fact that undocumented immigrants are also less likely to assist with 
organizing an event or program in the congregation may be a function of the long hours 
many of them have to work to make ends meet. The low wages earned by the majority of 
undocumented immigrants in this country make it necessary to work two jobs or longer 
hours to barely survive. This is confirmed by the fact that the odds of a congregant with 
an annual household income of $14,999 or less helping out at church are just .369 the 
odds of a congregant that has an annual household income of $50,000 or more.      
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Table 16. Hypothesized vs. Actual Relationship Effects (N = 977*) 
 Civic Engagement Models 
    Within Church                Community               Society 
Independent Variable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education (better educated 
versus less educated) 
- - - + + + + +/- + 
Gender (women versus 
men) 
+ + + + + + + - - 
Age (older versus younger) 0 0/+ 0 0 0/+ 0 0 0/+ 0 
Annual household income 
(higher versus lower) 
- - -/+ + + + + + +/+ 
Citizenship status (non U.S. 
citizen versus U.S. citizen) 
+ + +/- + + + +   
Language (Spanish versus 
English) 
+ +/- + +/- +/+ + + -/- -/- 
Religious switching 
(switched versus not 
switched) 
+ + + - - - - - - 
Marital status (not married 
versus married) 
0/- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latino origin (Central 
American & Mexican 
versus Puerto Rican) 
+ + + -    - - - - - 
Church attendance (once a 
week or > versus less often) 
0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0 0/+ 0 0 0 0 
Abortion perspective (favor 
versus oppose) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/+ 
Pentecostal church type 
(“progressive” vs. others) 
- - -/- + + + + + +/+ 
Denominational affiliation 
(independent versus others) 
+/- + + +/- +/- + + + +/- 
Pastor’s education (B.A. or 
more  versus less education) 
- - - + + + + +/+ + 
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and 
participating in political party activities (N = 505). Notes: + = positive effect; - = negative 
effect; 0 = no hypothesized effect. Only models and relationships found to be statistically 
significant are reported in bold typeface. All variables are congregant variables, except 
Denominational affiliation (church variable), and Pastor’s education. 
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Attending a “traditional” Pentecostal congregation also increases the likelihood of 
helping out at church so much so that the odds, controlling for other variables in the 
model, of helping out compared to not helping out are multiplied by a very large factor of 
2.530 by attending this type of church rather than a “progressive” one. In other words, 
“traditional” Pentecostal congregations are relatively more inclined to provide civic 
engagement opportunities for their congregants even if that means helping out with the 
organizing of events or programs.  
The results produced by the first three models, all of which focused on three 
separate dimensions of within congregation civic engagement—church membership, 
having a leadership position in church, and assisting with organizing an event or program 
at church—indicate that there are several variables that are important to understanding 
these types of civic engagement. Namely, frequency of church attendance was relevant to 
all models, while attending a “traditional” congregation, not being married, speaking 
more or only Spanish at home, being a U.S. citizen, having an annual household income 
of $14,999 or less, being older, and attending a church that is affiliated with an American, 
U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination were all relevant for at least one model. 
From these results, there is no doubt that frequency of church attendance is the most 
prevalent factor in helping explain within congregation civic engagement—those that are 
present can certainly participate. The other factors listed are also important but to a lesser 
degree.       
While the first three models tested the civic engagement of congregants within 
their own churches (Level 1), Models 4 and 5 tested it at the community level (Level 2). 
Specifically, Model 4 addresses community volunteerism outside of the church more than 
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once a month. Speaking both English and Spanish at home, and attending a church 
affiliated with an American Pentecostal denomination were all found to be statistically 
significant at p < .05 for this model. While being both English and Spanish language 
dominant (p= .000) is positively associated with volunteering in the community, the 
association is negative if one attends a church that is affiliated with an American 
denomination (p = .052). That is, the odds of volunteering in the community more than 
once a month compared to not doing so are improved (multiplied by a very much larger 
factor of 2.362) by being both English and Spanish language dominant rather than just 
English language dominant, controlling for other variables in the model. On the other 
hand, the odds of volunteering in the community more than once a month compared to 
not doing so are multiplied by a factor of .583 by attending a church that is affiliated with 
an American denomination rather than an independent one. About 58 American 
denomination church attendees volunteer in the community more than once a month per 
100 independent church attendees.  
It is indeed very surprising that no other variable such as education, gender, and 
even citizenship status plays a significant role in community voluntarism among Latino 
Pentecostal congregants. Instead those that dominate both the English and Spanish 
languages and those that attend independent congregations are more likely to volunteer in 
the community more than once a month. Being fully bilingual may also be an added 
benefit to volunteering in the community because it allows for the interaction with larger 
numbers of people particularly if the volunteering is taking place at both Latino and non-
Latino communities. At the same time, these results show that Latino congregations that 
 
 
222 
 
 
are affiliated to American denominations may put less emphasis on involvement in 
community, at least through volunteering outside of the church.  
After testing Model 5 which focuses on helping the needy in the community 
sometimes or often as a form of community civic engagement, four variables were found 
to be statistically significant: age (p = .000), attending worship services at least once a 
week (p = .000), speaking more or only Spanish at home (p = .054), and attending a 
church affiliated with a U.S. Latino denomination (p = .56). All variables were found to 
be strongly and positively associated with helping the needy in the community. In fact, 
the odds of helping the needy in the community sometimes or often compared to not 
doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 2.653 by attending church at least once a 
week rather than not doing so. Also, per a one-year increase in the age of the congregant, 
the odds of the person helping the needy in the community (sometimes or often) are 
multiplied by a factor of 1.028, controlling for other variables in the model. Then too, the 
odds of helping the needy in the community sometimes or often compared to not doing so 
are multiplied by a very large factor of 1.986 by attending a church affiliated with a U.S. 
Latino denomination rather an in independent church. Finally if the congregant speaks 
more or only Spanish at home, the odds of helping the needy in the community 
sometimes or often compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 1.660. 
 In other words, those that attend church frequently, more mature individuals (as 
demonstrated by their age), those that speak mainly Spanish at home, and those that 
attend churches affiliated with U.S. Latino denominations are more likely than other 
Pentecostals to help the needy in the community. Once again, religiosity measured in this 
case as attending church at least once a week, is very important in predicting the odds of 
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helping the needy in the community—a form of community civic engagement. It is very 
telling that the type of Pentecostal congregation attended (“traditional,” “neo-
conservative,” or “progressive”) was not found to be statistically significant.  
Both Models 4 and 5 specifically looked at the effect of the various independent 
variables on two different forms of community civic engagement, volunteering in the 
community outside of the church at least once a month, and helping the needy in the 
community sometimes or often. Both language and denominational affiliation were 
significant predictors for both models while age and frequency of church attendance were 
significant for only one of the two models. It is important to note that gender, type of 
Pentecostal congregation, education, and income were not statistically significant 
contributors in understanding the community civic engagement behavior of Latino 
Pentecostal congregants in Chicago.   
Unfortunately, Models 6 and 7 were not found to be statistically significant. They 
both intended to test two important dimensions of community civic engagement—helping 
someone find a job and lending money to non-family members, respectively. These two 
forms of community engagement are very important for Latino Pentecostals because they 
represent informal dimensions of community civic engagement. As such, it is surprising 
they were not found to be significant, but as discussed before in this section, that may be 
a result of the fact that Latino Pentecostal congregations in general are similarly engaged 
in both types of engagement.  
Finally, Models 8 and 9 are designed to test civic engagement behavior in wider 
society (Level 3). Whereas Model 8 looks at political engagement, considered by many 
as the ultimate expression of civic engagement behavior (Schlozman et al., 1999; Smidt, 
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2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004), Model 9 tests the 
participation of the congregants in political party activities.  
The results of Model 8 show that the predictors included in the model have an 
important impact on congregant voting behavior in the 2004 presidential election 
(Negelkerke R Square = .138). Several predictors were statistically significant including 
the congregant’s age, having less than a H.S./GED education, speaking more or only 
Spanish, and the church’s pastor having completed a B.A. degree or more. Having less 
than a H.S./GED education (p = .007) and speaking more or only Spanish (p = .043) are 
negatively associated with having voted in the 2004 presidential election. On the other 
hand, the congregant’s age (p = .001), and the congregation’s pastor having completed at 
B.A. degree or more (p = .097) are all positively associated with voting.  
In other words, the odds of having voted in the 2004 presidential elections 
compared to not voting are multiplied by a factor of .354 by having less than a H.S. 
education rather than a B.A. or more. That is, congregants with higher levels of education 
are a lot more likely to vote than those that do not have the same level of educational 
achievement. This is certainly not surprising because the same voting patterns are 
observed in the general public, whether Latino or non-Latino. Similarly, speaking more 
or only Spanish at home (which is a proxy for how recently the person came to the U.S.) 
is also negatively associated with getting involved in political party activities.   
Furthermore, the odds of having voted compared to the opposite are also 
multiplied by a large factor of 1.548 when the respondent’s pastor has completed a B.A. 
degree or more compared to not having completed that level of education, controlling for 
other variables in the model. Namely, the congregation’s pastor having achieved higher 
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levels of education increases the likelihood of having voted in the 2004 presidential 
election. This finding is not surprising and is aligned with chapter four findings where it 
was confirmed that the pastor’s education is by far the most important factor 
differentiating the different types of Latino Pentecostal churches. This time, it also 
appears to be an important contextual variable affecting the civic engagement behavior of 
their congregants at the highest level (societal engagement)   
Finally, the results of Model 8 also show that age is positively associated with 
having voted.  In fact, for each one-year increase in the age of the congregant, the odds of 
the person having voted is multiplied by a factor of 1.030, controlling for other variables 
in the model. In other words, the older the congregant, the more likely it is he or she 
would have voted in the 2004 Presidential election. This finding also aligns with what is 
known about the voting patterns of the general public: the younger the individual the less 
likely he or she is to vote.  
After closely looking at the predictors that are statistically significant in this 
model, it is more than evident that a congregant’s relative lack of education, and English 
language limitations predictably affects voting habits in a negative way while age (that is, 
more age!), as expected, positively influences the likelihood of voting, as does the 
pastor’s education.  
The results of Model 9, which looks at congregant involvement in political party 
activities (including voting registration drives, campaign involvement, and financial 
donations to political parties), show that the model predictors moderately impacted the 
participation in these types of activities (Negelkerke R Square = .196). That is, this 
logistic regression model explains 20 percent of the variation in congregant involvement 
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in political party activities. Nonetheless, a total of four model predictors were found to be 
statistically significant (the same number as Model 8). Attending a church that is 
affiliated to an American denomination (at p = .013), having an annual household income 
of $35,000 to $49,999 (at p = .044) and believing that abortion is acceptable at least 
sometimes (p = .006) are positively associated with participation in political party 
activities. On the contrary, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends (p = 
.000) is negatively associated with participating in political party activities.  
This model’s results show that the odds of getting involved in political party 
activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a very large factor of 2.394 when 
the congregant speaks more or Spanish at home or with friends. Namely, English 
language barriers are negatively associated with getting involved in political party 
activities.  
On the other hand, attending a congregation that is affiliated with an American 
denomination positively influences congregants’ involvement in political party activities. 
That is, the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so 
are multiplied by a large factor of 3.205 when a respondent attends a congregation that is 
affiliated with an American denomination rather than an independent church, controlling 
for other variables in the model. These findings are not surprising given the fact 
denominational affiliation tends to mobilize political activity as a result of the 
information, organizational networks, and leadership provided by denominations to their 
affiliated churches. At the same time, large numbers of Latino churches that are very 
engaged in society (for example, “progressive” Pentecostal types) have been found, as 
shown in chapter four, to be independent and without the support of a denomination. This 
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requires further research to clarify the relationships that were found to be statistically 
significant by this model.  
Also, having an annual household income of $35,000 to $49,999 positively 
influences congregants’ involvement in political party activities. That is, the odds of 
getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a 
large factor of 2.394 when a respondent has an annual household income of $35,000 to 
$49,999 rather than an annual household income of $50,000 or more, controlling for 
other variables in the model.  
Finally, believing that abortion is sometimes acceptable was found to be 
significant and positively associated with getting involved in political party activities. In 
fact, the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are 
multiplied by a large factor of 2.230 when a respondent believes that abortion is 
sometimes acceptable rather than believing that it is not, controlling for other variables in 
the model. In other words, those that believe that abortion is at least sometimes 
acceptable are more likely to participate in political party activities demonstrating that 
this issue is also a politically mobilizing issue in the Latino community the way it is for 
millions of people around the U.S. In the Latino Pentecostal context, however, it is not 
those opposed to abortion the ones that are more engaged, as may be the case with white 
Evangelicals and Pentecostals, but the ones that believe that it is sometimes acceptable.    
Models 8 and 9 sought to understand the effect of the model predictors on voting 
and involvement in political party activities. Unexpectedly, education (the pastor’s and 
congregant’s) and not religiosity—measured in these models with the at least once a 
week church attendance predictor—was a significant predictor in explaining civic 
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engagement in the wider society but only in Model 8. At the same time the congregant’s 
abortion stance, language, age, and denominational affiliation were also important in 
understanding both the voting behavior of Pentecostal congregants and their involvement 
in political party activities.  
When it came to involvement in political party activities, it is understandable why 
those that speak more or only Spanish at home are not as likely to get involved. What is 
surprising, however, is that the likelihood of getting involved in political party activities 
significantly increases for those that attend churches affiliated to American 
denominations because a large number of “progressive” Pentecostal churches are 
independent. More research is needed to better understand these dynamics.        
In the end, several of the proposed hypotheses were confirmed by this research 
but with important qualifiers (see Table 16). Namely, although I hypothesized that Latino 
Pentecostal congregants with higher levels of education would be more engaged in 
community and society, education was only a significant factor for voting (one of the two 
forms of societal engagement studied) confirming that congregants with lower levels of 
education engage much less in society than those with a B.A. degree or more.  
Although women were hypothesized to be actively engaged within church and in 
the community and less so in society, the results of this study show that gender was not 
statistically significant for a particularly civic engagement model. This means that gender 
was similarly relevant to all civic engagement models. Also, annual household income 
was predicted to play an important role in explaining both community and societal civic 
engagement, and it did play an important role. That is, annual household income was 
found to be a relevant predictor in helping organize an event at church (within church 
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engagement); those with annual household incomes of $14,999 or less are significantly 
less likely to help with event organizing than those congregants with annual household 
incomes of $50,000 or more. It was also found those congregants with annual household 
incomes of $35,000 to $49,999 are significantly more likely to get involved in political 
party activities than those with incomes of $50,000 or more.  
When it comes to immigrant status, non-U.S. citizens were expected to be very 
active in the congregation and less so in the community and society. The results of this 
research show, however, that being a non-U.S. citizen was not a relevant explanatory 
factor for any of the models. It is important to keep in mind that for Model 8 (voting) and 
Model 9 (participating in political party activities) only U.S. citizens were analyzed. 
Being a U.S. citizen was relevant to one of the models: helping in organizing an event at 
church (within church engagement). Although I hypothesized that U.S. citizens would be 
engaged at all level of civic engagement, their citizenship status was not found to be an 
important predictor of community engagement. It was, however, very important for 
Models 8 and 9 because the analysis was conducted with U.S. citizens.  
It was originally hypothesized that language was to play an important role in 
understanding civic engagement at all levels—within church, in community, and in larger 
society. This study confirmed that it certainly did, but not necessarily in the way it was 
expected. For instance, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends 
significantly decreased the odds of being a leader at church when compared to the 
congregant that spoke more or only English at home and with friends. Congregants that 
speak both languages equally at home and with friends were significantly more likely to 
volunteer outside the church than those that spoke more or only English. Then too, 
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speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends significantly increased the odds 
of helping the needy in the community when compared to those that spoke more or only 
English. Finally, Latino Pentecostal congregants that spoke more or only Spanish at home 
and with friends were significantly less likely to be involved in political party activities 
than those that spoke only or mainly English at home and with friends. There is no 
question that language was found to be one of the main predictors of Latino Pentecostal 
congregant civic engagement at all levels, with the exception of Model 9 (participation in 
political party activities), the role of language, although very important, was different 
than expected.  
Even though Latino origin (nationality) was expected to play an important role in 
explaining civic engagement among Latino Pentecostal congregants, it was not 
significant for any of the models. Denominational switching was also hypothesized to 
produce complex patterns of civic engagement (at all levels). Instead, it was not found to 
be relevant for any of the models tested.  
On the other hand, both marital status and abortion perspective were found to be 
predictors of civic engagement behavior among Latino Pentecostal congregants, albeit 
not as important as other factors. Even though age was not even hypothesized to play a 
relevant role as a civic engagement explanatory factor, it was one of the top four 
explanatory factors relevant for each of the civic engagement levels studied. This is also 
the case for religiosity as measured by attending worship services at least once a week. 
Namely, it was found that religiosity is an important factor in explaining within church 
and community engagement and not so for societal engagement, voting and participation 
in political party activities—the area of civic engagement where it has been found to be 
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important in the literature (Wuthnow, 1999, 2003). Religiosity was found to be positively 
and significantly related to being a church member, a church leader, and a church event 
assistant. It was also positively and significantly related to helping the needy in the 
community. In fact, religiosity along with church denominational affiliation, and 
language were found to be the most important predictive factors for all models of Latino 
Pentecostal congregant civic engagement. 
The review of the results produced by the logistic regression testing of the nine 
models did confirm several of the original hypotheses but also disconfirmed many others. 
It also documented new relationships among the variables. Ultimately, however, this 
chapter sought to study the contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of Latino 
Pentecostal congregants in Chicago. It did so by studying the effect of Pentecostal church 
type, the church’s denominational affiliation, and the pastor’s education—all factors 
documented in chapter four to be important for the understanding of civic engagement 
among Latino Pentecostals.     
Although the congregation’s denominational affiliation was, as hypothesized, 
important in explaining civic engagement at all levels, the testing of the models show 
both confirmation and deviation from the proposed relationships. For instance, it was 
found that being affiliated with an American, Latin American or U.S. Latino 
denomination results in a lot higher within church involvement than being unaffiliated at 
all (that is, part of an independent church). It was also confirmed that being affiliated to 
an American denomination significantly reduces the odds of volunteering outside the 
church in comparison to being an independent church. These two align with the 
hypothesized relationships. On the other hand, being affiliated with a U.S. Latino 
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denomination makes the congregant more likely to help the needy in the community than 
if they were part of an independent church. And being affiliated with both an American 
denomination makes it a lot more likely for the congregants to get involved in political 
party activities than congregants that attend independent churches. In short, attending an 
independent congregation was not relevant to any of the models tested, but attending 
churches that are affiliated to denominations was an important predictor of civic 
engagement behavior. These results certainly are different than originally predicted.  
Furthermore, the education of the pastor was hypothesized to have an important 
contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of congregants. It was proposed that 
the more educated the pastor, the more engaged the congregants would be at the 
community and societal levels (Level 2 and 3). The results show that the pastor’s 
education was only relevant for one of the models—voting. It was confirmed that if the 
pastor had completed a B.A. degree or more, the congregants were more likely to vote 
than if the pastor had not done so.  
Finally, Pentecostal church type was hypothesized to be the most relevant factor 
explaining, in most if not all the models, congregant civic engagement. The fact is that it 
was not. It was not even one of the top four explanatory factors (religiosity, 
denominational affiliation, language—all significant in four models, and age—significant 
in three models). Pentecostal church type was only significant in 2 of the 7 statistically 
significant models that were analyzed. It was relevant to within church and societal 
engagement. Attending a “traditional” congregation was strongly and positively related to 
helping organize an event at church compared to those that attended “progressive” 
churches. In the end, although Pentecostal church type was not found to be the most 
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important explanatory factor, some of the hypothesized relationships (“traditional” 
church congregants engaging less in society) were confirmed while others—the 
prominent role “progressive” church congregants were to play—only partially so. This 
may be a reflection of the fact that all Latino Pentecostal congregants, as gleaned from 
chapter four, are fairly similar in their behavior, with some variations. The major 
differences seem to be between “progressive” church pastors and their counterparts.                     
In summary, the three contextual factors hypothesized as playing an important 
role in the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants were indeed 
confirmed by the results. At least one of the three factors, Pentecostal church type, 
pastor’s education, and church’s denominational affiliation, was statistically significant in 
five of the seven models analyzed. However, the most relevant factor was denominational 
affiliation and not Pentecostal church type and the pastor’s education was only relevant 
for one model.    
Conclusion   
In summary, the analysis of the results of the nine logistic regression models used 
to test the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants—looking at nine 
different types of behaviors—shows that all but two of the models were statistically 
significant (Table 15). Basically, the predictor independent variables used (the eight 
models included the same independent variables) explained the variation in the various 
types of civic engagement behavior from a low 7.8 percent for Model 4, voluntarism in 
communities outside the church, to a high 21.0 percent for church membership (the 
Negelkerke R square was used).  
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Although two models were dropped from the analysis (Model 6—helping 
someone find a job—p = .108, and Model 7—lending money to non–family members—p 
= .086), those two models also tell us a lot about the community civic engagement 
practices of Latino Pentecostal congregants in Chicago. The fact that the models were not 
statistically significant tell us that there was not a lot of variation among the different 
types of congregants when it comes to helping someone find a job and lending money to 
non-family members. In chapter five, it was found that Latino Pentecostal congregations 
are in general very engaged through these two types of engagement.  
Table 17. Significant Civic Engagement Predictors (N = 977*) 
Predictor 
 
Importance 
 
Church attendance—religiosity 
(congregant) Very important (4 of 7 models) 
Denominational affiliation (church) Very important (4 of 7 models) 
Language (congregant) Very important (4 of 7 models) 
Age (congregant) Very important (3 of 7 models) 
Pentecostal church type Important (2 of 7 models) 
Immigrant status (congregant) Important (2 of 7 models) 
Education (congregant) Less important (1 of 7 models) 
Education (pastor) Less important (1 of 7 models) 
Marital status (congregant) Less important (1 of 7 models) 
Annual income (congregant) Less important (1 of 7 models) 
Abortion perspective (congregant) Less important (1 of 7 models) 
*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and 
participating in political party activities (N = 505). 
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The models that were statistically significant allowed the testing of the civic 
engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants in all three levels of civic 
engagement, within the church, in the community, and in the wider society.  
 What is evident after analyzing all models and the statistically significant 
predictors for each is that there are a few factors that are very important in understanding 
the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal congregants in general (Table 17). Namely, in 
at least four of the seven models, religiosity (here measured as at least once a week 
church attendance or more), denominational affiliation, and congregant’s language were 
all important predictors closely followed the by congregant’s age and Pentecostal church 
type. Other factors that were also relevant and statistically significant but for only one of 
the models include marital status, annual household income, abortion perspective, and the 
education of both the congregant and the church pastor. Surprisingly, neither education 
nor income played a very significant role in understanding the civic engagement behavior 
of Latino Pentecostal congregants. It is important to keep in mind that the Chicago Latino 
Congregations Study’s sample is not a national sample. As a results, a local sample, in 
this case focused on Chicago, may reduce the variability of the characteristics studied 
which may ultimately result in an inability to detect otherwise statistically significant 
effects.           
  It is, indeed, very telling that although gender and national origin were included 
as part of the independent variables, they were not significant for any of the models and 
failed to contribute to our understanding of civic engagement behavior among Latino 
Pentecostal congregants. This may also mean that there are no differences in civic 
engagement by gender and national origin, given the other variables in the model. 
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Because the majority of those that attend Latino Pentecostal churches are women and 
there are significant national differences among the various types of congregations, this 
requires further research.  
This analysis shows that when it comes to Latino Pentecostal congregants some 
already well-known predictors, such as religiosity, help explain their civic engagement 
behavior. On the other hand, in this context other variables are also very important if one 
is to understand congregant civic engagement, specifically denominational affiliation, 
congregant’s language and age, Pentecostal church type, and citizenship status. The fact 
is that predictors, such as education, income, and moral values, all of which have been 
successfully used by researchers to predict the civic engagement of other religious 
groups, were shown to be only partially significant in the Latino Pentecostal context.  It 
was categorically demonstrated that other factors (religiosity, denominational affiliation, 
language, and age) were more important predictors of civic engagement behavior among 
Latino Pentecostal congregants than Pentecostal church type. 
It is important to emphasize at this point that religiosity (as measured by once a 
week or more church attendance) was found to play an important role in predicting civic 
engagement but particularly at the church. It was also found to be a positive predictor of 
community engagement particularly in helping the needy. In other words, in the Latino 
Pentecostal context, being very religious encourages engagement inside the church and in 
the community, but not so in the larger society.     
Even when several of the hypotheses originally proposed were confirmed, many 
more were either not confirmed or the relationships found to operate differently. 
Notwithstanding that the results are significantly different than expected, this analysis has 
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contributed invaluably to the understanding of civic engagement practices among Latino 
Pentecostal congregants.     
In chapter seven, I will compare the civic engagement behavior of Latino 
congregations and their congregants with those of other Latino religious traditions— 
Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic. I will then compare Latino Pentecostal 
congregants with non-Latino Evangelicals, keeping in mind that I will be comparing, for 
instance, Pentecostal congregants with Evangelicals in general (not Evangelical 
congregants). At the end, the dualistic liberal/conservative framework will be addressed 
in light of the findings of the chapter. Does the experience of Latino Pentecostals provide 
compelling evidence to modify the liberal/conservative framework of analysis?       
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
LATINO CHURCHES AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, using the typologies of Latino Pentecostal congregations and civic 
engagement developed in chapters four and five, I compare and contrast Latino 
Pentecostal churches with their Latino Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic 
counterparts. The main objective is to outline the similarities and the points of departure 
particularly as it relates to different types of civic engagement behavior within the 
congregation, in the community and in wider society (the three different levels included 
in the civic engagement typology developed in chapter five).  
 By comparing and contrasting the main Latino religious traditions (in this case 
different congregations and their congregants), my goal is, first, to determine whether 
Latino Pentecostals—particularly the “progressive” types—are more or less civically 
engaged when compared to their counterparts. Second, given the argument I have made 
throughout this dissertation that Latino Pentecostals are different than Latino 
Evangelicals, comparing these two traditions’ civic engagement practices is very 
informative to test if the data supports the hypothesis. Finally this analysis also seeks to 
test whether the well established paradigm of liberal religion being associated with 
Mainline Protestantism and conservative religion associated with Evangelical and 
Pentecostal traditions is actually replicated in the Latino community (Greeley & Hout, 
2006; Smidt, 2003; Stark, 2008; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004).  
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Of special interest for this dissertation is the testing of the hypothesis that the 
liberal/conservative religious paradigm so prominent in the study of religion in the U.S. 
needs revising given the religious landscape changes occurring as a result of the growing 
influence of U.S. Latinos. Because of the duality documented among Latinos (see chapter 
four)—where they are conservative in some areas but liberal in others—I propose that it 
is imperative to include a moderate category to the existing paradigm in order to more 
accurately categorize the beliefs and practices of Latinos and other groups that may 
experience the same reality but are outside of the mainstream of white Christianity.           
 I use cross tabulations and comparisons of means (Chi-Squares—Pearson and 
Likelihood Ratios—and Analysis of Variance—ANOVA—were used to test for 
statistical significance) to compare and contrast congregations and their congregants on a 
variety of demographic, religiosity, social and political, and civic engagement variables. I 
start the chapter with a brief analysis of demographic similarities and differences and 
then move on to a comparison of religiosity. Another section of the chapter delves into 
the social and political differences of Latino congregations in Chicago. These 
comparisons will serve the purpose of drawing a picture that illustrates whether Latino 
Pentecostal churches and their congregants are, in fact, different from their counterparts 
in other religious traditions, and if so, how different they are.  
The most important section of the chapter analyzes the civic engagement practices 
of Latino Pentecostals, the churches and their congregants, in comparison to other Latino 
faith traditions. Particular attention is paid to the civic engagement practices of 
“progressive” Pentecostals to test if they are in fact trail blazers, as found in chapter five, 
or not. Using a variety of studies (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2007, 
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2008; Stark, 2008), a brief comparison is also drawn between the different Latino 
religious traditions and their U.S. counterparts. This comparison is limited because the 
studies available are national surveys of the U.S. population (for instance, a national 
survey of Catholics), instead the Chicago Latino Congregations Study surveyed 
congregants, those that were present at the worship service when the survey was 
completed.  
Although there were high response rates among all Latino congregation pastors or 
leaders, this was not replicated with congregants. The overwhelming majority of 
congregants from Pentecostal, Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant congregations 
completed the surveys, but given the size and fast pace of Catholic parishes, a smaller 
number of those present at the mass completed the survey. In most cases, far less than 
fifty percent of the attendees completed it. Consequently, in making comparisons and 
drawing conclusions, it is imperative to bear in mind that the data has close to a census of 
Latino Protestant church pastors and their congregants (this is particularly the case with 
Latino Pentecostals), but it has a lot less representation for Catholic congregants. There 
were specific reasons, although unknown, for those that completed the survey to do so.        
   I conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and discuss 
questions needing further research.    
Demographic Profiles of Latino Churches  
 Not surprising, the age structure of Latino church congregants is very similar for 
all faith traditions ranging (mean age) from 39 to 43 years of age. Although the mean age 
for Latino Mainline Protestants is 43 years old, the youngest, the Pentecostal ones, are 39 
years old—only 4 years younger. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test if the 
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age differences observed among different types of Latino congregants were significant. 
The null hypothesis (there are no age differences for the congregants of the four different 
types of Latino congregations) is rejected (p = .000). When it comes to gender, the 
picture unexpectedly changes. Namely, while 62 percent of those that attend Latino 
Pentecostal churches are women (63 percent for “progressive types), the number climbs 
to 66, 70, and 75 percent for Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant churches 
respectively. While 38 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants are men, only 25 
percent of those that attend Mainline Protestant churches are men. In other words, all 
Latino churches primarily serve the needs of women with Catholics leading the way 
while Pentecostal churches are the most effective at attracting (or retaining) men to the 
pews. In general, Latino congregations are attended by younger people with a mean age 
of 40 years old for all congregations (a clear reflection of the Latino age structure in the 
U.S.). Mainliners are the oldest and Pentecostals the youngest (see Table 18).  
 Also the education accomplishments of the various groups defy preconceived 
notions. Although the majority of Latino church congregants in Chicago, 66 percent, only 
have a H.S. diploma, GED, or less, the churches with the highest percentage, 73 percent, 
in this category are the Mainliners. In fact, the congregants with less representation in this 
educational category are Evangelicals (63 percent), and Pentecostals (63 percent)—
“progressive” church congregants have the lowest representation in this category at 57 
percent. Although Mainline Protestant church congregants lead in having a B.A. degree 
or more with 15 percent, they are closely followed by their Evangelical and Catholic 
counterparts with 14 and 13 percent respectively. They are all followed at a distance by 
Pentecostal congregants at 9 percent (even “progressive” ones report the same 
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percentage). However, when those that have some college and more are analyzed, 
Pentecostal congregants and Evangelicals lead the way with 37 percent each 
(“progressive” ones report 43 percent, the highest for all Latino congregants), followed 
by those that attend Catholic churches—Mainliners lag behind with 27 percent. That is, 
when it comes to education Pentecostal congregants have the lowest rates in the high 
school, GED, or less and also the lowest rates in the B.A. degree or more categories.  
However, those that attend Pentecostal churches (along with their Evangelical 
brethren) have the highest percentage of all congregants with some college and more, 
particularly those that attend “progressive” churches. This may indicate that Pentecostal 
congregants are little by little becoming more educated even in comparison to their 
counterparts in the other Latino faith traditions.   
 When it comes to annual household income, all Latino congregants, regardless of 
the type of church they attend, report very similar numbers with the important exception 
of those that attend “progressive” Pentecostal churches. In general, all Latino 
congregations serve a significant number of poor people (23 percent of congregants 
report annual household incomes of $14,999 or less) with the highest number not being 
reported by Pentecostals but instead by Mainliners (22 vs. 26 percent)—“traditional” 
Pentecostal congregants do report 25 percent in this category. Once working-class 
congregants ($24,999 or less) are added, 36 percent of Latino church congregants are 
either poor or working class. Evangelical and Pentecostal churches lead the way at 53 and 
52 percent, respectively, with lower middle-class congregants ($25,000 to $49,999 in 
annual household income), and “neo-conservative” and “progressive” Pentecostal 
churches have the highest percentage of congregants with incomes of more than $50,000 
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at 18 and 17 percent, respectively—five percentage points higher than all other Latino 
faith traditions at 12 percent.  Latino Pentecostal congregants are, in general, not the 
poorest (“traditional” Pentecostal churches do have the highest percentage of poor people 
along with Mainline ones). Instead, “progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal 
congregations have the highest percentage of attendees with annual household incomes of 
$50,000 or more—they are hardly the destitute of society. On the other hand, both 
Mainline and “traditional” Pentecostal churches report the highest percentages of very 
poor congregants.    
 In terms of language, 65 percent of all Latino church congregants report speaking 
only or more Spanish at home. Evangelical congregants report the highest number with 
79 percent followed by their Catholic (71 percent) and Mainline Protestant counterparts 
at 68 percent. Those that attend Pentecostal churches report the lowest numbers at 57 
percent particularly the “progressive” types at 44 percent. “Traditional” Pentecostal 
congregants report 79 percent, the same as their Evangelical counterparts. On the other 
hand, Pentecostal congregants report the highest number for all Latino congregants (20 
percent) in speaking only or more English at home while Evangelicals report the lowest 
at 7 percent. However, when the different Pentecostal types are looked at, “neo-
conservative” Pentecostal attendees report the highest of all Latino congregants at 30 
percent and “traditional” ones the lowest at 4 percent. That is, the overwhelming majority 
of Latino congregants speak only or more Spanish at home, with Latino Pentecostal 
congregants reporting both the highest numbers for Spanish and for English. 
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Table 18. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Congregants by Church 
Type 
 
Characteristic Trad.  Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Mean age 38 41 39 41 43 42 41+ 
Percentage        
Women 58 66 63 66 75 70 66* 
Citizenship        
       Undocumented 27 5 9 22 3 16 14* 
       Legal resident 40 22 22 33 38 30 31* 
       U.S. citizen 31 73 69 44 59 53 55* 
Household Income        
       < $15,000 25 18 23 20 26 23 23* 
       < $25,000 39 31 32 35 38 39 36* 
       < $50,000  94 82 83 88 88 88 87* 
       $50,000 and more 6 18 17 12 12 12 13* 
Education        
       H.S./GED or less 75 58 57 63 73 68 66* 
       Some college plus 25 42 43 37 27 33 35* 
3 or more children 51 51 49 47 52 56 51** 
Language spoken at home 
and with friends        
       More or only English  4 30 27 7 12 11 15* 
       Only or more Spanish 79 48 44 79 68 72 65* 
       Both languages  17 22 29 15 20 17 20* 
N 480 312 185 602 110 679 2368 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
**Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
+ Significantly different from an overall mean at p<.05. 
 
Not surprising, the majority of Latino congregants are either U.S. citizens (55 
percent) or have another legal status in the country (31 percent), while a significant 
minority, 14 percent, are undocumented immigrants. Mainline congregants report the 
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highest rate of U.S. citizenship at 59 percent and the lowest rate of undocumented 
immigrants at 3 percent while their Evangelical counterparts report the lowest citizenship 
rates (44 percent) and highest undocumented immigrant rates at 22 percent. However, 
when the various types of Pentecostal congregations are looked at, the “traditional” types 
have both the lowest rate of citizenship (31 percent) and the highest rate of 
undocumented immigrants at 27 percent. “Progressive” congregants report the highest 
rate of U.S. citizenship at 69 percent. In other words, Pentecostal congregations 
experience very diverging realities when it comes to citizenship status.  
 Finally, when the national origin of Latino church congregants is reviewed, those 
of Mexican decent represent the largest national group at 45 percent followed at a 
distance by those of Puerto Rican (20 percent), other Caribbean (15 percent), and Central 
American (14 percent) descent. At 60 percent, congregants of Mexican descent represent 
the overwhelming majority of Catholic parish congregants. Although congregants of 
Mexican descent have an important presence in all Protestant traditions (ranging from 34 
percent at Mainline and Pentecostal churches to 37 percent at Evangelical ones), 
congregants of Puerto Rican descent are well represented in both Mainline (32 percent) 
and Pentecostal (33 percent) churches and significantly less at Evangelical congregations 
(13 percent). Congregants of Central American descent are mainly concentrated in 
Evangelical (22 percent) and Pentecostal (15 percent) churches with little representation 
in Catholic and Mainline churches, 4 percent for both. When different types of 
Pentecostal congregations are analyzed, the majority of “traditional” church congregants 
are of Mexican descent (58 percent) while almost half (48 percent) of those that attend 
“progressive” churches are of Puerto Rican descent.          
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 The analysis of a variety of demographic factors related to Latino congregants in 
Chicago reveals similarities and differences. Both the age and gender structures are very 
similar for all congregations with few differences. In general, congregants are fairly 
young with a mean age of 41. Also, Catholic parishes, not Pentecostal churches, have the 
highest rate of female congregants (Pentecostal churches have the highest rate of male 
congregants). Pentecostal churches have both the lowest rates of congregants with H.S. 
diploma, GED, or less and with B.A. degrees or more. Surprisingly, Pentecostal churches 
also have the highest rate of Latino congregants with some college (in fact, “progressive” 
church attendees have the highest rate of all). Mainline churches have both the highest 
rate of those with B.A. degrees or more (closely followed by Catholic and Evangelical 
churches) and the highest rate of those with only a H.S. diploma, GED, or less.    
 All Latino congregants report similar annual household incomes. “Progressive” 
Pentecostal congregants report the highest rate of congregants with household incomes of 
$50,000 or more while those that attend “traditional” churches (along with Mainline 
Protestant ones) report the highest rate of poor people and the lowest rate of those with 
annual incomes of $50,000 or more. When it comes to the language spoken at home, the 
overwhelming majority of Latino congregants report speaking more or only Spanish at 
home.  “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants (along with their Evangelical brethren) 
report the highest rates of speaking more or only Spanish at home while “progressive” 
types report the highest rate of speaking more or only English at home and with friends.  
 When it comes to U.S. citizenship “progressive” Pentecostal congregants and 
those from Mainline Protestant churches lead the way, and they both report the lowest 
numbers of undocumented immigrants. On the contrary, “traditional” Pentecostal 
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churches, followed at a distance by Evangelical ones, report both the lowest rates of U.S. 
citizenship and the highest rates of undocumented immigrants. Finally, although Latino 
churches are very diverse in the Latino origin of their congregants and those of Mexican 
descent are represented in both Catholic and Protestant churches, congregants of Mexican 
descent are the overwhelming majority at Catholic parishes. Congregants of Puerto Rican 
descent are well represented in Mainline and Pentecostal congregations particularly the 
“progressive” ones and those of Central American descent are also well represented at 
Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations and a lot less so at Catholic and Mainline 
churches.  
 In comparison to other Latino religious traditions, it is obvious that “traditional” 
and “progressive” churches experience very divergent realities in several areas. While 
“Progressive” church congregants lead in higher household income and in education, 
their “traditional” counterparts lead in levels of poverty, lack of education, and 
undocumented immigrant status, among others.  
 How similar or different are the demographic characteristics of church pastors or 
key leaders (some of the respondents at Catholic parishes were key leaders. For the sake 
of simplification, I will call them all pastors in this dissertation) in comparison to their 
congregants? This is a very important issue taking into consideration that, as documented 
in chapter four, significant gaps exist between Pentecostal pastors, particularly 
“progressive” church pastors, and their congregants (see Table 19).  
  The majority (63 percent) of Latino pastors is less than 50 years of age. 
Unfortunately, this relationship is not statistically significant and, as a result, a 
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comparison of the different types of Latino churches is not possible. However, it is clear 
that the average pastor is significantly older than the average congregant.   
Table 19. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pastors by Church Type 
 
Characteristic Trad. Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Percentage        
< 50 years old  57 64 60 57 75 67 63 
Men 80 92 80 91 88 69 83 
Education        
       Undocumented 7 0 0 9 0 6 4 
       Legal resident 13 0 0 30 33 24 17 
       U.S. citizen 80 100 100 61 67 71 80 
Education        
       Some college or less 21 14 0 4 13 19 12* 
       Bible institute or 
diocesan lay program 43 64 20 17 0 19 27* 
       B.A. degree or more 36 21 80 78 88 63 61* 
Language spoken at home 
and with friends        
       More or only English 0 46 40 4 12 25 21** 
       More or only Spanish 93 46 60 83 63 56 67** 
       Both languages 
equally 7 8 0 13 25 19 12** 
N 14 12 5 21 9 20 81 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
**Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
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 At the same time, almost all Latino church pastors are men (83 percent). The 
generalized belief (with the exception of Catholics) in the ordination of women has not 
pragmatically translated into the actual appointment of women as pastors of Latino 
congregations. The results of the analysis show that whereas Latino congregants in 
Chicago are overwhelmingly female and younger, the pastors are almost exclusively male 
and older—major gaps indeed.      
 When education is analyzed, major gaps are also revealed between church pastors 
and their congregants. For instance, while only 5 percent of pastors have a H.S. diploma 
or less, 61 percent have a B.A. degree or more and another 27 percent have a Bible 
institute or diocesan lay certificate. There are significant education differences among the 
pastors of the various Latino religious traditions. While 88, 78, and 63 percent of 
Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic pastors, respectively, have a B.A. degree or more, 
only 46 percent of their Pentecostal colleagues report the same. When the education of 
Pentecostal pastors is closely looked at, however, an impressive 80 percent of 
“progressive” church pastors and 21 percent of “neo-conservative” ones have a B.A. 
degree or more. That is, Pentecostal pastors both have one of the highest (only surpassed 
by their Mainline Protestants counterparts) and lowest levels of B.A. degree or more 
educational attainment of all Latino pastors. Another important point is that although 
barely a fifth of “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors have a B.A. degree or more, the 
majority of them (64 percent) have a Bible institute certificate, leading all other pastors in 
this type of theological training.  
 The gap between pastors and their congregants is replicated with U.S. citizenship 
status. Whereas only 4 percent of Latino pastors report being undocumented immigrants, 
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80 percent are U.S. citizens. Although the large majority of pastors are U.S. citizens, the 
majority also retains the Spanish language. Namely, 93 percent of “traditional” 
Pentecostal pastors report speaking only or more Spanish than English at home and with 
friends; they are closely followed by Evangelical pastors at 83 percent. The numbers 
quickly drop for “progressive” Pentecostal, Mainline, and Catholic pastors (60, 63, and 
56 percent, respectively). In other words, although the overwhelming majority of Latino 
pastors are U.S. citizens, they have, in general, successfully retained the Spanish 
language, particularly those pastors from “traditional” Pentecostal and Evangelical 
congregations.  
 While the overwhelming majority of Catholic pastors are of Mexican descent (63 
percent), the majority of Pentecostal church pastors are of Puerto Rican (55 percent) and 
a significant portion of Central American descent (14 percent). A large percentage (44 
percent) of Mainline Protestant pastors is also of Puerto Rican descent followed by those 
of Cuban and Colombian descent (22 percent each). On the other hand, Evangelical 
pastors are primarily of Mexican (26 percent), South American (30 percent), and Central 
American (22 percent) descent. Simply stated, pastors of Mexican descent are mainly 
concentrated in Catholic parishes while those of Puerto Rican descent are concentrated in 
Mainline and Pentecostal congregations. Central American pastors have an important 
representation in Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations and very little in Catholic 
and Mainline ones. Pastors of South American origin mainly serve in Evangelical and 
mainline churches. Given the large numbers of Chicago Latinos that originate in Mexico 
and Puerto Rico, these results are hardly surprising. Central and South Americans are 
definitely overrepresented in the pastor ranks given their share of the Latino population.   
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 This research has documented a significant gap in age, gender, education, and 
citizenship status and to a lesser extent in language and national origin between Latino 
pastors and their congregants. It would not be surprising if that same gap is found in the 
religiosity, and the social and political perspectives of pastors in comparison to their 
congregants.   
      Finally it is important to highlight that while the majority of Catholic parishes (65 
percent) have 1,000 congregants or more, 50 percent of Mainline Protestant 
congregations have between 25 to 50 congregants. On the other hand, over 90 percent of 
both Pentecostal and Evangelical churches have 200 congregants or less, and 43 and 48 
percent of the same congregations have less than 100 congregants. In summary, Catholic 
churches are generally mega churches, Mainline Protestant ones very small churches, and 
Pentecostal and Evangelical ones medium in size.  
Given the size of the congregations, it is not surprising that the annual operating 
budgets of Latino congregations are very small (with the noted exception of Catholic 
parishes). Whereas 30 percent of Catholic parishes have a budget of $100,999 or less, 89, 
71, and 61 percent of Mainline, Pentecostal, and Evangelical churches, respectively, 
report the same. Surprisingly while 26 percent of Evangelical churches report an annual 
budget of $201,999 and more, only 8 percent of Pentecostal congregations do so—in fact, 
only one “traditional” church reports more than $100,999 in annual budget. Due to their 
size, 56 percent of Catholic parishes report an annual budget of $201,999 and more. With 
some exceptions, the majority of Latino churches in Chicago are medium size with 
budgets of less than $100,999.    
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Religious Profiles of Latino Churches 
 Religiosity has been used by researchers to predict a variety of social and political 
beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Smidt, 2003; Stark, 2008; 
Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Consequently, it is important to test whether religiosity is found 
to be an effective predictor of social and political beliefs and practice among Latino 
congregants and their pastors in Chicago. If it is, are there significant differences among 
the congregants and the pastors of the different Latino churches? See Table 20 and Table 
21. 
 Surprisingly, while 32 percent of Catholic congregants claim to be conservative 
religiously speaking (the highest for all Latino congregants), those that attend Pentecostal 
churches report the lowest percentage at 26 percent (the lowest of all is reported by 
“progressive” ones at 23 percent). Then too, 47 percent of all congregants report being 
moderate and only 9 percent liberal, religiously speaking. Catholic congregants at 11 
percent report the highest rates of liberal self-identification, but are closely followed by 
their Pentecostal and Mainline counterparts at 10 percent each, Not surprising, 
“progressive” Pentecostal church congregants report both the lowest conservative rate (23 
percent) and the highest liberal rate (17 percent) while those that attend “traditional” 
churches report the lowest (6 percent) liberal rate of all Latino congregants in Chicago.  
Although almost half of all Latino congregants claim to be religiously moderate, 
this claim is not reflected in their religious beliefs and practices. For instance, 83, 80, and 
76 percent of Evangelical, Pentecostal (75 percent of “progressive” church congregants 
agree), and Mainline congregants believe the Bible to be the word of God to be taken 
literally—56 percent of Catholic ones believe the same. That is, while Catholic 
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congregants are the least likely to believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, those that attend 
“traditional” Pentecostal churches are most likely to believe in it (84 percent). At the 
same time, 80 percent of both Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants claim to pray at 
least once a day (this number drops considerably to 64 and 62 percent, respectively, for 
those attending Mainline and Catholic churches). “Progressive” Pentecostal church 
congregants report similarly high numbers as all other Pentecostals.  
Table 20. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Congregants by Church 
Type   
 
 
Behavior/Perspective 
 
Trad. 
Neo-
Con. 
 
Pgs. 
 
Evg. 
 
Ml. 
 
Cath. 
 
Total 
Percentage        
Religiously conservative 24 31 23 29 30 32 28* 
Bible-literal word of God 84 82 75 83 76 56 76* 
Daily praying 80 80 80 80 64 62 74* 
Daily Bible reading  55 48 45 51 21 18 40* 
Weekly church 
attendance—once or more 94 92 89 89 72 81 86* 
Very or extremely close to 
God 85 76 82 78 73 70 77* 
N 480 312 185 602 110 679 2368 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
When it comes to daily reading of the Bible, both Pentecostal and Evangelical 
congregants report similarly high rates at 51 and 49 percent, respectively (“traditional” 
Pentecostal congregants actually report the highest of all Latino congregants at 55 
percent). Daily reading of the Bible is, however, not as prevalent among Mainline and 
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Catholic congregants who report rates of 21 and 18 percent, respectively. All Latino 
congregants, 86 percent, also report extremely high levels of church attendance (once or 
more a week). Although those that attend Pentecostal churches report the highest 
attendance at 91 percent—94 percent for “traditional” and 89 percent for “progressive” 
church congregants—they are closely followed by their Evangelical (89 percent) and 
Catholic (81 percent) counterparts. In fact, even the absolute majority, 72 percent, of 
Latinos who attend Mainline Protestant congregations go to church once or more a week.  
In summary, the overwhelming majority of Latino Pentecostal and Evangelical 
congregants are very religious—even though they do not see themselves in that manner. 
“Traditional” Pentecostal congregants are the most religious by every measure used, 
closely followed by Evangelical and “progressive” Pentecostals. With the exception of 
daily Bible reading, both Catholic and Mainline Protestant congregants are also fairly 
religious albeit less so than their Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts. There is no 
doubt that Pentecostal congregants, including the “progressive” types but particularly the 
“traditional” types, are the most religious of all Latino congregants, but they are very 
closely followed by their Evangelical brothers and sisters.  
 The analysis of the demographic characteristics of pastors and congregants 
documented a significant gap between the two. Is there also a gap between pastors and 
congregants as it relates to religiosity? Yes, there is one, but it is not as wide (see Table 
21).  The evidence shows that when it comes to religious orientation, both pastors and 
their congregants show similar results. When asked about how they saw themselves 
religiously speaking, 52 percent of Latino pastors claimed to be moderate, 30 percent 
conservative, and 10 percent liberal. While 35 percent of Pentecostal pastors claimed to 
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be conservative, only 13 percent of Catholic priests or leaders claimed the same. On the 
contrary, 25 and 19 percent of Mainline and Catholic pastors identify themselves as 
liberal or progressive, but a smaller number, 13 and 4 percent, respectively, of their 
Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts do the same. What is really telling is that while 
54 percent of “neo-conservative” Pentecostal church pastors (the highest rate for all 
Latino faith traditions) identify themselves as conservative, none of the “progressive” 
types do so. More important, whereas 40 percent of “progressive” church pastors see 
themselves as liberal or progressive religiously speaking (the highest for all Latino faith 
traditions), none of their “traditional” or “neo-conservative” counterparts make such a 
claim. This evidence suggests that there are significant gaps particularly among 
“traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors and their congregants. Namely, 
“progressive” church pastors are much more progressive than their congregants while 
“traditional” ones are a lot less progressive than those that attend their churches. Either 
way, there is a significant Pentecostal pastor-sheep gap that is not observed in any other 
Latino faith tradition, at least not at the same level.  
 Only 26 percent of Latino pastors believe the Bible to be the literal word of God 
and another 49 percent maintains the Bible to be the word of God but warn that not 
everything should be taken literally. There are major differences in the Bible views of the 
various Latino faith traditions. Although 41 and 33 percent of Pentecostal and 
Evangelical pastors, respectively, believe the Bible to be the literal word of God, none of 
their Catholic and Mainline Protestant counterparts believe so. When the beliefs of 
Pentecostal pastors are analyzed closely, it is found that both “traditional” and “neo-
conservative” church pastors profess the belief in Biblical inerrancy at high rates (50 and 
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54 percent respectively) with that not being the case with “progressive” ones—20 
percent. In other words, Latino Pentecostals show very divergent patterns of beliefs, even 
as it relates to the Bible, depending on the strand of Pentecostalism they practice. 
Table 21. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pastors by Church Type   
 
Behavior/Perspective 
 
Trad. Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Percentage        
Religiously conservative 50 54 0 35 25 13 30* 
Bible-literal word of God 50 54 20 33 0 0 26* 
N 14 12 5 21 9 20 81 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
 In summary, most Latino pastors, with the exception of the “traditional” and 
“neo-conservative” Pentecostal types, are mainly moderate and to a lesser extent liberal 
in their religious beliefs creating a gap between themselves and their congregants. This is 
particularly the case between “progressive” Pentecostal pastors and their sheep (pastors 
more liberal than their sheep), and “traditional” and “neo-conservative” pastors and theirs 
(pastors a lot more conservative than their sheep in religious orientation). 
Social and Political Profiles of Latino Churches     
 Does the intense religiosity of Latino Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants 
and their pastors and to a lesser extent that of their Catholic and Mainline counterparts 
translate into conservative social and political beliefs? Research has documented that in 
the U.S. high levels of religiosity are directly related to conservative social and political 
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stances but as religiosity declines, those stances also become less conservative (Greeley 
& Hout, 2006; Stark, 2008; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). See Table 22 and Table 23.  
 The overwhelming majority of Latino congregants (74 percent) lean to or are 
solid Democrats while only 11 percent lean to or are solid Republicans. While 88, 77, and 
71 percent of Mainline, Catholic, and Pentecostal congregants report leaning to or being 
Democrat, 66 of their Evangelical counterparts do so. Amazingly 72 percent of 
“traditional” and 71 percent of “progressive” Pentecostal congregants report the same. 
Even though Latinos that attend “traditional” Pentecostal churches are by far the most 
religious of all Latino congregants, they have similar Democratic Party affiliation to 
Catholic and both are only surpassed by Mainline Protestant congregants. Evangelical 
congregants, although still overwhelmingly Democrat, are less so than Pentecostals and 
along with their “neo-conservative” counterparts pledge the highest support for the 
Republican Party at 16 percent. In fact, “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants 
display almost the exact same support for the Democratic and Republican parties as their 
Evangelical brethren. This data shows that the Republican Party does not even enjoy high 
levels of support among the relatively most conservative segments of the Latino 
congregant population.   
Given the liberal political affiliation observed, it is not surprising that the great 
majority of Latino congregants in Chicago (83 percent) support giving undocumented 
immigrants a path to legalize their status in this country. In fact, all Latino religious 
traditions range from 82 to 85 percent in support for this issue with the Mainline 
Protestant congregants taking the lowest point in the range. However, when the different 
types of Pentecostal congregants are analyzed, 89 percent of “traditional” —the highest 
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of all—and 77 percent of “neo-conservative” congregants, the lowest of all, support 
providing a path for the legalization of the status of undocumented immigrants.  
Table 22. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Congregants by 
Church Type  
 
Perspective Trad. Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Percentage        
Abortion—never acceptable 79 68 65 68 51 50 64* 
Undocumented 
immigrants—agree to 
legalize 
89 77 82 85 82 84 83* 
Ordination of women—
agree 42 62 83 52 64 29 55* 
Gender equality at home—
agree  88 86 87 88 95 92 89* 
Iraq War—disagree  47 47 44 52 60 65 53* 
Democratic Party—
affiliation  72 69 71 66 88 77 74* 
N 480 312 185 602 110 679 2368 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
 When it comes to going to war in Iraq, 53 percent of Latino congregants in 
Chicago disagree with it and only 8 percent agree. Catholic congregants are particularly 
opposed to the war at 65 percent, closely followed by Mainliners at 60 percent. Although 
the opposition drops to 52 and 46 percent among Evangelical and Pentecostal 
congregants, respectively, their support for it was also minimal at 9 percent each.  
 So far this analysis has not at all supported the notion that being very religious, in 
the Latino context, results in political and social conservativism. Instead, a very large 
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majority of Latino congregants in Chicago are politically and socially liberal. With a few 
differences, Latino congregants overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, giving 
undocumented immigrants legal status, and they generally disagree with the war in Iraq. 
Surprisingly, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants, in general, are as liberal as their 
Catholic and Mainline counterparts, albeit a little less. Not only is the religiosity 
hypothesis not supported in the Chicago Latino context, but it seems that the argument 
that Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism equal conservative religion and politics does not 
get support either. It must be said that Latino Evangelical congregants have been found to 
be less supportive of liberal social and political causes when compared to Pentecostal 
ones, but not so much so as to mirror the patterns observed with white Evangelicals in 
this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2008; Stark, 2008). 
 Furthermore, 89 percent of all Latino congregants in Chicago believe that at home 
men and women should be equal in all decision making. This belief ranges from 95 
percent of Mainline Protestant congregants to 86 percent among their Pentecostal 
brothers and sisters (88 and 87 percent of “traditional” and “progressive” church 
congregants, respectively, agree). By contrast, when asked about the ordination of 
women, the results are very different. Mainline church congregants are the most 
supportive of the ordination of women at 64 percent (only 8 percent disagree) and 
Catholics the least supportive with 29 percent agreeing and 36 percent disagreeing. When 
Latino Pentecostals are looked at closely, 83 percent of “progressive” congregants agree 
while 42 percent of “traditional” ones agree (27 percent disagree). Namely, the most 
supportive of the rights of women are “progressive” Pentecostal congregants while the 
least supportive are their Catholic counterparts.  
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 In spite of the liberal social and political beliefs held by the majority of Latino 
congregants, their views of abortion are unquestionably ultra conservative. Bluntly put, 
only 2 percent of Latino congregants believe that abortion is always or mostly acceptable. 
In fact, 64 percent of the same congregants believe that abortion is never acceptable. 
Although there are some differences among the various Latino religious traditions (50 
and 71 percent of Catholic and Pentecostal congregants, respectively, reject abortion as 
never being acceptable), the fact is that the overwhelming majority of Latino congregants 
either reject abortion altogether or believe that is acceptable only in extreme 
circumstances (34 percent). “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants are by far the most 
opposed to abortion (79 percent believe it is never acceptable) closely followed by those 
that attend Evangelical and the other types of Pentecostal churches.  
 In summary, when it comes to social and political issues, Latino congregants of 
all religious traditions are surprisingly liberal with a very few exceptions. Mainline, 
“traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal congregants lead the way in several areas 
while those that attend Evangelical and Catholic churches, although still liberal, are less 
so in several areas. However, when it comes to moral issues (which some call political or 
social issues), Latino congregants are also in general very conservative. Although 
Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants lead the way, closely followed by those that 
attend Mainline and Catholic churches, the overwhelming majority either believes that 
abortion is never acceptable (64 percent) or acceptable only in extreme circumstances (34 
percent). This shows once again that Latinos, in this case Latino congregants, embody an 
unusual duality (at least unusual for the U.S. with the exception of African Americans) 
comprised of both liberal and conservative beliefs. More specifically, Latino congregants 
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are socially and politically liberal, but morally conservative. It was also found that Latino 
Pentecostal congregants are not the most conservative in the Latino religious landscape. 
Instead, they seem to be more politically and socially liberal than Latino Evangelical 
congregants, but at the same time the most morally conservative of all Latino 
congregants.   
With more education and moderate religious perspectives, it is expected that 
Latino church pastors will have more liberal and progressive social and political beliefs 
than those that attend their congregations. At the same time, pastors are hypothesized to 
have less conservative moral views than their congregants.   
Whereas 49 and 44 percent of Pentecostal and Evangelical pastors, respectively, 
claim to be politically conservative, only 13 and 19 percent of their Mainline Protestant 
and Catholic counterparts make such a claim. In fact, 64 percent of “traditional” 
Pentecostal congregation pastors (the highest of all Latino pastors) identify themselves as 
politically conservative and only 20 percent of “progressive” church pastors do so. On the 
other hand, while 25 and 13 percent of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Pentecostal 
(same as Catholics) pastors claim to be political liberals, it drops to 0 percent for 
Evangelical ones. Of significance is the fact that an impressive 40 percent of 
“progressive” Pentecostal pastors (the highest of all Latino pastors) claim to be political 
liberals while none of their “traditional” and “neo-conservative” brothers and sisters 
claim such a label. That is, once again “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal, 
and Evangelical pastors claim to be the most politically conservative while the 
“progressive” types are the most liberal of all Latino pastors in Chicago.  
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Table 23. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pastors by Church 
Type  
 
Perspective Trad. Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Percentage        
Abortion—never acceptable 50 46 40 26 13 50 38 
Same-sex marriage—
strongly disagree 93 92 60 75 0 50 62* 
Undocumented 
immigrants—agree to 
legalize 
93 85 100 100 100 94 95 
Death penalty—disagree  64 23 100 42 75 75 63* 
Ordination of women—
agree 50 69 100 52 100 31 67* 
Gender equality at home—
agree 93 77 100 87 100 88 91* 
Iraq War—disagree  50 31 80 50 78 82 62 
Politically conservative 64 62 20 44 13 19 37* 
Democratic Party—
affiliation 43 23 60 13 44 50 39* 
Republican Party—
affiliation 0 15 20 29 0 0 11* 
N 14 12 5 21 9 20 81 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.    
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
 
This is not supported by the church pastors’ reported political affiliation. Whereas 
29 percent of Evangelical pastors affiliate with the Republican Party, only 12 percent of 
their Pentecostal and 0 percent of their Mainline and Catholic counterparts, respectively, 
do so. Only 11 percent of all Latino pastors in Chicago affiliate with the Republican 
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Party, and just another 39 percent pledge affiliation to the Democratic Party. In fact, the 
majority of Latino pastors in Chicago are independents at 50 percent.  Whereas 50, 44, 
and 42 percent of Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Pentecostal pastors, respectively, 
declare themselves as Democratic, only 13 percent of their Evangelical counterparts 
claim the same. What is really interesting is that a whole 43 percent of “traditional” 
Pentecostal pastors and a very high 60 percent of “progressive” ones (the highest of any 
Latino faith tradition) pledge their support for the Democratic Party. Unexpectedly, none 
of the “traditional” Pentecostal pastors support the Republican Party.   
These results do not at all align with the congregant findings and show significant 
gaps between pastor and sheep particularly among Evangelicals, some Pentecostals, and 
Mainliners. In all cases congregants are found to be more progressive than their pastors. 
It must be clarified, however, that “traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal and 
Catholic pastors’ liberal political beliefs are more closely aligned with those of their 
congregants.   
When it comes to the issue of granting undocumented immigrants an opportunity 
to obtain legal status, an absolute majority of Latino pastors in Chicago (95 percent) 
agree or strongly agree with such a proposition. In this issue, Latino pastors, in general, 
show more progressive stances than their own congregants.  
A similar pattern is observed when the pastor’s position on the U.S. intervention 
in Iraq is analyzed. That is, 62 percent of Latino pastors disagree or strongly disagree 
with the intervention while 20 percent agree or strongly agree. This evidence shows a 
significant gap between pastors and their congregants in their position towards the 
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intervention in Iraq. Latino pastors strongly oppose the war, more so than their 
congregants.  
Very much aligned with the social perspective of their congregants, the 
overwhelming majority of Latino pastors in Chicago (91 percent) believe that at home 
men and women should be equal in decision-making. The agreement with this proposal 
ranges from 100 percent for Mainline Protestant pastors to 77 percent for their 
Evangelical counterparts. In fact, 100 and 93 percent of “progressive” and “traditional” 
Pentecostal pastors, respectively, believe the same while 77 percent of “neo-
conservative” Pentecostal pastors (the lowest for all Latino pastors) agree with them.  
When it comes to the ordination of women, similar to what was observed with 
congregants, Mainline Protestants and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors lead the way 
with 100 percent agreement (agree or strongly agree) followed by “neo-conservative” 
Pentecostal (at 69 percent), Evangelical (at 52 percent), “traditional” Pentecostal (at 50 
percent), dropping considerably to 31 percent for Latino Catholic pastors. Once again 
both Mainline Protestant and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors show a significant gap 
between their beliefs about the ordination of women and those of their congregants.  
With the exception of a conservative to moderate political self-identification and 
lesser commitment to the Democratic Party by Evangelicals, pastors are generally 
progressive in their social and political perspectives. Mainline Protestant, “progressive” 
Pentecostal, and Catholic pastors lead the way while “neo-conservative” Pentecostal and 
Evangelical, although progressive in the majority of issues, are less so. In reality, 
congregants seem to be, generally, less progressive than their pastors (the hypothesis 
about pastors did hold true) with the exception of political affiliation.  
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As stated before, it is expected that in relation to moral issues Latino pastors in 
Chicago will be more progressive than their sheep. The abortion issue will serve as the 
litmus test to test this hypothesis. Only 38 percent of Latino pastors believe that abortion 
is never acceptable.  
The analysis in this section has shown that Latino pastors are generally 
progressive in social and political issues with a handful of exceptions, and they are 
generally more progressive than their congregants. Latino pastors are also more 
progressive than their sheep in moral issues—at least as it relates to the abortion issue. 
Civic Engagement Profiles of Latino Churches     
 Although understanding the differences in demographic characteristics and the 
social, political, and moral perspectives between the Pentecostal and other Latino faith 
traditions (in this case as measured by the pastor and congregant data) is important, the 
ultimate objective of this chapter is to determine if those differences substantially affect 
the civic engagement behavior of the church, the pastors, and their congregants. The civic 
engagement typology developed in chapter five which looks at civic engagement 
behavior within the congregation, in the community, and in the wider society will be used 
for this section. The hypothesis is that Latino Pentecostals in general are as civically 
engaged as Catholics and more engaged than Evangelicals. Latino “progressive” 
Pentecostals are as engaged as Mainline Protestants while the “neo-conservative” types 
are as engaged or less engaged than their Evangelical counterparts.  
 In order to study the first level of civic engagement, within congregation, several 
congregant behaviors will be analyzed including church membership, holding a 
leadership role, and helping organize an event or program at church (see Table 24). At 
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the same time, the weekly time commitment to the church will be analyzed to determine 
exactly how much time Latino congregants are committing to their churches and if that 
time commitment is similar for the different Latino religious traditions.  
Table 24. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Congregants by Church 
Type 
 
Civic Engagement Behavior  Trad.  Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total 
Percentage        
Church member 91 89 80 82 68 72 80* 
Church leader 64 64 63 59 58 51 60* 
Event organizing—
sometimes/often  85 78 74 76 81 67 77* 
Church activities--three hours 
or more weekly  74 75 60 63 36 32 57* 
Monthly contribution--$50 to 
$200 56 49 49 54 41 38 48* 
Outside of church 
volunteering—> once a month 57 48 54 50 56 59 54* 
Helping needy in 
community—sometimes/often 80 79 74 74 68 61 73* 
Helping someone find job—
sometimes or often  82 80 77 81 79 76 79 
Lending money to non 
family—sometimes or often 88 87 84 89 86 89 87 
Voted in 2004 election 75 74 77 81 83 84 79** 
Attend political party events—
sometimes or often 11 13 20 10 22 18 16* 
N 480/ 150a 
312/
227 
185/
128 
602/ 
263 
110/ 
65 
679/ 
362 
2368/ 
1195 
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007 
a. The number of U.S. citizens analyzed for both voting and attendance at political party 
events. 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
**Significant at p<.10 for Chi-square test of independence. 
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 Whereas 86 percent of the Latino Pentecostal congregants (the highest of all 
Latino congregants) reported being a member of their church, 82, 72, and 68 percent of 
their Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant brethren, respectively, reported the 
same. However, once the Pentecostal category is broken down into its different types, the 
“traditional” ones report the highest membership rates for all Latino traditions at 91 
percent followed by the “neo-conservative” types at 89 percent (80 percent of 
“progressive” congregants are also members of their church). There is no doubt that when 
it comes to commitment to the church by formally engaging it and making a commitment 
to being a member, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants lead the way closely followed 
by “neo-conservative” congregants and to a lesser extent by Evangelical and 
“progressive” Pentecostal ones. At 68 percent, Mainline Protestant congregants, closely 
followed by Catholic ones, report the lowest church membership rates of all Latino 
congregants in Chicago.  
 An important question to ask at this juncture is whether an active engagement as a 
church member also results in active participation either assisting in organizing events or 
programs or in taking a leadership role in the church. Besides attending worship services 
and being part of the liturgical life of the congregation, are Latinos developing civic skills 
and practicing them through service to other congregants and the community? 
 An impressive 60 percent of Latino congregants from all faith traditions report 
having a leadership role in their congregation. Consistent with church membership 
findings, Latino Pentecostals at 63 percent lead in congregant involvement in leadership 
positions compared to 59, 58, and 51 percent of Evangelical, Mainline, and Catholic 
congregants, respectively, who are also similarly involved. All Latino Pentecostal 
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congregants report similar rates when asked about their engagement as church leaders. 
These findings support the literature (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 
2004) which found that Protestant congregations are more likely to offer opportunities for 
the development of civic skills and administrative experience in comparison to Catholic 
parishes. It was, therefore, not surprising that Pentecostal churches, in general, led the 
way given their generalized lack of financial resources and a long-standing tradition of 
voluntarism to run the congregation’s administrative and programmatic functions. It was 
also not surprising that Catholic parishes and their congregants scored the lowest (51 
percent) because many parishes and their program are run by paid professionals.   
Because the majority of Latino congregants are women, it means that women are 
developing important civic and administrative skills. In fact, an impressive 65 percent of 
Pentecostal women congregants report holding a leadership position in church (61 
percent of men report the same) while only 51 percent of Catholic women report the 
same. Of major importance is the fact that 68 percent of “progressive” Pentecostal 
women congregants claim to have a leadership role, whereas only 55 percent of their 
male counterparts do so. In none of the Latino faith traditions in Chicago do more men 
than women report having leadership positions. In other words, besides having influence 
and power at home, Latino women also have influence and power at the church—the 
majority of the leaders of Latino churches in Chicago are women. It is important to 
emphasize that this is the case at all Latino churches in Chicago but it is particularly so at 
“progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches.  
Holding a leadership position is only one way of engaging in the local 
congregation. Countless congregants also make themselves available to assist in the 
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organization of events or programs. Seventy-seven percent of congregants claim they 
sometimes or often assist in this manner; of this total 29 percent do it often. Pentecostal 
congregants once more lead the way in those that claim to often assist in organizing 
events or programs at 32 percent; they are closely followed by those that attend 
Evangelical churches at 30 percent. Those that attend Mainline and Catholic churches 
report the lowest rates at 26 and 23 percent respectively. Of significance is the fact that 
34 percent (the highest for all Latino congregants in Chicago) of those that attend both 
“traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches report engaging in this 
manner. That is, the majority of Latino congregants assist in organizing events or 
activities sometimes or often at their churches. When those that do it often are analyzed, 
Latino Pentecostal congregants, particularly the “traditional” and “neo-conservative” 
types, lead the way while their Catholic counterparts report the least engagement in this 
manner.     
Up to now the results of this analysis show that Latino congregants in Chicago are 
very engaged in their congregations, particularly the Pentecostal and Evangelical types, 
but what does that mean in terms of a weekly time commitment to their congregations? 
While 35 percent of all Latino congregants spend from 3 to 7 hours a week in church-
related activities, another 22 percent spend more than 7 hours a week doing so. In fact, 
when the numbers are looked at closer, 33 percent of Pentecostal congregants spend more 
than 7 hours a week, while just 19, 8, and 7 percent of Evangelical, Mainline, and 
Catholic congregants, respectively, do the same. In fact, 38 percent of “traditional” 
Pentecostal congregants (the highest of all Latino congregants) report spending 7 or more 
hours a week in church-related activities closely followed by those that attend 
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“progressive” Pentecostal churches at 29 percent. In summary the majority of Latino 
congregants in Chicago spend a significant amount of time (more than three hours a 
week) in church-related activities. Pentecostals, particularly the “traditional” types, lead 
the way in how much time they invest in their congregations.  
When it comes to the first level of civic engagement, within congregation, there is 
no doubt that Latino congregants from all faith traditions significantly engage in their 
churches. It is important to emphasize that Latino Pentecostal congregants, particularly 
“traditional” ones, lead the way, closely followed by their Evangelical counterparts. Both 
Mainline Protestant and Catholic congregants, although still actively engaged in their 
congregations, are much less engaged when compared to Pentecostals and even 
Evangelical ones.  
Congregants can only be engaged in their congregations because those churches 
make available to them a variety of ways of getting involved. Participating in the 
liturgical life of the congregation, organizing and running events and programs for church 
congregants and the outer community, and managing administrative aspects of the 
organization are only a few examples of the many ways churches provide opportunities 
for involvement within their walls.  
In order to understand the second level of civic engagement, in the community, a 
handful of congregant behaviors will be looked at including helping the needy in the 
community, helping someone find at job, and volunteering to do community service 
outside of local church.  I hypothesize that congregants from all Latino faith traditions 
will engage in these activities but at different degrees. Mainline, “progressive” and 
“traditional” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregants are expected to be the most engaged 
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while those that attend Evangelical and “neo-conservative” churches the least engaged in 
their communities. In other words, I propose that there is a variation in community civic 
engagement depending on the Latino faith tradition the congregant belongs to.  
An impressive 73 percent of all Latino congregants in Chicago help the needy in 
the community sometimes or often (18 percent do so often). Once again, Latino 
Pentecostal congregants lead with 77 percent (21 percent do it often) closely followed by 
Evangelical (18 percent do so often) and Mainline (19 percent report doing it often) 
congregants at 74 and 68 percent respectively. Those that attend Catholic congregations 
follow at a distance at 61 percent (15 percent do it often) in reporting helping the needy 
sometimes or often. Of Pentecostals, 80 percent of those that attend “traditional” 
congregations report the same (the highest of all Latino congregants). Although the 
majority of Latino congregants are engaged in their immediate communities by helping 
the needy, those in Pentecostal congregations, particularly the “traditional” ones, lead the 
way followed closely by those who attend Evangelical and Mainline churches. Catholic 
congregants, surprisingly, report helping the needy the least in comparison to all other 
Latino congregants.      
Because Latino churches are an integral part of the extensive immigrant networks 
through which all kinds of resources flow, helping someone find a job is an important 
deliverable in Latino communities. Given the undocumented status of a large number of 
church congregants and the recent arrival of many others who are legally in the country, a 
job (which is the main reason why the overwhelming majority of Latinos are in this 
country anyway) is a valued asset. Therefore, helping someone find a job is an important 
community service both inside the congregation and in the immediate community.  
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Consequently, it is not surprising that 79 percent of Latino congregants claim to 
have helped someone find a job sometimes or often in the previous twelve months (14 
percent did it often). This data clearly shows that besides helping the needy in the 
community with hospital visitation, and feeding the hungry, among others, the 
overwhelming majority of Latino congregants in Chicago are also engaged in helping 
people find jobs. That is, helping people find jobs, although informal in nature in the 
majority of cases, is an important way of engaging in the Latino community.  
Finally, volunteering in the community to do community service has been found 
to be an important way of addressing community issues (Putnam, 1993; Smidt, 2003; 
Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Fifty-four percent of Latino 
congregants report volunteering to do community service outside of their local church 
more than once a month. Although the numbers are very similar for all Latino faith 
traditions, Catholic congregants with 59 percent lead the way closely followed by their 
Mainline and Pentecostal brothers at 56 and 53 percent respectively. Those that attend 
Evangelical churches report the least volunteering more than once a month at 50 percent. 
Despite the differences among Latino religious traditions, the majority of Latino 
congregants report volunteering outside of their churches to do social service work at 
least once a month. Unfortunately, the survey did not obtain in-depth data to figure out if 
the volunteerism reported is facilitated by the local congregations, para-church 
organizations, secular non-profit organizations, or by government agencies. 
There is no question that Latino congregants are also very engaged in their 
communities by helping the needy, helping someone find a job, or by volunteering to do 
social service work beyond the walls of the church. With the exception of community 
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voluntarism, Pentecostal congregants lead the way in community civic engagement. In 
fact, Mainline, “progressive” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregants were not found to be 
the most actively engaged in the community. Instead, those that attend “traditional” 
Pentecostal and Evangelical churches were found to the most active in the community. 
However, the differences among all Latino congregants were not very large and all 
Latino congregants, by every measure used, are very engaged formally and informally in 
their communities.  
The various Latino churches also make available to the community a variety of 
programs and services that not only give the congregants the opportunity to engage in a 
church activity but to do so serving the needs of those in the community. Food pantries, 
day care services, and after school programs are only a few of the services offered.  
At the same time, Latino pastors also get involved in addressing the needs of the 
communities around them (see Table 25). In fact, 74 percent of all Latino pastors 
reported contacting a public official to address a church or community issue. 
Furthermore, when asked about participation in community organizations or associations 
in the last two years, 22 percent of all Latino pastors in Chicago report to never having 
done so. However, 85 percent of Latino pastors report holding membership in four or 
more associations or community organizations.  
The commitment for community civic engagement is also demonstrated by the 
pastors’ encouragement of it. In fact, 68 percent of all Latino congregants maintain that 
they pastors often, through their sermons or homilies, have encouraged them to serve or 
volunteer in the community in the last year. Both “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic 
pastors are reported to encourage their congregants more often (76 percent for both) 
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closely followed by Evangelical pastors (67 percent) while “traditional” Pentecostal and 
Mainline pastors (59 and 62 percent respectively) are reported to do it less often.   
When it comes of the engagement of Latino congregations in their immediate 
communities, Latino Pentecostal churches lead the way, closely followed by Evangelical 
and Mainline churches. Surprisingly, Catholic churches are the least engaged in their 
surrounding communities.  
To study the third and last level of civic engagement, in wider society, two 
congregant behaviors (voting and attending political party activities) will be analyzed. It 
is expected that all Latino congregants engage in these activities; however, those who 
attend Mainline Protestant, “progressive” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregations will 
show a higher degree of engagement than those that attend Evangelical, “traditional” and 
“neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches.  
  Due to the large number of undocumented or documented non U.S. citizen 
immigrants in Latino churches, only U.S. citizens were studied for voting and attending 
political party activities. Of Latino congregants who are U.S. citizens, seventy nine 
percent reported voting in the 2004 Presidential election. As expected, Catholic and 
Mainline Protestant congregants voted at somewhat higher rates, 84 and 83 percent 
respectively, while 75 and 81 percent of Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants did so. 
There were no significant differences in the percentages of Pentecostal congregants who 
voted across the three types of churches. Overall 75 percent of them reported voting the 
in the 2004 presidential elections. In summary, non-Pentecostal Latino congregants do 
vote at higher levels than their Pentecostal counterparts, but the differences are not very 
large.   
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Table 25. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pastors by Church Type 
 
Civic Engagement Behavior Trad. Neo-Con. Pgs. Evg. Ml. Cath. Total
Percentage        
Contacted public 
representative 71 85 80 83 75 50 74 
Signed a petition 27 39 60 30 50 50 43 
Hold membership in 4 or more  
associations/organizations 86 83 100 67 89 85 85 
Voted in 2000 election 100a 92 100 89 75 100 93* 
2000 election—voted for:         
       Al Gore 55 40 60 45 100 73 62* 
       George W. Bush 45 60 40 55 0 27 38* 
Participated in direct action 20 0 40 22 38 50 28 
N 14/11b 12/10 5/5   21/11 9/5 20/15 81/57
Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = 
Evangelical; Ml = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.  
Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007 
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.   
a. The number of U.S. citizens analyzed for voting. 
b. The number of pastors that voted was analyzed for their choice of candidate. 
*Significant at p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence. 
  
When it comes to participating in political party activities such as voter registration 
drives, political campaigns, and giving money to a party, of Latino congregants who are 
U.S. citizens, 16 percent reported engaging in such activities sometimes or often. Both 
Mainline Protestant and “progressive” Pentecostal congregants lead the way with 22 and 
20 percent, respectively, reporting participating in political party activities followed by 
their Catholic brothers at 18 percent. Those who attend Evangelical churches, as 
expected, report the lowest participation rate at 10 percent while their “traditional” and 
 
 
276 
 
 
“neo-conservative” Pentecostal counterparts report 11 and 13 percent respectively. In 
other words, a small percentage of Latino congregants who are U.S. citizens do engage in 
political party activities, outside of voting, but with major differences among the various 
religious traditions.  
Latino Pentecostals in Chicago continue to show an important duality that 
demonstrates once again the diversity in their midst. The results of this analysis certainly 
document the existence of a “progressive” strand among them. Evangelical, “traditional” 
and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants all engage in political activities less than 
their counterparts in other Latino religious traditions, supporting my original hypothesis.  
The congregation’s pastor also gets civically involved in the larger society. When 
voting behavior was analyzed, 93 percent of all Latino pastors reported voting in the 
2000 presidential elections—this is an extremely high voter turnout taking into 
consideration that 80 percent of all pastors are U.S. citizens and thus allowed to vote. 
“Progressive” Pentecostal pastors at 100 percent voted the most, followed by “neo-
conservative” Pentecostal, Catholic, and “traditional” Pentecostal (92, 75, and 72 percent, 
respectively). Although Mainline Protestant pastors reported voting the least at 50 
percent, they were closely followed by their Evangelical colleagues at 54 percent.  
However, once only U.S. citizens were included in the calculation, “progressive” 
and “traditional” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors voted the most at 100 percent. They 
were closely followed by “neo-conservative” Pentecostal and Evangelical pastors at 92 
and 89 percent, respectively, with Mainliners reporting a 75 percent voting rate. In other 
words, although the absolute majority of the Latino pastors that are able to vote (U.S. 
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citizens) do so, “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors lead the 
way while their Mainline counterparts report voting the least.  
But for whom did they vote? Of those that voted in the 2000 presidential election, 
62 percent voted for the Democratic candidate (Al Gore) and 38 percent for the 
Republican one (George W. Bush). Mainline Protestant pastors led the way voting for the 
Democratic candidate at 100 percent and Catholic, “progressive,” and “traditional” 
Pentecostal pastors followed at 73, 60, and 55 percent, respectively. On the other hand, 
the majority of Evangelical and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors at 55 and 60 
percent, respectively, voted for the Republican candidate. Once again, Pentecostals are at 
both extremes of the issue: “progressive” and “traditional” pastors mainly voted for the 
Democratic candidate while their “neo-conservative” brothers mainly voted for the 
Republican one. When it comes to voting, both Mainline and Catholic Latino pastors led 
the way in supporting the Democratic Party candidate.  At the same time, 28 percent of 
all Latino pastors reported having participated in direct action such as protests and rallies 
in the previous three years.  
In fact, 50 percent of Latino congregants in Chicago claim that their pastor, in the 
last year, encouraged them sometimes or often to get involved in politics. Those that 
attend “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches and Catholic parishes lead 
with 63, 53, and 59 percent, respectively, while Evangelical and “neo-conservative” 
Pentecostal congregants, at 38 and 44 percent, respectively, report the least pastoral 
encouragement. 
The data show that when it comes to the third level of civic engagement, societal 
engagement, “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic congregations and their congregants 
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lead the way followed closely by Mainline Protestants. Evangelical, “traditional” 
Pentecostal, and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches and their congregants lag 
behind the other Latino religious traditions. The lack of leadership in regards to societal 
civic engagement by Latino Mainline Protestant congregations and their congregants is a 
major surprise. It is a clear reminder that the paradigms that apply to the U.S. religious 
landscape, in general, may actually make a poor fit in the complex Latino context. 
Furthermore, the fact that “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches, their pastors, and 
congregants, are only as engaged as their “traditional” counterparts is very significant 
given my hypothesis of their evolution from their “traditional” origins. In fact, with the 
exception of the pastor’s voting behavior, Evangelical churches are more civically 
engaged in wider society than their “neo-conservative” Pentecostal cousins.          
 The analysis of the civic engagement behavior of Latino churches, their pastors 
and congregants, has produced some expected and many more unexpected results. That 
is, when it comes to the first level of engagement (within the walls of the church), as 
expected, both Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations are very active with Mainline 
and particularly their Catholic counterparts following at a distance. All Latino churches 
experience intense civic engagement within their walls, but more so in Pentecostal 
(particularly the “traditional” types) and Evangelical congregations. This means that 
congregants at Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations have more opportunity to 
develop civic and administrative skills than if they attended any other Latino church. 
Because the majority of Pentecostal and Evangelical church congregants are women, 
immigrants, and the poor and working classes, these congregations offer an invaluable 
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opportunity to the disfranchised to obtain the skills and experience they are unlikely to 
get anywhere else in this society (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).   
 Surprisingly Mainline and Catholic congregants were not found to be the most 
active in community civic engagement. Instead Pentecostal congregants, particularly the 
“traditional” types, were the most engaged in helping the needy and even in social service 
volunteering in the community. In fact, Evangelical congregants where also found to be 
more active in their communities than their Catholic and Mainline brothers and sisters. 
Similar to what was found for within church engagement, Pentecostal churches (in this 
case the “progressive” types) lead the way in community engagement, followed by 
Evangelical and Mainline ones. Catholic churches lag considerably behind at this level of 
engagement.     
 At the third level of civic engagement, societal engagement, both “progressive” 
and Catholic congregations lead the way. Mainline Protestant churches show an active 
participation by their congregants but a disappointing one by their pastors (at least as it 
relates to voting). With the exception of voting, both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” 
Pentecostal churches showed significant disengagement. Evangelical churches joined 
them in that disengagement particularly as reflected by the pastor’s low voting turnout 
and the congregant’s low involvement in political party activities (both were the lowest 
of all Latino congregants and pastors).  
 In summary, the analysis of the civic engagement among Latino churches in 
Chicago, their pastors, and congregants shows that Pentecostal churches are extremely 
engaged in their congregations (more than any other church) and are also actively 
engaged in their communities—less so than within the walls of the church. When it 
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comes to the societal realm, however, only the “progressive” types are very engaged; in 
fact, along with Catholic parishes, “progressive” Pentecostal congregations are the most 
engaged politically of all Latino congregations in Chicago. Both “neo-conservative” and 
“traditional” Pentecostal churches along with their Evangelical counterparts were the 
least engaged politically of all congregations.  
 Evangelical churches were found to be very engaged within their congregation, 
less so than Pentecostal ones, and also fairly engaged in their communities—also less so 
than their Pentecostal counterparts but more so than Mainline and Catholic churches. 
Along with “neo-conservative” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches, they were also 
found to be the most politically disengaged of all Latino churches. 
 With the exception of the political activism of Mainline Protestant congregants, 
Mainline Protestant churches were found to be not as engaged in their congregations and 
in their communities in comparison to churches of other Latino religious traditions. In 
fact, they lagged behind Evangelical churches at both levels. In political engagement 
(against expectations), Mainline Protestant pastors also lagged behind both “progressive” 
Pentecostal and Catholic pastors. This study shows that Latino Mainline Protestant 
churches in Chicago are certainly not the leaders of the Latino religious landscape when 
it comes to civic engagement behavior (including the three levels of engagement). 
 Catholic congregations, with the noted exception of congregant community 
voluntarism, were not found to be as engaged within their congregations and in their 
communities as their Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts. However, they led, along 
with “progressive” Pentecostals, in political engagement—both pastors and their 
congregants showed a very dynamic engagement.  
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If the perspective is advanced that community voluntarism and political 
engagement is the true civic engagement (as many researchers have done in the past), 
then Latino Catholics, “progressive” Pentecostals, and Mainliners are without a doubt the 
leaders in civic engagement. However, if all levels of engagement are included in the 
equation, then Latino Pentecostals, particularly the “progressive” and “traditional” types 
are the leaders. As I have argued before, the study of civic engagement, particularly in the 
Latino religious context, must include all levels of engagement—within the church, in the 
community, and in wider society. They are all important in causing change, and in 
engaging individuals to address issues that are individually and communally relevant. 
Pentecostal versus Evangelical 
 In the U.S., Pentecostalism is generally lumped under the category of 
Evangelicalism and very little research is conducted to study it separate from and in 
comparison to other faith traditions (see Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 
2006, 2008 for some exceptions). I have argued in this dissertation, however, that in the 
Latino context Pentecostals need to be studied separately from Evangelicals for a couple 
of important reasons. First, Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are a lot 
more numerous than Evangelical ones and exert a lot of influence over them—we found 
64 percent more Pentecostal than Evangelical Latino churches in Chicago (Center for the 
Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 14). Second, the majority of Latino Evangelical 
churches is affiliated with American denominations and is, consequently, directly 
influenced by the U.S. Evangelical movement. That is not the case with Latino 
Pentecostal congregations, which are quickly experiencing a trend towards 
denominational independence or at worst are affiliated with Latin American or U.S. 
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Latino denominations (“concilios"). In other words, in the Latino context the separation 
of Pentecostals and Evangelicals for the purpose of understanding is not a nicety but a 
research necessity.  
 Although some similarities between Latino Evangelicals and “neo-conservative” 
Pentecostals have been documented in this dissertation, significant differences exist when 
Evangelicals are compared to other types of Pentecostal congregants. Whereas Latino 
Pentecostal congregants and pastors (with the exception of the “neo-conservative” types) 
are strong supporters of the Democratic Party, this is not necessarily the case among 
Latino Evangelicals. That is, it is true that the majority of Evangelical congregants 
affiliate with the Democratic Party, but their pastors along with “neo-conservative” 
Pentecostals are the only ones among all Latino pastors in Chicago to mainly vote for the 
Republican Party.   
 In other words, although there are some similarities between Latino Evangelicals 
and Pentecostals, particularly with the “neo-conservative” types, there are also significant 
differences mainly as regards their social and political perspectives and civic engagement 
in wider society.  
In fact, Latino Evangelicals are as conservative or even more so than their white 
Evangelical counterparts. According to Pew, while 59 percent of white Evangelicals 
voted for the Republican candidate in the presidential election of 2000, this dissertation 
found that 55 percent of Latino Evangelical pastors did so (Pew Research Center, 2008). 
There is, however, a large difference in political affiliation between Latino and white 
Evangelicals. While 28 percent of white Evangelicals affiliated with the Democratic 
Party in 2004, this dissertation found that 66 percent of Latino Evangelical congregants 
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did so (Pew Research Center, 2008). When it comes to abortion, Latino Evangelical 
congregants are definitely more conservative than their white counterparts. Whereas 19 
percent of white Evangelicals believe that abortion should be illegal in all cases, this 
dissertation found that 68 percent of Latino Evangelical congregants believe that it is 
never acceptable (Pew Research Center, 2008). This is certainly an imperfect comparison 
because Latino Evangelical pastors and congregants are being compared to white 
Evangelicals in general.   
 In the end, it is very important to separate Latino Evangelicals and Pentecostals 
for the sake of research. Although Latino Evangelicals have some similarities with 
Pentecostals (moral issues, for instance), particularly with the “neo-conservative” types, 
they also have significant differences in social and political views and civic engagement 
behavior—mainly with the “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal types.    
Summary and Conclusion  
In summary, it is very clear that the Latino religious landscape of Chicago has 
radically changed and with it the involvement of churches in the public arena. 
“Progressive” Pentecostal churches now compete with Catholic parishes for political 
influence and Pentecostal congregations, in general, lead in all levels of civic 
engagement. Even though “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches are 
very active within their congregations and in the surrounding communities, they are less 
so in wider society (particularly the “neo-conservative” and “traditional” types). 
Evangelical churches also have significant influence in the new landscape of Latino 
religion. Even when they are very involved within the church and in their communities, 
they lack very active involvement in wider society. Surprisingly, Mainline Protestant 
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congregations, even when fairly engaged at all levels, are not the civic engagement 
leaders of the Latino religious landscape. Finally, although their congregants and pastors 
are not as involved within the walls of their churches and in their communities, Catholic 
parishes share the leadership in political engagement along with their “progressive” 
Pentecostal counterparts.   
One thing is certain of Latino churches in Chicago: the majority of the 
congregations and their congregants are actively involved at all levels of civic 
engagement with varying degrees of focus and intensity for the different religious 
traditions. All Latino churches and their congregants demonstrate a commitment to 
progressive social and political perspectives with some exceptions such as the 
conservative politics of “neo-conservative” and Evangelical pastors. However, Latinos 
pastors and their congregants are a very religious bunch, particularly the Pentecostal and 
Evangelical ones, and have strong moral convictions. It is without a doubt a fascinating 
duality.    
I proposed early on in this dissertation that a new category, moderate, was needed 
to be included in the dominant liberal versus conservative religion paradigm that has been 
used extensively in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Smidt, 2003; Wuthnow, 1999, 
2004).  I think the results of this dissertation point to the fact that a person can be very 
religious, the way a significant portion of Latinos were found to be, and still be socially 
and politically progressive. Although the study found that Latinos are, in general, social 
and political progressives, it is undeniable that they are also very religious and staunch 
moral conservatives. Does having a conservative morality make you a conservative when 
you consistently believe and behave as a social and political progressive? The fact is that 
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Latinos, particularly the Pentecostal and Evangelical types, are presently categorized as 
conservatives when in fact, with a few exceptions, they have been documented to be 
social and political progressives that happen to be religious and who possess a 
conservative morality. At the very least, when all their beliefs and practices are looked at, 
Latinos (congregants and pastors) are moderates, but certainly not conservatives.  
Given the low levels of education, financial resources, and class status (the 
majority are poor or working class) among “traditional” Pentecostals, it is really 
surprising how engaged they are at all levels civic engagement. In fact, in many areas of 
engagement, particularly in within the church and in the community categories, 
“traditional” Pentecostals are the most active, and are not that far behind their 
“progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic counterparts in wider society engagement.    
The analysis in this chapter also confirms the pastor-sheep gap that was observed 
in chapter four, except this time it was documented among all Latino religious traditions.  
“Progressive” Pentecostal pastors continue to outpace their congregants in wider society 
engagement and politics and in several social and political views. At the same time, 
Evangelical and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors are more conservative politically 
than their congregants and even in some key social and political issues. 
Finally, the separation of Evangelicals and Pentecostals for the sake of analysis 
has been a fruitful one. The data shows that although Latino Evangelical congregants are 
similar to their Pentecostal cousins in a variety of areas, particularly in their demographic 
characteristics, religiosity, and some social and political beliefs, they are also very 
different in other areas. Latino Evangelical congregants are different than Pentecostal 
ones in their political behavior and their engagement in wider society; they are 
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particularly so in comparison to the “progressive” Pentecostal types. This is surprising 
given the high levels of education reported by the Evangelical pastors in comparison to 
the very low levels reported by their “traditional” Pentecostal colleagues.                    
In chapter seven, the conclusion, I will summarize the main arguments and 
contributions of this dissertation. I will then outline and discuss the implications of my 
findings for the study of religion and civic engagement, but more importantly for the 
study of Pentecostalism and civic engagement. I will then discuss several key questions 
that still need answering and propose future research.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary  
 I engaged in this project with the ultimate objective of shedding light on 
Pentecostalism, which is a huge and growing religious movement that has traveled to 
even the least known corners of the world. As a sociologist, I am very interested in the 
empowerment of the poor and disfranchised around the world, but particularly of those 
that make the urban setting their home. Given Pentecostalism’s origin among racial 
minorities, immigrants, women, and the disfranchised in Los Angeles, California, over 
one hundred years ago, I have spent almost a decade trying to understand if this 
movement and its ethos are a facilitator or an inhibitor (a type of “opium of the people”) 
of social and political empowerment.      
Even though Pentecostalism originated in the United States, it has received scant 
research attention in this country. The fact is that until recently, with some exceptions, 
Pentecostalism had not also received a lot of attention around the world even when it was 
estimated that its followers were counted in the hundreds of millions. It was not until 
2006 when the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life published its global, ten-country, 
study of Pentecostalism that a comparative in-depth look of the movement was even 
possible.  
Despite the fact that the United States was included as one of the countries 
analyzed by the 2006 Pew report, the Pentecostal movement was studied as a monolithic 
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movement and no differentiation was made about its internal diversity particularly as it 
relates to different expressions that result from the lived experiences of multiple racial 
and ethnic groups. Given the humble origins of Pentecostalism and its prevalence among 
Latino immigrants, the focus of this dissertation is Latino Pentecostalism and its 
intersection with civic engagement. Is Pentecostalism a facilitator or an inhibitor of civic 
engagement for U.S. Latinos, who, along with African Americans, are one of the most 
disadvantaged groups in American society?  
 Given the conclusions of recent research (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 
2007), I argue in this dissertation that there are different strands of U.S. Latino 
Pentecostalism that see their role in the world differently and that this ultimately results 
in varying emphasis and modes of civic engagement behavior for both churches and their 
congregants. That is, while some Pentecostal churches and their congregants may be 
conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, others, in fact, may be progressive 
outward-looking, and thisworldly—with the possibility of other options along this 
continuum.       
 In order to answer the research questions of this dissertation and to test its thesis, I 
used the Chicago Latino Congregations Study data collected from 2003 to 2007 by the 
Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame. This data set 
contains the most comprehensive data ever collected on U.S. Latino Pentecostal 
churches, pastors, and congregants. Because the study included all major Latino faith 
traditions in Chicago, it allows an in-depth comparative analysis of Latino churches and 
their congregants. I used cluster analysis, logistic regression, cross tabulations, and 
comparisons of means to analyze the quantitative data. Due to the fact that the Chicago 
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Latino Congregations Study used a mixed methods approach, qualitative data on several 
case study congregations and their congregants was also collected and analyzed. As a 
result, this dissertation is primarily quantitative in nature, but it also uses qualitative data 
for depth and detail to complement the larger patterns observed through the quantitative 
analysis.  
In order to understand the intersection of Latino Pentecostalism and civic 
engagement, a typology of Pentecostal congregations and one of civic engagement were 
developed. I originally hypothesized that there were three different types of Pentecostal 
congregations—“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist”—but the research results 
besides confirming the existence of two of the types also showed that instead of an 
“activist” type a “neo-conservative” type existed. These three types of congregations 
were then analyzed in relation to the three levels of engagement that were part of the 
civic engagement typology I developed—within church (Level 1), in community (Level 
2), and in wider society (Level 3). Each of the levels was operationalized through the use 
of several variables that went from church membership and leadership role to voting and 
participation in political party activities. The analysis included congregant, pastor, and 
church variables.  
Once the typologies had been developed, several models were developed and 
tested using logistic regression analysis. The objective was to identify the factors that 
contribute to different modes of congregant civic engagement. In the end, the civic 
engagement behavior of the different types of Pentecostal congregations, their pastors 
and congregants, was compared to that of Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, and Catholic 
churches. The goal was to find out how the civic engagement behavior observed of the 
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different types of Pentecostal churches and their congregants compared to that of other 
Latino faith traditions. 
 The data showed that “traditional” Pentecostal congregations (the quintessential 
classical churches), although declining, still command the largest portion of the Latino 
Pentecostal landscape in Chicago with 45 percent of the churches. They are followed by 
the newly emerged and dynamically growing “neo-conservative” churches with 39 
percent of all Latino Pentecostal churches. Finally, “progressive” congregations, with 16 
percent of all churches, are also new arrivals and aggressively growing, but they are 
different than their other Pentecostal brethren.        
 Although it was hypothesized that “traditional” congregations would be the most 
conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly and as such the least engaged in 
community and wider society, this research results outright disproved it. Instead it was 
found that “traditional” churches are surprisingly socially and politically progressive, 
enjoy very dynamic engagement within the walls of their churches, are very actively 
engaged in their surrounding communities, and even rival for leadership in wider society 
civic engagement. In fact, “traditional” Pentecostal congregations were leaders of Level 1 
and Level 2 civic engagement (their pastors, however, were documented to be the least 
engaged in the community), and they provided both the most and the richest opportunities 
of all Latino churches for the development and practice of civic and administrative skills.  
The majority of “traditional” Pentecostal church pastors and congregants affiliate 
with the Democratic Party, vote for democratic candidates, and hold very progressive 
social and political perspectives. The “traditional” Pentecostal church is the unapologetic 
Latino immigrant church with the highest percentage of undocumented immigrants and 
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the largest concentration of the poor and the very poor (of all Chicago Latino churches) 
of the Latino community.  
What is even more puzzling, at least in comparison to white Pentecostals, is that 
besides being very progressive, the “traditional” Pentecostal church is, by every measure 
used, the most religious and morally conservative of all Latino Pentecostal and all Latino 
churches in Chicago. Bluntly stated, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants and their 
pastors embody both some of the most progressive and some of the most conservative 
perspectives known in American religion.  
 Although “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches and their congregants were 
hypothesized to be moderates in their religious, social and political views and to be 
actively engaged within the church and in the community and less so in wider society, 
they were found only partially to live up to those expectations. They were, however, 
found to be very religious, very morally conservative (just like all other Pentecostals), 
more integrated to U.S. society than their “traditional” Pentecostal brethren, and 
comparatively less progressive in several social and political issues. “Neo-conservative” 
pastors (along with their Latino Evangelical colleagues) were documented to be the only 
Latino Pentecostal pastors who mainly voted for the Republican Party in a clear departure 
from even their own congregants. On the other hand, living up to expectations, “neo-
conservative” Pentecostals were active in all levels of civic engagement, but less so than 
their “traditional” brothers and sisters. These are very interesting findings due to the 
higher availability of human, educational, and financial resources these churches have at 
their disposal (they have the largest annual budgets of all Pentecostal churches) 
particularly in comparison to their “traditional” counterparts. There is no question that 
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“neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches are not the conservative churches white 
Pentecostal churches have been found to be (Greeley & Hout, 2006), but they are 
unequivocally the most conservative in the Latino Pentecostal landscape. In fact, their 
beliefs and practices resemble Latino Evangelical churches, which this dissertation found 
are the most politically conservative of all Latino churches in Chicago, and along with 
“neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches the overall most conservative Latino church in 
the city. 
 On the contrary, although “progressive” Pentecostal churches, along with their 
“neo-conservative” counterparts, are the most integrated into U.S. society, they are also 
the most progressive of all Pentecostals even surpassing both Mainline and Catholic 
churches on most issues. Even though they (and particularly the pastors) are the most 
supportive of the Democratic Party, they are also very religious and morally conservative. 
Their pastors and, to a lesser extent their congregants, have the highest levels of 
education of all Latino pastors and the highest annual household incomes (along with 
“neo-conservative” ones) of all Latino congregants. Yet, their congregations are smaller 
and with fewer financial resources than their “neo-conservative” brethren. Even with size 
and financial limitations, “progressive” churches experience dynamic within church 
engagement and are actively involved in the community, albeit at lower levels than their 
“traditional” counterparts, particularly if informal engagement is emphasized. 
“Progressive” congregations do offer the largest number of formal programs and services 
for congregants and community members of all Latino Pentecostal churches. Of the 
different types of Pentecostal churches, the “progressive” congregations lead in wider 
society engagement and share with Mainline Protestant churches and Catholic parishes 
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leadership in this area. Although their congregants, along with all other Pentecostals, are 
extremely religious and morally conservative, “progressive” Pentecostal pastors are less 
morally conservative than their members, which resulted in a wide pastor-sheep gap.  
 Because qualitative research shows that the majority of “neo-conservative” and 
“progressive” Pentecostal congregations evolved from “traditional” ones, several 
questions beg for answers. Will “neo-conservative” churches eventually evolve into 
“progressive” types, or will they consolidate themselves as the conservative Pentecostal 
type in line with their conservative white Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts? Will 
“progressive” congregations become “activist” types—actively engaging the oppressive 
social structures of society in search of social justice—or will they remain the same? 
Given the proliferation of prosperity theology among some of the “progressive” 
Pentecostal churches, is it possible that many will become conservative and abandon their 
progressive ways? More important, will “traditional” congregations remain as an 
important force in the Latino Pentecostal landscape? Will they develop the ability and 
vision to more actively and directly engage social structures given the fact that they are 
not the ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly churches they were 
hypothesized to be? 
 Even more important, for the sake of this study, is whether the typologies of 
Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement I developed for this dissertation proved 
to be useful in understanding the reality of Chicago Latino Pentecostals and their civic 
engagement behavior. I would argue that the use of the typologies produced fresh and 
important knowledge about Latino Pentecostals and that this will contribute to our poor 
understanding of this seriously understudied branch of Christianity.  
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In fact, the use of these typologies resulted in the identification of similarities and 
differences among Latino Pentecostals. That is, whereas “traditional” churches are the 
refuge of recent Latino immigrants (including the undocumented) and the truly 
disadvantaged of the Latino barrios, their “progressive” counterparts are the home of the 
more educated and emerging middle classes of the Latino community. The typologies 
and the results they produced were particularly instrumental in conducting 
comprehensive comparisons between the identified types of Pentecostal congregations 
with those of all other Latino faith traditions.            
Shortcomings 
 Even when the data collected by the Latino Congregations Study produced the 
most complete data sets of Latino congregations in the country (containing in-depth 
information of all Latino faith traditions), it was not uniformly collected at all churches. 
There were differences in the rate of success between Catholic and Protestant 
congregations. The pastor data was collected successfully and uniformly for all faith 
traditions, but that was not the case with congregant data. The issue is not one of 
excessive missing data among Catholic congregants, but of congregant response rates. 
Unlike Protestant churches where close to a census of the congregants present when the 
data was collected was achieved, at Catholic parishes (because of logistical reasons that 
result from having multiple masses one right after the other) small percentages of the 
parishioners at the mass filled the surveys out.  
 Consequently, one must be careful in comparing Catholic congregants with their 
counterparts in the other Latino faith traditions. The Catholic congregants that completed 
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the survey are not fully representative of congregants in that church making it hard to 
generalize about that parish let alone about Latino Catholic congregants in general.  
 Also, the Chicago Latino Congregations Study focused on congregants and their 
pastors in Chicago; as a result, it is not possible to generalize about all Latino 
Pentecostals or Evangelicals, for instance. Instead the results can only be generalized to 
Chicago Latino churches, their congregants and pastors. Then too, by using a 
convenience sample of congregants, the results may be biased toward attendees.  
As important is also the fact that the Chicago Latino Congregations Study did not 
target the whole Chicago metropolitan area, but instead it focused on Chicago and a 
couple of adjacent suburbs (Cicero and Berwyn). This may bias the results in favor of the 
Democratic Party given the high affiliation rates, particularly among minority groups, 
this party enjoys in the city—for instance, in Chicago, Puerto Ricans tend to generally 
affiliate to the Democratic Party.   
 Finally an issue that was not predicted in research design but that became relevant 
in the data analysis phase of this study relates to the fact that an increasing number of 
Latino Pentecostal congregations join U.S. non Pentecostal denominations (the Swedish 
Evangelical Covenant Church, for instance) in search of stability and resources but 
remain Pentecostal churches. Those congregations, in practice and through the pastor’s 
self-definition, are Pentecostal, but because they are affiliated with non-Pentecostal 
denominations were coded as Evangelical churches. Because the recoding of churches 
was done manually following a tedious process, I am not completely sure that all 
Pentecostal congregations in the sample were properly coded. 
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Future research must adequately tease out those details to prevent, among Latinos, 
an undercounting of Pentecostal congregations and an over counting of other faith 
traditions. Besides congregant and pastor self-identification as Pentecostals, I recommend 
the inclusion of a battery of questions that test the central Pentecostal beliefs and 
practices (speaking in tongues, healing, the active role of Holy Spirit in the daily life of 
the individual, and others).    
Implications 
 This study has implications not just for the sociology of religion and the particular 
study of Pentecostalism, but also for the understanding of the dynamics at play in the 
social and political empowerment of the most disadvantaged in society. First, this study, 
against my own predictions, documented that “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches 
are not the ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly fundamentalists many 
people may believe them to be as a result of research among some Pentecostals (Greeley 
& Hout, 2006; Wood, 1994). With the noted exceptions of their intense religiosity and 
ultra conservative morality (which is similar for all Latino Pentecostal churches), 
“traditional” Pentecostal churches and their congregants are actually very progressive in 
almost all social and political areas. They definitely do not vote Republican simply 
because of the abortion and gay rights issues as is the case with many Conservative 
Protestants in the U.S. Instead they show a pragmatism that reflects their daily social 
reality as immigrants, minorities, and the disfranchised, and/or in line with their Latin 
American origins (keeping in mind that Latin America in the last ten years has decisively 
gone to the political left).  
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Because the “traditional” Pentecostal church attracts and serves the most 
disadvantaged of the Latino community and offers them opportunities for the 
development and practice of civic and administrative skills, it is certainly the church that 
empowers the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. Unfortunately, the 
“traditional” Pentecostal church is quickly declining and has even lost the leadership 
position it once commanded in the Latino Pentecostal landscape of Chicago. If the 
decline continues, the empowerment of the poor and disfranchised of the urban Latino 
community may significantly suffer.   
 This study also found that there are indeed different types of Latino Pentecostal 
congregations, but the main difference between the types of churches is the pastors more 
than the congregants. Whereas “progressive” church pastors are a lot more liberal than 
their sheep, “neo-conservative” pastors are generally more conservative than theirs. 
Either way the pastor makes the difference. It is important, therefore, to seriously study 
pastors and the role they play in the development of Pentecostal congregations 
particularly as it relates to civic engagement.  
 Also, “progressive” Pentecostal churches are on the vanguard of civic 
engagement in wider society competing with Catholic parishes and Mainline churches for 
leadership in that area. Yet they are also less and less the refuge of the truly 
disadvantaged. They are, instead, quickly becoming the home of the upwardly mobile of 
the Latino community. In addition their social and political commitments may be 
compromised by the growing influence of prosperity theology and its embrace of 
individualism and materialism—hardly the core values of Christian leftists. Some of the 
qualitative research results seem to indicate that some of the “progressive” churches are 
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already exhibiting a desire to confront the oppressive social structures of society, to 
become “activist” congregations. What is really telling, however, is the fact that while 
“progressive” Pentecostal churches may have chosen the cause of the poor and 
oppressed, the poor and oppressed have, instead, chosen “traditional” churches. As 
“progressive” Pentecostal congregations continue on their civic engagement journey, they 
will need to also look internally, in critical ways, and see how they can be more effective 
at attracting and retaining those they have chosen to defend.    
What is truly perplexing is not that “traditional” Pentecostal churches are not what 
they were hypothesized to be, but that they have given birth to a new type of 
congregation, the “neo-conservative” church, that is less progressive than its progenitor.  
This has and will continue to produce a significant rearrangement of the Latino 
Pentecostal landscape of Chicago with important consequences socially and politically 
for the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. This certainly requires further 
research. “Neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors have the lowest rate of higher education 
(B.A. degree or more) of all Latino pastors in Chicago. As they become more educated, 
will they become more progressive? Some of the qualitative research results seem to 
indicate that instead of looking for educational opportunities at conservative seminaries, 
some of the “neo-conservative” pastors are starting to look at liberal seminaries which are 
institutions that are more accepting of “Pentecostals just as they are,” as one 
“progressive” church pastor who attended a liberal Mainline seminary put it.   
The data seem to indicate that instead of modeling themselves after the Black 
churches (characterized by intense religiosity, moral conservatism, and liberal social and 
political perspectives) next door, Latino “neo-conservative” churches are looking at white 
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suburban churches for models. That is, it seems that as many Latino Pentecostals 
assimilate to American culture, they also assimilate to white Evangelicalism and 
Pentecostalism at the expense of their own unique Pentecostal traditions and practice. 
More important of all, many (particularly the pastors) seem to acculturate to the 
Conservative Protestant establishment at the expense of their predecessors’ social and 
political commitments.     
In general, the findings of this study seem to suggest that Pentecostal 
congregations, with some variations among the different types, are not inhibitors of civic 
engagement. In fact, judging from the pastors’ encouragement of their members to get 
involved in the community and politics, and the civic engagement behavior of both 
congregants and their pastors, Pentecostal congregations operate as facilitators of civic 
engagement with some types being more effective at it than others. Even more, 
Pentecostal congregations, with some variation, do not seem to be a factor contributing to 
the making of their congregants into overall conservative Christians. The fact is that at 
present the majority of Latino Pentecostals in Chicago (with the exception of “neo-
conservative” pastors) supports the Democratic Party and hold very progressive social 
and political stances with the already noted exception of their moral conservative 
perspectives. Where Latino Pentecostals will go from here, particularly the “neo-
conservative” and “progressive” types, is a research question for a future project. 
It is not Latino Mainline churches, as some might have expected, that lead in civic 
engagement in the Latino context. Instead, when all civic engagement behaviors are 
considered, both “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal congregations lead all Latino 
churches in Chicago. At the societal level, “progressive” Pentecostal, Mainline 
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Protestant, and Catholic churches lead while both “progressive” and “traditional” 
Pentecostal churches lead at the community level. In terms of within church engagement, 
it is clear that “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches lead all Latino 
churches in Chicago closely followed by their “progressive” Pentecostal and Evangelical 
counterparts.     
Latino Evangelical churches were, on the other hand, found to be the most 
conservative of all Latino churches and the least engaged in society along with their 
“neo-conservative” Pentecostal counterparts. They were, in fact, found to mirror several 
of the conservative white Evangelical church features. This clearly indicates that at least 
in the Latino context, and even in the U.S. religious context, the separation of 
Pentecostals and Evangelicals for the sake of research may actually be a necessity and not 
a nicety.     
Future Research 
 This research project’s results can only be generalized to Latino Pentecostal 
churches and their congregants in Chicago. However, how much of the framework 
developed can be used to study other Pentecostal groups around the country and the 
world? Will similar results be obtained if this framework is applied to study African 
American and white Pentecostal churches in urban versus rural areas?  
 This dissertation sheds light on only a few aspects of the civic engagement 
behavior of Latino Pentecostals, but a lot more research is needed to understand the 
theological and social mind set of the different types of Pentecostals and how that affects 
their views of the world, and their responsibility to themselves, their families, their 
surrounding communities and their society. The qualitative research conducted among 
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the representative case study congregations seemed to hint that while “progressive” 
congregations, particularly their pastors, displayed a humanistic perspective of life and 
their role in society, “traditional” churches had a spiritualistic perspective. Whereas 
“progressive” pastors and even their congregants seemed to believe, as reflected by their 
discourse, that it is human beings that cause problems and fix them with the help of God, 
their “traditional” brothers believed that it is angels and demons that influence people to 
do what they do and God, after defeating the devil and his evil soldiers, fixes it—mainly 
supernaturally and sometimes through the use of his anointed. Research may show that 
both of these mind sets are operational at the same time, but certain types of Pentecostals 
emphasize one more than the other at a given time or place.   
 A lot more research is also needed to understand if and how Pentecostals actually 
transfer the civic skills and administrative experience they obtain in church to their 
families, communities, and wider society. Are they better able to manage their homes and 
finances? Are they better able to compete for promotions at work? Are they more likely 
to join in local organizations and pressure groups to address the problems that affect their 
communities?  
 Also, more research, particularly the longitudinal type, is needed to track the 
evolutionary trajectories, through time, of Latino Pentecostal congregations. The fact that 
the majority of “non- traditional” churches originated from “traditional” ones really hints 
at a very dynamic evolutionary process among Latino Pentecostal churches. 
Understanding what triggers the evolutionary process and the factors that contribute to a 
congregation becoming “progressive” versus “neo-conservative” (the education of the 
congregants and/or of the pastor, for instance) are important.  
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 Although the social capital theoretical framework and the literature on religion 
and civic engagement, particularly the work of Wuthnow (1999, 2004), Loveland (2005), 
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999), Schwadel (2002, 2005), Smidt (2003), Cnaan 
(2002), and Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), was very helpful in understanding 
the intricacies of the role religion plays in civic engagement, some important issues need 
addressing. While some work places a lot of importance on the individual’s participation 
in civic organizations, very little attention is paid to within congregation engagement, and 
the role churches, but particularly pastors, play in influencing the civic engagement 
behavior of their congregants. Given the importance of the Pentecostal pastor within the 
congregation, a lot more research is needed to understand how and why these pastors lead 
Latino Pentecostal congregations in different trajectories as congregations (“traditional,” 
“neo-conservative,” or “progressive”) and in their civic engagement practices. As 
important is finding out how church pastors affect their congregants as they engage 
within and beyond the walls of the church. 
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Adult Focus Group Interview Schedule 
General Questions about Church Life, Community Ministry, Labor Issues, and 
Religious Identity 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Your church is one of four congregations that have been selected to 
be studied in depth. This is a conversation in which we would like everyone to 
participate. There is no right or wrong answer.  We simply want to know your feelings, 
beliefs, and opinions about different aspects of your congregation.  What you say in 
this conversation is confidential.  No one will ever be able to connect your answers to 
your name.  We will be recording the conversation.  We need you to sign the consent 
form before we begin.  We expect our conversation with you today to take 
approximately XXXX.  Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
 
[Instructions for Interviewers: Please make sure to ask the “probe” 
questions.  Many times people will have other comments, so we want to 
elicit information about these areas as well] 
 
I.  Religious and Spiritual Life: Individual Practices and Communal Norms 
 
1) Think about the first time you came to this church. What attracted you most to 
this church?  Be specific. Probe: Did a family member or friend invite you? 
Describe for us your very first visit to this church.  What still attracts you most 
to this church? 
 
2) This church has been growing in numbers in recent years.  From your perspective 
what are the key reasons for this growth? Probe: What role do pastors, key 
leaders, programming, warm/friendly culture play in this growth?  Do you do 
things with other churches, support their ministries? 
 
3) From your perspective, what are the greatest challenges that parents face in 
supporting the development of their children’s faith? Probe: Be specific - how 
does your church help people in dealing with the needs of their children?  Does 
the church have programs or initiatives that help to support the development of 
children or adolescents’ faith?   
 
II. Civic/Community Engagement: The Collective Story of the Church’s Work 
in the Community 
 
4) What do you think is the most important way in which your church serves the 
local community? What social issues does the church engage? [Note to 
Interviewers: we are talking about programs that mostly serve people outside 
of the church.] Probe: How does the church address this issue? In what way 
are you involved in any ministries or programs that serve the community? What 
do you do?  What does it mean to you to be involved in this way?  
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5) Is getting the church involved in social service ministry an important 
mission/value of your church?  [For interviewer: Wait for answer and 
discussion, then ask] If so, how is this made evident to the members? Probe: 
Through preaching, teaching, key lay-leaders, etc.? 
 
6) What types of things do you do as a church to minister to families in need? Probe: 
From your perspective how well is your church ministering to their needs?  Has 
this church ever helped you or your immediate family with any type of 
assistance (housing, cash assistance, counseling)? 
 
7) How does your church work with other churches or other community 
organizations when doing community outreach and ministry?  [For Interviewer: 
Don’t cut off discussion] Probe: With whom do you work most closely?  Do you 
ever work with non-religious groups? Why or why not?  Do you work with 
churches outside of your tradition?  What have you done?  Do you work with 
non-Latino churches?  Why or why not?  
 
8) Do you in any way volunteer with a community organization outside of your 
church? If so, how are you involved? Probe: Do you volunteer as an individual 
or with other people from your church? Does your pastor or others at the 
church encourage you to be involved in volunteering outside of the church?     
 
III. Labor Issues:    
Now, we’d like to talk to you more specifically about how your church has helped people 
with work related issues.   
 
9) Have you or anyone you have known been helped, through your church (or 
through a member of the church) to find a job?  If yes, how were you/they 
helped?  
 Were you referred to another organization?   
 Is there an informal network of people who help people in your church 
find jobs?  
Probe: Who helped them find the job? What did that person do? Referral? Introduced 
me to a business? Wrote a letter? Was it individual help or did they get help through a 
program? 
 
10) Have you helped someone from your church get a job? (If yes) Probe: Can you 
describe how you helped them—what specifically did you do for them to help 
them find a job? 
 
11) Does your church have a specific program or work with a specific organization 
(or send people to that organization) to help people find work or improve their job 
skills?  Probe: ask them to talk about the program and if they’ve been involved 
or someone they know has been involved in the program.  What was the 
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experience like? If there is no program, ask them about other churches or 
community groups that they might work with or refer people to when a job-
related issue arises – what does that group do?  How is the church involved with 
them? 
 
12) Does your pastor or priest ever talk about labor issues during mass or other 
worship services?  [For Interviewer: If not specifically, do religious leaders at 
the church ever mention work in the context of discussions about 
immigration?] Probe: does your minister ever mention the importance of good 
working conditions or fair wages?  Does your pastor encourage getting involved 
politically to address a work-related issue?  If your pastor doesn’t say anything 
publicly, have you had private conversations with him/her about this issue? 
 
13) Are you or anyone you know at your church involved with a union?  Probe: In 
your opinion, does the church support members’ involvement in unions?   
 
14)  Have you ever approached your pastor/priest or someone at church because of a 
work-related issue?  Probe: If so, who did you approach? What was it about?  
What did that person do?  Were you referred to a community organization or 
other group that works on job-related issues?  
 
15) Is there anything that your church isn’t doing that you think they should do in 
terms of outreach to the community?  Probe: Why don’t you think there is any 
ministry right now addressing this issue? What is keeping the church from 
forming a ministry or program around this issue? How likely is it that the 
church would start a ministry like that?   
 
IV. Religious Identity:    
Now, we’d like to talk to you more specifically about your and your church’s religious 
identity. 
 
16) Religiously speaking, what faith tradition does this church belong to? Probe: Is it 
Pentecostal, Baptists, Methodist? Is it different than other Pentecostal churches 
and how?  Is it part of a denomination? Why or why not? Does it make a 
difference? 
 
17) With what faith tradition do you identify with (Pentecostal, Methodist)? Probe: 
Where you always…or have you changed in the last years? 
 
18) What is it to be Pentecostal, and are there different types of Pentecostalism? 
Probe: Do you know other Pentecostal that believe and practice faith 
differently?
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Field Note Guide for Observations at Latino Churches 
Name
: 
Date: 
Organization:  ____________________________________  
This information will help us to understand the life of Latino churches in Chicago. As 
you are conducting participant observation, any materials you might pick up at the site 
are relevant to include with your notes: brochures, bulletins, or religious booklets, etc. 
As you are participating in services and church activities, please keep in mind these areas 
and include them in your field notes if they are relevant to the particular activity that you 
are observing. 
1. Spatial Map 
A. Physical Structures 
 In what type of structure is the church housed (office building, school, church, retail 
space, old industrial facility)? 
 Is there more than one building related to/owned by this organization? 
 Did the main building used to be a church of another denomination? 
 Is there parking? How much space is allotted for cars? Is it zoned? 
 What is the arrangement of the church space (sanctuary upstairs, fellowship hall 
in basement, education classes in another building?)? 
 What is the condition of the building on the outside? What are indoor spaces like? 
(new, modem, freshly painted, multiple bathrooms)? 
 Are there other churches/organizations using the space? 
 Is the space conducive to the types of activities taking place (is there enough 
seating, is the sound system good, do they have space for multiple groups of 
people, such as children, the elderly, the disabled?)? Is there ample space in the 
reception/waiting areas? 
 What types of technology does the church have (large sound system, 
computers in church offices, multiple microphones?)? 
B. Aesthetics: Religious and Cultural Symbols 
 Are there religious symbols around the buildings (cross, banners, Virgen de 
Guadalupe)? 
 Are there cultural or national symbols in the space (Puerto Rican flag, etc.)? 
 Are the aesthetics reflective of the groups that use the space? That is, the choice 
of posters, paint, etc., --what does it say to people about who uses the space? Is it 
geared so that Latinos (or perhaps, more specifically, a particular group, such as 
Mexicans) feel that the programs or organizations value and welcome them? 
 Was there religious literature in the vestibule, fellowship hall, or other areas in the 
church (besides the sanctuary?)? What did the literature address? 
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 Were there any types of posters, brochures, or flyers hanging on the walls or 
scattered around the church? If yes, what topics did they address (HIV/AIDS 
posters, pamphlets on domestic violence, flyers for community protests, cultural 
festivals, etc.)? 
C. Neighborhood Context 
 Briefly describe the immediate neighborhood where the church is located (1-2 
block area) — socio-economic aspects, racial/ethnic composition, housing stock, 
green space, if any. 
 Is the building where the church is located visible and easily identifiable? 
 Is the building accessible to public transportation? 
 Are there other churches and/or community based organizations in the immediate 
proximity (1-2 blocks)? If identifiable, which faith communities and/or issues do 
they address (San Lucas Worker's Rights Center, Salon de Testigos de Jehova, 
etc.)? 
2. Social Map 
D. Approximate # of people in church at particular activity you are observing 
E. Demographic characteristics: Age, gender, race of participants 
F. How many different groups were at the site (children under 12, adolescents and 
young adults, middle-aged adults and the elderly)? Were there non-church 
members there or people from the community? 
G. Who appear to be the leaders (women, men, Latinos, Anglos, ages, etc.)? 
H. Does leadership appear to be shared? Are there multiple members of one family 
in leadership positions in the church? 
3. Temporal Map 
I. What activities were going on? 
J. What is the interaction between congregants like? (people interacting, talking, 
sitting alone, praying together, was there much physical contact? Crying? Quiet 
meditation, praying in tongues or praying out loud?)? 
K. Were there outside groups/people (non-church people) coming in and out of the 
space? 
L. What is the interaction like between leaders and congregants? Between men and 
women, young and old? Latinos and non-Latinos (if applicable)? 
M. What types of issues did the leaders and congregants discuss? What themes 
emerged in sermons, prayer meetings, youth groups, or other activities? 
N. What types of activities are going on in the street/sidewalk, immediately 
outside of the church? 
4. Pentecostal Practice  
O. What type of attire did they were or not wear (particularly the women)? (Pants, 
make-up, jewelry) 
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P. What are some of the Pentecostal religious practices evident through the event? 
(speaking in tongues, healing, etc.)   
Q. How were these particular Pentecostals similar or different than those of other 
churches you observed at? (discourse, religious symbols, music, etc.)
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Three survey instruments were used to collect the quantitative data used for this 
dissertation (see chapter three for more detail on the adult congregant survey, 
pastor/leader structured interview survey, and the pastor/leader take-home survey). The 
research team of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study designed all the instruments. 
Due to their length, they are not included as appendices to this dissertation. They are, 
however, available through the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University 
of Notre Dame Institute for Latino Studies. The center’s web site is 
http://latinostudies.nd.edu/cslr/ 
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Church Engagement: Odds of Church Membership vs. Attendance (N = 977) 
  
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
CLess than H.S./GED .143 .409 .726 1.154 
H.S. or GED .693 .396 .080 1.999 
Some College1 .338 .394 .391 1.402 
Female2 -.002 .232 .994 .998 
Age .015 .010 .112 1.016 
Less than $14,999  -.154 .426 .717 .857 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.078 .398 .845 .925 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .366 .485 .450 1.441 
U.S. Citizen  .551 .383 .150 1.735 
Legal Resident4 .374 .338 .269 1.453 
More or Only Spanish  -.440 .373 .239 .644 
Both Languages Equally5 -.675 .366 .065 .509 
Never Switched6 .027 .230 .906 1.027 
Not Married7 -.632 .238 .008 .532 
Mexican or Mexican American  .394 .377 .297 1.482 
Puerto Rican  .259 .382 .498 1.296 
Central American  .577 .427 .176 1.781 
South American8  -.359 .560 .522 .699 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 1.847 .286 .000 6.339 
Abortion10 -.172 .239 .471 .842 
Traditional Pentecostal  .159 .426 .708 1.173 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 .479 .381 .209 1.615 
Other Denomination .628 .333 .060 1.874 
American Denomination .982 .378 .009 2.670 
U.S. Latino Denomination 1.611 .458 .000 5.008 
Latin American Denomination12 1.186 .466 .011 3.273 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .019 .326 .952 1.020 
Constant -1.542 .867 .075 .214 
Negelkerke R Square = .210     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No.  
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Church Engagement: Taking Leadership Role (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED .069 .289 .812 1.071 
H.S. or GED .151 .272 .578 1.163 
Some College1 .153 .281 .587 1.165 
Female2 .102 .147 .486 1.108 
Age .012 .006 .053 1.012 
Less than $14,999  -.465 .279 .096 .628 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.197 .254 .437 .821 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .319 .305 .295 1.376 
U.S. Citizen  .013 .239 .956 1.013 
Legal Resident4 .051 .215 .811 1.053 
More or Only Spanish  -.547 .239 .022 .579 
Both Languages Equally5 -.133 .248 .591 .875 
Never Switched6 -.029 .146 .841 .971 
Not Married7 -.145 .161 .368 .865 
Mexican or Mexican American  -.382 .243 .115 .682 
Puerto Rican  .056 .263 .830 1.058 
Central American  -.334 .278 .230 .716 
South American8  -.512 .438 .243 .600 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 1.070 .258 .000 2.915 
Abortion10 -.136 .159 .392 .873 
Traditional Pentecostal  .303 .273 .267 1.354 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 -.142 .262 .587 .868 
Other Denomination .406 .247 .101 1.501 
American Denomination .325 .268 .226 1.384 
U.S. Latino Denomination -.029 .288 .921 .972 
Latin American Denomination12 .508 .300 .090 1.663 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .109 .209 .600 1.116 
Constant -.610 .608 .316 .543 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .095     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Church Engagement: Helping to Organize Events (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED .027 .353 .939 1.027 
H.S. or GED .013 .331 .968 1.013 
Some College1 .188 .344 .584 1.207 
Female2 -.268 .186 .149 .765 
Age .012 .008 .119 1.012 
Less than $14,999  -.997 .370 .007 .369 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.515 .349 .140 .598 
$35,000 to $49,9993 -.450 .393 .252 .637 
U.S. Citizen  .827 .312 .008 2.287 
Legal Resident4 .252 .266 .342 1.287 
More or Only Spanish  -.028 .288 .921 .972 
Both Languages Equally5 -.203 .291 .484 .816 
Never Switched6 .238 .179 .184 1.269 
Not Married7 -.149 .194 .442 .862 
Mexican or Mexican American  .117 .291 .689 1.124 
Puerto Rican  -.158 .307 .606 .854 
Central American  .451 .338 .182 1.569 
South American8  .068 .510 .894 1.070 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 1.483 .265 .000 4.406 
Abortion10 .212 .200 .291 1.236 
Traditional Pentecostal  .928 .321 .004 2.530 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 -.010 .306 .973 .990 
Other Denomination .157 .288 .586 1.170 
American Denomination -.325 .306 .288 .722 
U.S. Latino Denomination .187 .358 .601 1.206 
Latin American Denomination12 -.460 .354 .194 .631 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .068 .247 .783 1.071 
Constant -.734 .727 .313 .480 
 Nelgelkerke R. Square = .138     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Community Engagement: Volunteering Beyond the Church Walls (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -.499 .281 .076 .607 
H.S. or GED -.426 .262 .104 .653 
Some College1 -.499 .269 .064 .607 
Female2 -.183 .146 .209 .833 
Age .006 .006 .319 1.006 
Less than $14,999  .327 .273 .231 1.386 
$15,000 to $34,999 .114 .244 .641 1.121 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .112 .283 .692 1.119 
U.S. Citizen  -.006 .242 .979 .994 
Legal Resident4 -.126 .221 .568 .881 
More or Only Spanish  .320 .235 .173 1.378 
Both Languages Equally5 .860 .235 .000 2.362 
Never Switched6 -.194 .145 .183 .824 
Not Married7 -.134 .162 .408 .874 
Mexican or Mexican American  .330 .250 .187 1.391 
Puerto Rican  .340 .265 .199 1.405 
Central American  .159 .285 .576 1.173 
South American8  -.388 .494 .433 .679 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 .401 .279 .150 1.493 
Abortion10 .243 .157 .122 1.275 
Traditional Pentecostal  -.387 .270 .152 .679 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 -.102 .254 .688 .903 
Other Denomination .181 .242 .454 1.198 
American Denomination -.539 .278 .052 .583 
U.S. Latino Denomination .262 .288 .363 1.299 
Latin American Denomination12 -.020 .298 .945 .980 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .000 .205 .998 1.000 
Constant -1.138 .610 .062 .320 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .078     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Community Engagement: Helping the Needy (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -.362 .347 .297 .697 
H.S. or GED -.294 .328 .370 .746 
Some College1 -.264 .334 .429 .768 
Female2 -.118 .172 .493 .889 
Age .028 .008 .000 1.028 
Less than $14,999  -.478 .329 .146 .620 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.346 .301 .252 .708 
$35,000 to $49,9993 -.176 .346 .611 .839 
U.S. Citizen  .275 .287 .338 1.317 
Legal Resident4 .053 .254 .833 1.055 
More or Only Spanish  .507 .262 .054 1.660 
Both Languages Equally5 .376 .263 .152 1.457 
Never Switched6 -.116 .173 .500 .890 
Not Married7 .088 .187 .638 1.092 
Mexican or Mexican American  -.012 .285 .965 .988 
Puerto Rican  -.117 .300 .697 .890 
Central American  -.036 .319 .910 .964 
South American8  .063 .498 .900 1.065 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 .976 .263 .000 2.653 
Abortion10 .048 .186 .796 1.049 
Traditional Pentecostal  .062 .318 .845 1.064 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 .323 .298 .278 1.382 
Other Denomination -.372 .282 .187 .689 
American Denomination .247 .313 .431 1.280 
U.S. Latino Denomination .686 .360 .056 1.986 
Latin American Denomination12 -.085 .345 .806 .919 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 -.232 .227 .307 .793 
Constant -.540 .705 .444 .583 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .103     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Community Engagement: Helping Someone Find a Job (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -.649 .364 .075 .523 
H.S. or GED -.305 .348 .381 .737 
Some College1 -.317 .354 .371 .729 
Female2 -.439 .183 .016 .645 
Age .005 .007 .524 1.005 
Less than $14,999  -.051 .313 .871 .950 
$15,000 to $34,999 .489 .291 .093 1.630 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .498 .344 .148 1.646 
U.S. Citizen  -.028 .294 .924 .973 
Legal Resident4 .299 .273 .273 1.348 
More or Only Spanish  -.225 .275 .412 .798 
Both Languages Equally5 .249 .285 .382 1.283 
Never Switched6 -.053 .176 .764 .949 
Not Married7 .044 .195 .820 1.045 
Mexican or Mexican American  .121 .293 .680 1.128 
Puerto Rican  -.205 .303 .499 .815 
Central American  .372 .348 .286 1.450 
South American8  -.146 .496 .768 .864 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 .280 .292 .338 1.323 
Abortion10 -.033 .191 .864 .968 
Traditional Pentecostal  .269 .311 .387 1.308 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 .113 .299 .704 1.120 
Other Denomination .138 .286 .629 1.149 
American Denomination -.047 .307 .879 .954 
U.S. Latino Denomination -.163 .339 .629 .849 
Latin American Denomination12 -.137 .348 .694 .872 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 -.033 .244 .893 .968 
Constant 1.256 .714 .079 3.511 
 Nelgelkerke R. Square = .058     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Community Engagement: Lending Money to Non-Family Members (N = 977) 
 
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -.294 .321 .359 .745 
H.S. or GED -.046 .304 .879 .955 
Some College1 -.287 .309 .353 .751 
Female2 -.481 .166 .004 .618 
Age -.005 .007 .451 .995 
Less than $14,999  -.295 .296 .319 .745 
$15,000 to $34,999 .266 .273 .331 1.304 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .106 .313 .734 1.112 
U.S. Citizen  .106 .267 .692 1.112 
Legal Resident4 .183 .243 .451 1.201 
More or Only Spanish  -.062 .257 .809 .940 
Both Languages Equally5 .200 .263 .448 1.221 
Never Switched6 .327 .158 .038 1.387 
Not Married7 .110 .178 .535 1.117 
Mexican or Mexican American  .439 .263 .096 1.550 
Puerto Rican  -.105 .277 .705 .900 
Central American  .105 .298 .725 1.110 
South American8  .448 .497 .367 1.565 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 .014 .283 .960 1.014 
Abortion10 .061 .177 .730 1.063 
Traditional Pentecostal  -.257 .297 .387 .773 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 .113 .285 .691 1.120 
Other Denomination -.143 .267 .592 .867 
American Denomination .066 .297 .823 1.069 
U.S. Latino Denomination .050 .312 .873 1.051 
Latin American Denomination12 .018 .328 .957 1.018 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .266 .222 .231 1.305 
Constant 1.161 .658 .077 3.194 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .056     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 4 = Undocumented; 5= More of 
Only English; 6= Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= 
Other; 9 = No; 10 = No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Societal Engagement: Voting (N = 505—U.S. Citizen Congregants Only) 
  
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -1.040 .387 .007 .354 
H.S. or GED -.516 .345 .134 .597 
Some College1 -.091 .339 .789 .913 
Female2 -.150 .205 .465 .861 
Age .029 .009 .001 1.030 
Less than $14,999  .356 .350 .310 1.427 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.448 .290 .123 .639 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .162 .338 .632 1.176 
More or Only Spanish  -.560 .277 .043 .571 
Both Languages Equally5 -.032 .263 .904 .969 
Never Switched6 -.214 .204 .292 .807 
Not Married7 -.244 .224 .275 .783 
Mexican or Mexican American  .483 .392 .217 1.621 
Puerto Rican  .305 .357 .393 1.357 
Central American  .049 .453 .914 1.050 
South American8  .062 .656 .924 1.064 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 -.165 .371 .657 .848 
Abortion10 .103 .212 .629 1.108 
Traditional Pentecostal  .296 .341 .386 1.345 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 .176 .308 .568 1.193 
Other Denomination -.233 .292 .425 .792 
American Denomination .412 .336 .220 1.510 
U.S. Latino Denomination .423 .385 .273 1.526 
Latin American Denomination12 .432 .401 .281 1.540 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 .437 .263 .097 1.548 
Constant -.491 .768 .523 .612 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .138     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 5= More of Only English; 6= 
Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= Other; 9 = No; 10 
= No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No 
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Societal Engagement: Political Party Activities (N = 505—U.S. Citizen  
Congregants Only) 
  
Effects Coefficient (B) S. Error P-value Exp(B)
 Less than H.S./GED -.822 .529 .120 .440 
H.S. or GED -.574 .452 .204 .563 
Some College1 -.656 .424 .122 .519 
Female2 -.133 .295 .652 .876 
Age .020 .013 .122 1.020 
Less than $14,999  .355 .484 .464 1.426 
$15,000 to $34,999 -.214 .424 .614 .808 
$35,000 to $49,9993 .873 .434 .044 2.394 
More or Only Spanish  -1.726 .453 .000 .178 
Both Languages Equally5 -.185 .334 .580 .831 
Never Switched6 .426 .310 .170 1.531 
Not Married7 .061 .327 .853 1.063 
Mexican or Mexican American  .235 .541 .664 1.265 
Puerto Rican  .170 .482 .724 1.185 
Central American  .114 .668 .865 1.121 
South American8  -.204 1.191 .864 .815 
Attend Church Once/Week or + 9 -.333 .475 .483 .717 
Abortion10 .802 .290 .006 2.230 
Traditional Pentecostal  -.549 .459 .232 .577 
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal11 -.514 .450 .253 .598 
Other Denomination .103 .450 .820 1.108 
American Denomination 1.165 .470 .013 3.205 
U.S. Latino Denomination .858 .554 .121 2.359 
Latin American Denomination12 .040 .572 .944 1.041 
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More13 -.437 .417 .294 .646 
Constant -1.856 1.098 .091 .156 
 Negelkerke R. Square = .196     
1Reference = B.A. or more; 2 = Male; 3 = Over $50,000; 5= More of Only English; 6= 
Switched from Other Denomination; 7= Married or Living Together; 8= Other; 9 = No; 10 
= No; 11= Progressive Pentecostal; 12= Independent; 13= No
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